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1. Introduction 
Open-economy macroeconomics’ development has traditionally been related to the 
advancement in its closed-economy counterpart. Consequently, the evolution of models 
considering monetary policy in both fields resembles strong similarities. Under autarky, 
the IS-LM model was dominant during most of the postwar period. In an open 
environment, its extension, the Mundell-Fleming model, was the leading theoretical 
framework. The Mundell-Fleming model was developed by Fleming (1962) and Mundell 
(1963, 1964). Similarly to the IS-LM model, it is an ad hoc model.  The equilibrium 
relations are not derived from utility maximizing agents, but are constructed as an 
explanation of observed behavior of some aggregates. Lucas (1976) criticizes exactly 
such models in his famous critique. As he points out, such models cannot be used for 
forecasting or policy evaluation as they do not explicitly describe the decision process of 
the agents. Hence, they fail to capture the change in the estimated parameters, which is 
the result of the effect the change in policy has on agents’ behavior (see Lucas (1976), p. 
41). Indeed, several such shortcomings of the Mundell-Fleming model are described in 
the literature. For example, the capital account is specified as a flow function of the 
interest rate levels, which implies that capital flows uniformly forever, even if there is 
constant domestic-foreign interest rate differential (see Obstfeld (2000), p. 8). This is not 
reasonable if investors are rational and profit maximizing. However, this model’s 
combination of Keynesian pricing with international market segmentation made it, in 
practice, a good approximation and was widely used by policy makers (see Obstfeld 
(2000), p. 2).  
Nevertheless, international macroeconomists aimed at designing a model on sound 
microeconomic basis as Robert Lucas suggested in his critique. Similar to their closed-
economy colleagues, they focused on intertemporal dynamic optimization by the 
economic subjects. In both fields of macroeconomics, however, economists “assumed 
away the awkward reality of sticky prices” (see Obstfeld and Rogoff (1995), p. 624). In 
closed economy setting the Real Business Cycle models were developed. In international 
environment, models like Sachs (1981), a two-period model, and Obstfeld (1982), infinite 
planning period model, were designed. These open-economy models can be used to make 
predictions and to evaluate policies. However, they fail to explain some empirical 
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observations, e.g. the effect of policies on the exchange rates. This is primarily, because 
models with markets without frictions fail to explain most international finance issues 
(see Obstfeld and Rogoff (1995), p. 625).  
Logically, models that combine the two approaches were developed, the so-called 
New Keynesian models. These models combine the rational expectations and 
intertemporal optimization with nominal rigidities and imperfect markets. They perform 
well empirically. Furthermore, their conclusions are consistent with the fundamental core 
of beliefs central banks have concerning monetary economics: monetary policies have 
significant effect on real economic activity, which persist for several years; there is no 
significant long term trade-off between inflation and real activity; eliminating inflation 
leads to substantial gains; credibility of the monetary policies matter (see Goodfriend and 
King (1997), pp. 233-234). The models can be used for evaluating policies and making 
credible predictions in accordance with Lucas’s critique. Consequently, these models 
have become the common modeling framework for both closed- and open-economy 
monetary analysis in what Goodfriend and King call “The New Neoclassical Synthesis” 
(see Goodfriend and King (1997), p. 233). 
In international macroeconomics, the new trend in research was initiated by Obstfeld 
and Rogoff (1995), as it is now commonly recognized (see Lane (2001), p. 236). This is 
the first contribution that combines rigorously all the described above features. 
Subsequently, there has been a substantial amount of such models that, however, vary in 
many other aspects of their setting. As these models are commonly used to evaluate and 
predict the effects of monetary policy rules, it is important to fully understand how a 
difference in the settings of the model affects the findings of the model. Furthermore, 
what setting is the most appropriate for which real-world situation? For example, it is 
logical to think that a model, which presents the country as one of a continuum of 
economies and therefore its policy decisions do not affect the world equilibrium, is more 
applicable to a country such as Croatia than the US. This thesis’s goal is to examine 
precisely these issues. For the purpose, two of the most prominent New Keynesian open-
economy models are considered. In the second section of this paper the original Obstfeld 
and Rogoff model is examined. The third section studies Gali and Monacelli’s (2005) 
model. In the last section, the explained models are compared and jointly analyzed.                    
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2. Obstfeld and Rogoff Model 
An extensive part of the following is based on Obstfeld and Rogoff (1995), thus there 
will not be specific references to this source. 
 
2.1 Households and Firms 
The world is inhabited by continuum of infinitely-lived individuals [0,1]z ∈ , which 
are both producers and consumers. Every individual is a monopolistic producer. There 
are basically no firms, or equivalently one can think of an individual as a firm when 
discussing production. There are two countries, individuals [0, ]z n∈   are residents of 
Home and individuals ( ,1]z n∈  are located in Foreign. Hence, n determines the relative 
size of the two economies. All individuals have identical preferences and, within a 
country, the same constraints. Therefore, a representative national individual j  can be 
analyzed. From here on in order to avoid confusion, the representative individual is 
denoted with j , while z  is mostly used to denote the goods produced by the individuals. 
This individual maximizes the present discounted value of his/her life-long utility given 
by: 
1
2
0
log ( )
1 2
j
j t j t
t t
t t
MU C y j
P
εχ κβ
ε
−
∞
=
  
 = + − 
−   
∑                                                              (1) 
where:  
β  is a discount factor. 
1 ( 1)/ /( 1)
0
[ ( ) ]jtC c z dzθ θ θ θ− −= ∫  is a consumption index with 1θ > , where ( )c z is home 
individual’s consumption of good z . 
j
tM  is the money holdings of the individual in home currency.  
1 1 1/(1 )
0
[ ( ) ]tP p z dzθ θ− −= ∫  is a consumption based price index for an agent in Home, where 
( )p z is the domestic-currency price of good  z . 
( )ty j  is individual  j ’s effort.    
Assuming this utility function contains several smaller assumptions. First, it assumes 
that consumers’ preferences for goods exhibit Constant Elasticity of Substitution (CES), 
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as 
1 ( 1)/ /( 1)
0
[ ( ) ]c z dzθ θ θ θ− −∫  is a CES function. Elasticity of substitution between goods is 
equal to θ  (the derivation of this is done in Mathematical Appendix A.1, p. 59). The 
price index, tP , which is defined as the minimum expenditure for which a consumer can 
obtain 1 unit of the consumption index, is derived from this function (see Mathematical 
Appendix A.2, p. 59). This assumption may at first seem not excessively damaging to the 
model’s credibility, but one must note that, together with a further assumption made of no 
trade costs, this excludes home biases or border effects, facts strongly supported by 
empirical literature (see Wolf (2000), pp. 561-562 and McCallum (1995), p. 622).  
Second, the utility of an agent depends on his/her consumption of goods, log jtC , and 
effort of producing goods, 2( )
2 t
y jκ− , positively on the former and negatively on the 
latter. This in general is an unproblematic assumption, and the functions’ forms are 
widely used in the literature. The third component of the utility function, 
1
1
j
t
t
M
P
εχ
ε
−
 
 
−  
, 
represent dependence on real money holdings in domestic currency. Hence, the model is 
a Money-in-the-Utility-Function (MIU) model. This is one of the typical ways to 
incorporate money in an economy resulting in a positive demand for money (see Walsh 
(2010), p. 34). One of the other ways, treating money as an asset in order to transfer 
resources intertemporally, is still a possibility for this model as specified so far. However, 
a riskless asset yielding positive interest is later introduced, making this function of 
money obsolete. Practically, the MIU models perform robustly, helping to explain many 
monetary phenomena. Theoretically, there is a logical puzzle, especially for utility 
functions of the type 
0
[ , , ( )]
j
j t j t
t t
t t
MU u C y j
P
β
∞
=
=∑ . Money on its own is useless, i.e. if it 
does not result in less work or more consumption now or in the future. If there is no 
infinite horizon one can interpret MIU function just as more money is better than less, 
with some presumption of later use. However, when the utility function is of the type 
0
[ , , ( )]
j
j t j t
t t
t t
MU u C y j
P
β
∞
=
=∑ , one can hold constant the path of consumption and effort 
for all t  (until infinity). Still, an increase in money holdings paradoxically increases 
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individual’s utility. Nevertheless, MIU function is a useful shortcut to ensure positive 
demand for money (see Walsh (2010), pp. 33-36).    
Utility function (1), results in an individual j ’s demand for product z in period t  
given by: ( )( ) [ ]t t
t
p z
c z C
P
θ−
=  (see Mathematical Appendix A.3, p. 60).  
The representative individual maximizes the present discounted value of his life-long 
utility subject to his/her budget constraint, which is given by: 
1 1 1(1 ) ( ) ( )j j j j j jt t t t t t t t t t t t tPF M P r F M p j y j PC PT− − −+ = + + + − −                                             (2) 
Where: jtF  is the only financial asset, a real riskless bond denominated in the composite 
consumption good, traded at integrated complete world capital market.   
tr  is the real interest rate of this bond between periods t  and 1t +  
j
tT  is real lump-sum taxes paid to the home government.  
The budget constraint is straightforward, it only must be noted that ,j jt tF M denote the 
bonds and money holdings of the individual just before period  1t + .  
One can completely analogously derive all the above results for a foreign agent, since 
preferences are identical in both countries and there are no trade costs. In the following, 
variables noted with asterisk are concerning the foreign country. For example, *tM  is 
money holdings in a foreign currency. Since there are no trade costs, the law of one price 
holds. Let E  denote the nominal exchange rate, the home-currency price of foreign 
currency. Then the law of one price implies *( ) ( )p z Ep z= . This assumption is often used 
as it is supported by theoretical logic, however a number of empirical studies have found 
that it is debatable (see Haskel and Wolf (2001), p. 557 and Isard (1977), p. 942). 
*( ) ( )p z Ep z=  implies *P EP= (see Mathematical Appendix A.4, p. 61).   
The government completely finances its per capita purchases, G , by taxes and 
seigniorage, i.e. 1t tt t
t
M MG T
P
−
−
= +  and 
* *
* * 1
*
t t
t t
t
M MG T
P
−
−
= + . For simplicity, it is 
assumed that G  is a composite of government consumption of individual private goods  
( )g z  with the same weights as private consumption, i.e. 1 ( 1)/ /( 1)
0
[ ( ) ]jtG g z dzθ θ θ θ− −= ∫ . Then 
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the demand faced by each individual producer is obtained by adding up private and 
government demand: 
( )( ) ( )w wtt t t
t
p zy z C G
P
θ−
 
= + 
 
 
where *(1 )wt t tC nC n C= + −  and *(1 )wt t tG nG n G= + −  are, respectively, world private 
consumption demand and world government consumption demand.  
As this paper focuses on monetary theory and does not discuss fiscal policy, 
specifying a government in fiscal terms is not really necessary. The other two models 
presented do not discuss government purchases. This model can be easily modified not to 
include a government demand, e.g. 1 0t tt t
t
M MG T
P
−
−
= + = , or equivalently, 
1t t t tPT M M −− = − , all government revenues from seigniorage are distributed in terms of 
transfers to the population. This might be an useful simplification, however the goal of 
this paper is to compare the two models without modifications in order to keep 
authenticity of the analysis.  
 
2.2. Equilibrium 
The representative individual maximizes the present discounted value of his life-long 
utility given by (1) subject to (2). The first-order conditions for this maximization 
problem are (see Mathematical Appendix A.5, p. 61): 
1 (1 )j jt t tC r Cβ+ = +  
1/
1j jt t
t
t t
M iC
P i
ε
χ +=  
 
 
( 1)/ 1/1 1( ) ( )w wt t tj
t
y j C G
C
θ θ θθ
θκ
+ −
= +  
where 11 (1 )tt t
t
Pi r
P
++ = +  defines the nominal interest rate in home at time t . The nominal 
interest rate for foreign is defined in the same manner and, since *t tP EP=  and the real 
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interest rate is globally the same, the connection between the two nominal interest rates 
can be expressed as:  *11 (1 )tt t
t
Ei i
E
++ = +  
The three first-order conditions for foreign are analogical: 
* *
1 (1 )j jt t tC r Cβ+ = +  
1/
* *
*
* *
1j jt t
t
t t
M iC
P i
ε
χ +=  
 
 
* ( 1)/ 1/
*
1 1( ) ( )w wt t tj
t
y j C G
C
θ θ θθ
θκ
+ −
= +  
The first conditions are the standard Euler equations that give the optimal consumption 
path, in this case, fully described by the consumption index, the real interest rate and the 
discount factor. The second conditions are the money market equilibrium conditions. 
They equate the utility gained from consuming a unit of the consumption index in t  with 
the utility obtained by keeping the equivalent amount as money holdings in t  and then 
consuming it in 1t + . The last, third, conditions equalize the utility gained from 
additional revenue from producing an additional unit of good j  to the disutility from the 
effort required for the production.    
      The other condition, which insures that the above first-order conditions are indeed 
maximizing, is the Transversality Condition given by 1lim 0(1 )
j
j t
ttt
t t
MF
r P→∞
 
+ = 
+  
(see 
Mathematical Appendix A.5). This is the so-called “no Ponzi scheme” condition. It 
assures that no country or individual will continue to borrow forever (the limit cannot be 
negative) and it assures that no country or individual will continue to lend forever (the 
limit cannot be grater than zero). Both cases must be discarded as no rational agent will 
finance someone else’s consumption forever, by doing so, in fact making a gift. 
Therefore, it is fully reasonable to impose this condition onto the agents, i.e. assume it 
must hold, otherwise the agents are not rational. The first order conditions, the budget 
constraint and the transversality condition fully characterize the equilibrium.      
Due to monopoly pricing and endogenous output, this model does not yield a simple 
closed-form solution for the general paths. The system could be analyzed through 
 - 8 - 
numerical simulations, however, the intuition of the model is preserved, and thus it is far 
more convenient, if a linear approximation is studied. In order to linearize the system, a 
well-defined flexible-price steady state around which to approximate is necessary. The 
most convenient such steady state is the symmetric one with all exogenous variables held 
constant (see Obstfeld and Rogoff (1996), p. 667).    
In the steady state, all the endogenous variables are constant, e.g. 1
j j
t tC C+ = . Then it is 
clear that from the consumption Euler equation it follows: 1r ββ
−
=  , which is the world 
real steady-state interest rate. It is also constant. Symmetric steady state means that all 
producers are symmetric, i.e. they set the same price and output quantity in equilibrium. 
Let ( )p h be the home currency price of a home good and equivalently *( )p f be the 
foreign currency price of a foreign good. Let y and *y  be the corresponding output 
levels. Then modifying the budget constraint gives (see Mathematical Appendix A.6, p. 
64): 
( )p h yC rF G
P
= + −  
and for foreign: 
* *
* *
*
( )
1
n p f yC r F G
n P
 
= − + − 
− 
 
Note that for the second equation it is taken use of the fact that world net foreign assets 
must be zero, as domestic nominal money supply must equal domestic nominal money 
demand, i.e. *(1 ) 0nF n F+ − = . Furthermore, one must stress that ( )p h
P
 and 
*
*
( )p f
P
are 
not generally equal to 1. They are only equal to one if the two countries have equal 
wealth. Otherwise, it is not the case, as the terms of trade vary with relative wealth.   
It is important here to observe that the world financial market clearing condition 
( *(1 ) 0nF n F+ − = ) leads to global goods market clearing condition given by:  
* *
*
( ) ( )(1 )w wt t t tt t
t t
p h y p f yC n n G
P P
= + − −        (see Mathematical Appendix A.7, p. 65) 
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One can easily show, by just plugging in wtC , that the values obtained for C  and *C  
satisfy this condition. 
The special case of no foreign assets and no government spending has a closed form 
solution. Variables denoted with subscript 0 concern this case. Then: *0 0 0F F= =  and 
*
0 0 0G G= = . The solution of the model is then given by: 
1/2
0
1y θ
θκ
− 
=  
 
 
* *
0 0 0 0 0
WC C y y C= = = =  
1/*
1/0 0
0*
0 0
1M M y
P P
ε
εβ
χ
−
 −
= =  
 
   
(see Mathematical Appendix A.8, p. 66) 
After obtaining the solution to this steady state, the whole model can be log-linearized 
around it. The linearization is implemented by expressing the model in terms of 
deviations from the obtained steady path. In the following variables denoted by hats stand 
for percentage changes from this path, e.g. 
0
ˆ t
t
dXX
X
≡ , where X is some variable of the 
model. In order to obtain the final set of equations that fully describe the model in these 
terms, first all the equations should be rewritten (see Mathematical Appendix A.9, p. 67): 
Purchasing power parity equation: 
*P EP=    ⇒   *ˆ ˆ ˆE P P= −  
Price indexes: 
1/(1 )11 * 1
0
( ) [ ( )]n
n
P p z dz Ep z dz
θ
θ θ
−
− − 
= +
  ∫ ∫    ⇒    
*
ˆ ˆ
ˆ ˆ( ) (1 )( ( ))t t t tP np h n E p f= + − +  
1/(1 )1
1
* * 1
0
( ) ( )n
n
p zP dz p z dz
E
θθ
θ
−
−
−
  
= +     
∫ ∫  ⇒    
* *
ˆ ˆ
ˆ ˆ( ( ) ) (1 ) ( )t t t tP n p h E n p f= − + −  
Global goods market equilibrium:  
* *
*
( ) ( )(1 )w wt t t tt t
t t
p h y p f yC n n G
P P
= + − −       ⇒   
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⇒      * * * *
0
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ(1 ) ( ( ) ) (1 )( ( ) )
w
w t
t t t t t t t t t w
dGC nC n C n y p h P n y p f P
C
= + − = + − + − + − −              (3) 
Demand faced by producers: 
( ) ( )w wtt t t
t
p hy C G
P
θ−
 
= + 
 
       ⇒       ( )
0
ˆˆ
ˆ ˆ ( )
w
w t
t t t t w
dGy P p h C
C
θ= − + +                               (4) 
*
*
*
( ) ( )w wtt t t
t
p fy C G
P
θ−
 
= + 
 
    ⇒        ( )* * *
0
ˆˆ
ˆ ˆ ( )
w
w t
t t t t w
dGy P p f C
C
θ= − + +                             (5) 
First order conditions determining output: 
( 1)/ 1/1 1 ( )w wt t t
t
y C G
C
θ θ θθ
θκ
+ −
= +     ⇒    
0
ˆ ˆ
ˆ( 1)
w
w t
t t t w
dGy C C
C
θ θ+ = − + +                                 (6) 
*( 1)/ 1/
*
1 1 ( )w wt t t
t
y C G
C
θ θ θθ
θκ
+ −
= +   ⇒    * *
0
ˆ ˆ
ˆ( 1)
w
w t
t t t w
dGy C C
C
θ θ+ = − + +                                 (7) 
Modified budget constraints: 
( )p h yC rF G
P
= + −             ⇒               
0 0
ˆ ˆ
ˆ ˆ( )
w w
dF dGC r p h y P
C C
= + + − −                          (8) 
* *
* *
*
( )
1
n p f yC r F G
n P
 
= − + − 
− 
  ⇒   
*
* * * *
0 0
ˆ ˆ
ˆ ˆ( )
1 w w
n dF dGC r p f y P
n C C
 
= − + + − − 
− 
    (9) 
Consumption Euler equations: 
1 (1 )t t tC r Cβ+ = +           ⇒     1ˆ ˆˆ(1 )t t tC r Cβ+ = − +                                                             (10) 
* *
1 (1 )t t tC r Cβ+ = +          ⇒     * *1ˆ ˆˆ(1 )t t tC r Cβ+ = − +                                                             (11) 
Money demand equations: 
1/
1t t
t
t t
M iC
P i
ε
χ +=  
 
      ⇒      1
ˆ ˆ1
ˆˆ ˆ
ˆ
1
t t
t t t t
P PM P C rβ
ε ε β
+
 
−
− = − + 
− 
                                   (12) 
1/
* *
*
* *
1t t
t
t t
M iC
P i
ε
χ +=  
 
    ⇒      
* *
* * * 1
ˆ ˆ1
ˆˆ ˆ
ˆ
1
t t
t t t t
P PM P C rβ
ε ε β
+
 
−
− = − + 
− 
                                (13) 
It is important to note that equations (3)-(7) hold at any point, so clearly they as well hold 
when the economy is in a steady state, hence they remain valid when time-subscripted 
changes are interchange by steady state changes. Then there are seven equations for the 
seven variables, ˆy , *ˆy , ˆC , *ˆC , ˆˆ ( )p h P− , * *ˆˆ ( )p f P− , and ˆ wC  (notice that ˆˆ ( )p h P−  
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and * *ˆˆ ( )p f P−  always appear in this way (or as ˆ ˆˆ ˆ( ) ( ( ) )P p h p h P− = − − ) in the above 
equations, hence they could be considered as variables). Solving this system of equations 
gives the new real steady state path. The solution for consumption in home and foreign is 
(see Mathematical Appendix A.10, p. 72): 
*
0 0 0
1 1 1ˆ
2 2 2w w w
rdF n dG n dGC
C C C
θ θ
θ θ θ
+ + − −     
= − +     
     
 
*
*
0 0 0
1ˆ
1 2 2 2w w w
n rdF n dG n dGC
n C C C
θ θ
θ θ θ
+ +      
= − + −      
−      
 
An exogenous increase in home per capita bond holding increases home private 
consumption in the new steady state, but by less than the income per period from these 
bonds rdF . This is the case, since output is endogenous and individuals change their 
consumption-leisure decision. Higher wealth leads to higher consumption, which on its 
turn leads to a fall in marginal utility from consumption. Then the marginal disutility 
from working will be higher that the marginal utility from consumption and it will be 
optimal for the individual to work less. Thus, some of the additional income is used for 
additional consumption and some is used to compensate the income, already used for 
consumption, lost due to less work. An increase in home government spending decreases 
home private consumption. This is due to the fact that, although, some of the government 
purchases are of home goods, some are of foreign. However, all of the purchases are 
financed by taxes at home. The positive effect on output is offset by the higher takes. An 
increase in foreign government spending increases home private consumption, as some of 
the purchases are home goods. Home output increases to meet the higher demand and 
thus consumption. The same analysis is valid for foreign, just reversed. 
The solution of the model for output is: 
0
1ˆ
ˆ
1 2(1 )
w
w
dGy C
C
θ
θ θ
 
= − +  + + 
 
* *
0
1ˆ
ˆ
1 2(1 )
w
w
dGy C
C
θ
θ θ
 
= − +  + + 
 
The output rises with government spending. The result for home government spending 
holds, since it finances its expenditures with lump-sum taxes. Higher lump-sum taxes 
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change the consumption-leisure decision, individuals consume less and produce more. 
One can show (by substituting the result for ˆC ) that output falls, if home per capita 
foreign assets increase. This is again due to the fact that if individuals get wealthier, they 
would work less.  
The solution of the model for the prices is: 
( ) ( )* * *1 1 ˆ ˆˆˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ( ) ( ) 1p h p f E y y C Cθ θ− − = − − = −+  
If output in home increases relatively to the one in foreign, the prices in home relative to 
foreign fall, i.e. the terms of trade fall. The opposite is true, if home private consumption 
increases relatively to foreign private consumption. 
As prices are flexible, money supply does not affect real variables and, hence, money 
demand equations do not play a role in determining the real variables. Since inflation and 
the real interest rate do not change in the steady state, equations (12) and (13) give the 
solution to the steady state price levels: 
1
ˆˆ ˆ
t t tP M Cε
= −  
* * *1
ˆˆ ˆ
t t tP M Cε
= −  
Flexible-price models are in general unable to replicate the magnitude and the 
persistency of the effects of monetary shocks on real variables, which are commonly 
observed in the real world. This model is not an exception. In order to properly capture 
these effects, nominal rigidities are introduced (see Walsh (2010), p. 408). In this model, 
this is done by presetting nominal producer prices, ( )tp h and *( )tp f . The prices are set 
one period in advance and are hold fixed during this period. After the period, if there is 
no new shocks, prices fully adjust to the flexible-price levels.  
Price stickiness is not an artificial theoretical convenience, but considerably 
supported by theoretical logic and empirical evidence. Theoretically, there are many 
reasons why prices should be rigid, such as menu costs, fixed durable contracts, cost-
based pricing, lagged information upon decision on pricing, pricing points, etc. An 
extensive survey of all the theories is done in Blinder et al. (1998). Empirically, a number 
of studies have supported these theories, including: Blinder et al. (1998) - an extensive 
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survey of firms and some econometric data analysis; Golosov and Lucas (2007) examine 
disaggregated CPI data from greater New York area, Blinder (1991) surveys price setters; 
Kashyap (1995) studies catalog prices in the US.  
Price stickiness might be an established fact, however, how rigid prices are and in what 
manner they adjust is still an open question. Blinder et al. report that the median number 
of price changes for a product in a year is 1.4. Furthermore, almost half of the prices 
change no more frequent than once a year and, when there are regular price reviews, they 
are almost always annual (see Blinder et al. (1998), p. 298). Golosov and Lucas show that 
in their sample 21.9% of all prices in the CPI change every month (see Golosov and 
Lucas (2007), p. 183). Blinder finds that 55% of prices change no more often than 
annually and only 15% change more frequently than quarterly (see Blinder (1991), p. 93). 
Kashyap shows that in the sample studied the average time between price changes is 15 
months. (see Kashyap (1995), p. 252). These studies examine the dynamics of prices (the 
observed price changes), yet it is hard to find out if and how quickly prices converge to 
the flexible steady state based only on the observation of price changes. The first 
difficulty is that prices are “sticky” relatively to some unmeasured, perhaps 
unmeasurable, Walrasian norm (see Blinder et al. (1998), p. 296). It is problematic to 
determine convergence when the state to which the system should be converging is 
unknown. Second, it is unclear what triggered these changes. If there is identical shock to 
all producers, they should adjust simultaneously, which is obviously not the case. Third, 
it must be known with what lag producers act after a shock. Blinder examines many 
different kinds of shocks and finds that, while there is quite of variation, the mean lags 
cluster around 3-4 months range (see Blinder (1991), p. 94).  
The model assumes that prices remain fixed for one period and then adjust 100%. 
This means that producers react after 1 period to the shock, which is consistent with the 
empirical evidence if the period is one quarter. After this period prices adjust fully. This 
in practice means a change of all product prices after 1 period, which would on average 
not be problematic if the period is at least one year, as it is seen from the data above. The 
change of prices in the model is simultaneous, since in the model there is one single 
identical to all shock. While in reality there are many shocks affecting different producers 
differently, and, hence, prices never change simultaneously. To sum up, the quite 
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restricting assumption about price stickiness in this model harms the richness of the 
dynamics, as prices simultaneously adjust immediately after one period, and it makes it 
hard for the model to fit the data, as there is inconsistency between its and the empirical 
price dynamics.      
With sticky prices, output becomes demand driven for shocks that are not huge. This 
is the case, since in this model every good is produced by a single producer, a 
monopolist. The monopolist maximizes profits by equating marginal revenue to marginal 
cost. The profit maximizing conditions here are equations (6) and (7).  Equating marginal 
revenue to marginal cost by a monopolist always results in a price above marginal cost, 
as the monopolist faces downward sloping demand curve (except when demand is 
perfectly elastic, which is here not the case). Then, with prices fixed, the producer would 
benefit from every additional sell as it would increase profits by price minus marginal 
cost. The producer would increase his/her output if there is demand. This holds until 
marginal cost equals the price. Thus, the shock must not be huge, as then the output 
might not be fully demand determined if demand rises by so much that satisfying it 
means output must increase to a level at which marginal cost exceeds the price. A fall in 
demand will obviously lead to a fall in output. As a result equations (6) and (7) need not 
hold. Output is fully determined by the demand schedules (4) and (5).  
The fact that ( )tp h and  *( )tp f  are fixed, does not mean that the aggregate price level 
does not change. It changes with the nominal exchange rate. If there is a nominal 
depreciation ( ˆ 0tE > ), the home price index increases, since the domestic currency price 
of foreign goods becomes higher. From the two previously derived equations:  
*
ˆ ˆ
ˆ ˆ( ) (1 )( ( ))t t t tP np h n E p f= + − +       ⇒         ˆ ˆ(1 )P n E= −                                               (14) 
* *
ˆ ˆ
ˆ ˆ( ( ) ) (1 ) ( )t t t tP n p h E n p f= − + −     ⇒           *ˆ ˆP nE= −                                                  (15) 
Note that the variables on the right-hand side have no time indexes, but are also not 
variables in a steady state. From here on, such variables, with hats and no time index or 
overbars, denote short-run changes.   
Combining equations (4) and (5) with equations (14) and (15) gives the short-run 
aggregate demand: 
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0
ˆˆ
ˆ (1 )
w
w
w
dGy n E C
C
θ= − + +                                                                                                (16) 
*
0
ˆˆ
ˆ
w
w
w
dGy nE C
C
θ= − + +                                                                                                    (17) 
Equations (10)-(13) always hold. However, the new steady state is reached immediately 
after one period, meaning that variables with the subscript 1t +  can be replaced by the 
steady-state changes. The variables with subscript t  are now interpreted as short-run 
changes: 
ˆ
ˆ
ˆ(1 )C r Cβ= − +                                                                                                               (18) 
* *ˆ
ˆ
ˆ(1 )C r Cβ= − +                                                                                                             (19) 
ˆ
ˆ1
ˆˆ ˆ
ˆ
1
P PM P C rβ
ε ε β
 
−
 − = − +
 
− 
                                                                                         (20) 
* *
* * *
ˆ
ˆ1
ˆˆ ˆ
ˆ
1
P PM P C rβ
ε ε β
 
−
 − = − +
 
− 
                                                                                 (21) 
The last two equations to complete the model come from the budget constraints. While 
the modified intertemporal budget constraints ensure that in the long-run current accounts 
are balanced, in the short-run the current account deficit or surplus is given by: 
1 1 1
( )t t
t t t t t t
t
p h yF F r F C G
P− − −
− = + − −  
* *
* * * * * *
1 1 1 *
( )t t
t t t t t t
t
p h yF F r F C G
P− − −
− = + − −    
Log-linearizing gives (see Mathematical Appendix A.11, p. 75): 
0 0
ˆ ˆ
ˆ (1 )
w w
dF dGy C n E
C C
= − − − −                                                                                             (22) 
* *
* *
0 0 0
ˆ ˆ
ˆ
1w w w
dF dG n dFy C nE
C C n C
 
= − + − = − 
− 
                                                                      (23) 
The system that fully describes the short-run is given by the 10 equations (14)-(23) in the 
10 variables, ˆC , *ˆC , yˆ , *yˆ , ˆP , *ˆP , ˆ wC , ˆE , rˆ  and dF . For the long-run, it is enough to 
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notice that the economy returns to the steady state, which was already solved, and that 
after the short-run the wealth situation has changed due to the current account, dF . 
The model is now ready to be solved for a permanent monetary shock. Notice that in 
all the equations the effects of monetary shocks and of change in government spending 
are additive, therefore, nothing is lost if it assumed that the government does not change 
its spending, i.e. * * 0dG dG dG dG= = = = . This is one of the strong features of this 
model - it allows monetary and fiscal policy to be analyzed separately or in a policy mix. 
As in the case for the long-run steady state, it makes sense first to solve for the 
differences between home and foreign variables. This is again done in the mathematical 
appendix, however, this time it is beneficial to report some of the results in the main text, 
as it enhance the intuition of the model and some of the main predictions of the model 
can be more easily understood. The equations that follow are derived in Mathematical 
Appendix A.12, p. 76.  
The money supply shock is permanent, i.e. * *ˆ ˆˆ ˆM M M M− = − , there is an increase (or 
decrease) in relative home money supply that occurs in the short-run and stays the same 
when the economy reaches its new steady state after one period. From the Euler 
equations (18) and (19), it is easily seen that * *ˆ ˆˆ ˆC C C C− = − . This means that all shocks 
have permanent effect on the difference between countries’ consumptions. The difference 
is the same in the short-run and in the long-run. However, this does not imply that the 
consumption is the same in the two periods, since the short-run real interest rate might be 
different from the steady state real interest rate. From the money demand equations, one 
can show that: ( ) ( ) ( )* *1 ˆˆ ˆˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ(1 )M M E C C E Eβε ε β− − = − − −− . Notice, that relative short-
run money demand does not depend on output differences, but rather on consumption 
differences. In an open economy setting this is really important, since individuals can 
smooth consumption through borrowing or lending in the international financial market. 
The long-run nominal exchange rate after the shock is given by: 
( ) ( )* *1 ˆ ˆˆ ˆ ˆE M M C Cε= − − − , combining this with the short-run money demand gives: 
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( ) ( )* *1 ˆ ˆˆ ˆ ˆE M M C C
ε
= − − − . As * *ˆ ˆˆ ˆM M M M− = −  and * *ˆ ˆˆ ˆC C C C− = − , this means that 
the exchange rate jumps immediately to its new steady state value, ˆ ˆE E= . This is to be 
expected, since the differences in money supply and consumption remain constant. In fact 
from the short-run aggregate demand equations, (16) and (17), the current account 
equations, (22) and (23) and the solutions for the difference in consumptions in the long-
run it follows that:  ( )*22 ( 1) ˆ ˆˆ ( 1)rE C Crθ θθ + += − −   The equation shows by how much the 
home currency must depreciate in order for home relative output to increase enough to 
justify an permanent rise is relative home consumption. Home relative output increases 
when home currency depreciates, as can be seen from equations (16) and (17):  
*
ˆ
ˆ ˆy y Eθ− = . Notice that ( ) ( )* *1 ˆ ˆˆ ˆ ˆE M M C C
ε
= − − −  expresses the nominal exchange 
rate as a function of the difference in consumption, which is linear and downward 
sloping, while ( )*22 ( 1) ˆ ˆˆ ( 1)rE C Crθ θθ + += − −  is again a linear function in the difference in 
consumption, but it is upward sloping ( 1θ > ). One can express the change in the 
exchange rate as a function of the change in money supply:  
[ ]
[ ] ( )*2
2 ( 1)
ˆ ˆ ˆ ( )
2 ( 1) ( 1)
r
E M M
r r
ε θ θ
ε θ θ θ
 + +
= − = ∗∗  + + + − 
 
Observe that, since 1θ > , the following inequality holds: 
[ ]
[ ] ( )* *2
2 ( 1)
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ
2 ( 1) ( 1)
r
E M M M M
r r
ε θ θ
ε θ θ θ
 + +
= − < −  + + + − 
 
The exchange rate rises with home relative money supply, but by less than the money 
shock. This is the case, since relative consumption in Home increases as well. The 
depreciation switches world demand toward domestic products, which leads to short-run 
rise in relative home income. Individuals in Home do not consume the whole additional 
income, but, as typical for open-economy models, they intertemporally smooth the 
increase in consumption by running a current account surplus, as shown later.  
The difference in consumption is a function of relative money supply as well: 
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( ) [ ] ( )
2
* *
2
( 1)
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ( )
2 ( 1) ( 1)
rC C M M
r r
ε θ
ε θ θ θ
 
−
− = − = ∗  + + + − 
   
All the information obtained so far can be summarized in a graph, which makes 
understanding the model more intuitive and clear. This is done in Figure 1, where the  
 
 
MM schedule is given by ( ) ( )* *1 ˆ ˆˆ ˆ ˆE M M C C
ε
= − − − . The vertical intercept of the 
MM line equals the relative percentage increase in home money supply. Thus, 
the MM schedule passes through the origin before the monetary shock. The GG  schedule 
is given by ( )*22 ( 1) ˆ ˆˆ ( 1)rE C Crθ θθ + += − −  . It is called GG , since if the model is solved for 
M  
M  
'M  
'M  
G  
G  
Percentage change in relative 
domestic consumption, *ˆ ˆC C−  
Percentage change in 
exchange rate, ˆE  
2
2 ( 1)
( 1)
rSlope
r
θ θ
θ
+ +
=
−
 
1Slope
ε
= −  
*
ˆ ˆM M−  
( )∗  
( )∗∗  
Figure 1: Permanent Shock in Domestic Relative Money Supply  
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fiscal shocks, this is the curve that shifts. Obviously, it too passes through the origin. The 
monetary shock shifts the initial MM line to ' 'M M . The intersection of the ' 'M M  
schedule and the GG  schedule is the short-run equilibrium. Notice that ifθ → ∞ , i.e. 
domestic and foreign goods are perfect substitutes and perfectly competitive economy is 
approached, GG becomes flat. There will not be any exchange rate change.  
The model can be solved for the current account: 
( )
[ ] ( )*20
2 1 ( 1)
ˆ ˆ
2 ( 1) ( 1)w
ndF M M
C r r
θ ε θ
ε θ θ θ
 
− −
= −  + + + − 
 
A permanent increase in relative home money supply leads to positive current account, as 
explained earlier. Individuals at home smooth their consumption path and do not 
consume all their additional income. The current account is inversely proportional to the 
size of the country. The bigger home is (the greater n is) , the less positive affect on the 
current account an increase in home money supply has (the smaller 
0
w
dF
C
 is).  
The current account is all that is needed in order to solve for the new long run steady 
state. The results are: 
For consumption: 
Home: ( )[ ] ( )
2
*
2
1 ( 1)
ˆ
ˆ ˆ
2 ( 1) ( 1)
r n
C M M
r r
ε θ
ε θ θ θ
 
− −
= −  + + + − 
 
Foreign: [ ] ( )
2
* *
2
( 1)ˆ
ˆ ˆ
2 ( 1) ( 1)
nrC M M
r r
ε θ
ε θ θ θ
 
−
= − −  + + + − 
 
For output: 
Home: ( )[ ] ( )*2
1 ( 1)
ˆ ˆˆ
2 ( 1) ( 1)
r n
y M M
r r
θ ε θ
ε θ θ θ
 
− −
= − −  + + + − 
 
Foreign: [ ] ( )* *2( 1) ˆ ˆˆ 2 ( 1) ( 1)nry M Mr rθ ε θε θ θ θ
 
−
= −  + + + − 
 
For terms of trade: 
[ ] ( )* *2( 1)ˆ ˆ ˆˆ ˆ( ) ( ) 2 ( 1) ( 1)rp h p f E M Mr rε θε θ θ θ
 
−
− − = −  + + + − 
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If there is a positive monetary shock in Home, consumption is permanently higher for 
home residents, while output in the long-run is permanently lower, since home 
individuals are wealthier. As they have obtained wealth (the current account), they 
change their consumption-leisure decision, as discussed before. Home individuals’ 
consumption increases, but not by the whole additional income, as individuals choose to 
work less. Thus, the long-run steady state home output falls. Exactly the opposite is true 
for foreign. 
There is an improvement in the terms of trade in the long-run for home. This is again 
the case, because the country has become richer and, therefore, works less. However, 
short-run and long-run terms of trade effects work in opposite directions. In the long-run 
they might improve by [ ] ( )*2( 1) ˆ ˆ2 ( 1) ( 1)r M Mr rε θε θ θ θ
 
−
−  + + + − 
, but in the short-run they 
deteriorate by [ ][ ] ( )*2
2 ( 1)
ˆ ˆ
2 ( 1) ( 1)
r
M M
r r
ε θ θ
ε θ θ θ
 + +
−  + + + − 
, the value of ˆE , as ˆ ( )p h  and 
*
ˆ ( )p f  are fixed. It is easily seen that the short term effect is stronger. This is to be 
expected as the whole effect in the long-run comes only from the interest payments, 
0
w
rdF
C
.  
The effects from the monetary shock last longer than the sticky price period, in fact, 
they last infinitely long. The second part of this statement is due to some specifications of 
this model, infinitely-lived individuals and intertemporally separable utility. The first 
part, however, is a more general result, typical for such models. This is due to the fact 
that, if short-run nominal rigidities exist, monetary shocks will result in international 
capital flows. The resulting transfers have effects on real variables after the period of 
stickiness is over.   
The last thing left is to solve the model for short run variables: 
The short-run interest rate is: 
ˆ
ˆ (1 )
w
r Mβε β
 
= − + 
− 
, where *ˆ ˆ ˆ(1 )wM nM n M= + −  
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The real interest rate falls if world money supply increases. Hence, it increases global 
consumption demand.  
The short-run output is: 
( ) [ ][ ] 2
2 ( 1)
ˆ
ˆ (1 ) (1 )
2 ( 1) ( 1)
r
y n n M
r r
ε θ θ
ε β β θ
ε θ θ θ
  + +
= − + + − +   + + + −   
   
( ) [ ][ ]
*
2
2 ( 1)
ˆ(1 ) (1 ) (1 )
2 ( 1) ( 1)
r
n n M
r r
ε θ θ
ε β β θ
ε θ θ θ
  + +
+ − − + − −   + + + −   
 
( ) [ ][ ]
*
2
2 ( 1)
ˆ
ˆ (1 )
2 ( 1) ( 1)
r
y n n M
r r
ε θ θ
ε β β θ
ε θ θ θ
  + +
= − + − +   + + + −   
 
( ) [ ][ ]
*
2
2 ( 1)
ˆ(1 ) (1 )
2 ( 1) ( 1)
r
n n M
r r
ε θ θ
ε β β θ
ε θ θ θ
  + +
+ − − + +   + + + −   
 
The short-run consumption is: 
( ) [ ] ( )
2
*
2
( 1)
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ(1 ) (1 )
2 ( 1) ( 1)
w rC M n M M
r r
ε θ
ε β β
ε θ θ θ
 
−
= − + + − −  + + + − 
 
( ) [ ] ( )
2
* *
2
( 1)
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ(1 )
2 ( 1) ( 1)
w rC M n M M
r r
ε θ
ε β β
ε θ θ θ
 
−
= − + − −  + + + − 
 
A positive home monetary shock increases the short-run output of home, as it is expected. 
Home consumption increases as well. The more interesting question is what happens to 
foreign variables. Alternatively, what happens to home short-run variables when there is 
a positive foreign monetary shock? Unfortunately, the answer is ambiguous and depends 
on the parameters, or, more precisely, on ε . The special case where 1ε = , the output 
equation simplifies to: 
( ) *2 (1 ) ( 1) 2(1 )(1 )
ˆ ˆ
ˆ
2 ( 1) 2 ( 1)
n n r ny M M
r r
θ θ θ
θ θ
+ − + +
− −
= +
+ + + +
 
If there is an increase in money supply in foreign, home short-run output falls, since 
1θ > . It is easily seen from the solution for yˆ , that as ε  gets large enough, the effect of 
a foreign positive monetary shock on home output turns positive. From the first order 
conditions of the individual’s decision problem, one can see thatε  is inversely related to 
the interest elasticity of money demand. Money demand is interest inelastic if ε  is large.     
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3. Gali and Monacelli Model 
An extensive part of the following is based on Gali and Monacelli (2005), thus there 
will not be specific references to this source. 
 
3.1 Households  
The world consists of a continuum of economies represented by a unit interval. Let 
Home be the economy that is modeled, as before, variables without superscripts refer to 
this economy. However, in this model there is not one foreign country, but infinitely 
many. In the following, variables denoted with asterisk are regarding a single foreign 
country, one among the infinitely many that make up the world economy, * [0,1]∈ . 
Variables with w -superscripts again stand for world aggregates.  
As Home has zero weight in the world aggregates, its policy changes do not affect the 
rest of the world. This is rather different from the previous model with only two 
countries. However, one could think that the two models are asymptotically equivalent in 
this respect, if 0n → . From the solutions obtained in part 2 of this paper, one can see 
that, if 0n → , the changes of foreign long- and short-run output and consumption due to 
a monetary shock in Home tend to zero. That is, home monetary policy changes do not 
affect Foreign, which is the rest of the world in the case of two-country world.    
All the world economies have the same individuals’ preferences, technology and 
market structure. The first two points of this assumption are equivalent to the one of 
identical utility functions made in Obstfeld and Rogoff’s model, since there the utility 
function represents not only the preferences concerning consumption, but also the 
technology with which goods are produced from labor, as individuals are producers and 
consumers. The third point of the assumption, identical market structures, is the same for 
both models.     
As assumed, all individuals have identical preferences and, within a country, the same 
constraints. Therefore, a representative national individual can be analyzed. This 
individual maximizes the expected present discounted value of his/her life-long utility 
given by: 
1 1
0
0 1 1
t t t
t
C NU
σ ϕ
β
σ ϕ
− +∞
=
 
= Ε − 
− + 
∑                                                                                             (24) 
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where: 
β  is a discount factor. 
( ) ( ) /( 1)( 1)/ ( 1)/1/ 1/(1 ) H Ft t tC C C η ηη η η ηη ηα α −− − ≡ − +    is a composite consumption index, 
where: 
( ) /( 1)1 ( 1)/0 ( )Ht tC c z dz µ µµ µ −−≡ ∫   is an index of domestic goods consumption, where [0,1]z ∈  
is the goods’ variety.  
( )( ) /( 1)1 ( 1)/*0 *Ft tC C d γ γγ γ −−≡ ∫  is an index of imported goods, where 
( ) /( 1)1* * ( 1)/0 ( )t tC c z dz µ µµ µ −−≡ ∫ is the quantity of goods imported from * and consumed by 
the home representative individual.  
tN  denotes hours of labor. 
As seen before, 1µ >  is the constant elasticity of substitution (see Mathematical 
Appendix A.1, p. 59). However, here it is the elasticity of substitution between goods 
produced within a country, while in the Obstfeld and Rogoff’s model θ  is the elasticity 
of substitution between all goods. That is why a different parameter is used. γ  is the 
elasticity of substitution between goods produced in different foreign countries. 0η >  is 
the elasticity of substitution between home and foreign goods. Finally, [0,1]α ∈  
inversely measures the home bias, as seen from the definition of tC . Therefore, it is a 
measure of openness. If 0α = , home consumers would not buy any foreign goods. If 
1α = , they would buy only foreign goods.  The presence of a home bias in this model is 
a welcome expansion compared to Obstfeld and Rogoff’s model, since, as discussed 
before, home bias and border effects are strongly supported by the empirical literature.  
Note that in ( )( ) /( 1)1 ( 1)/*0 *Ft tC C d γ γγ γ −−≡ ∫ , Home is also included. However, this is 
irrelevant, since the economy has a zero measure.  
Let ( )1/(1 )1 10 ( )Ht tP p z dz µµ −−≡ ∫  be the price index as defined and derived before (see 
Mathematical Appendix A.2) for domestically produced goods. Correspondingly, 
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( )1/(1 )1* * 10 ( )t tP p z dz µµ −−≡ ∫ is the price index for goods imported from * in domestic 
currency. Then the domestic demand function for each good is given by: 
( )( ) Htt tH
t
p z
c z C
P
µ−
 
=  
 
  for domestic goods 
*
* *
*
( )( ) tt t
t
p z
c z C
P
µ−
 
=  
 
  for goods from country *. 
The derivation is equivalent to the one in Mathematical Appendix A.3, p. 59.  
The individual optimizes his/her allocation of expenditures on foreign goods by country 
of origin, which yields:  
*
* Ft
t tF
t
PC C
P
γ−
 
=  
 
, where ( )( )1/(1 )1 1*0 *Ft tP P d γγ −−≡ ∫  is the price 
index for imported goods in domestic currency. This is derived in exactly the same way 
as the demand function, but from the function ( )( ) /( 1)1 ( 1)/*0 *Ft tC C d γ γγ γ −−≡ ∫ .  
In order to obtain the last important optimal allocation of expenditures between goods, 
precisely between domestic and foreign goods, one must first note that, given the demand 
functions, total expenditures on home goods are given by
1
0
( ) ( ) H Ht t t tp z c z dz P C=∫ , on 
goods from country * by 
1
* * * *
0
( ) ( )t t t tp z c z dz P C=∫ , on aggregated foreign goods by 
1
* *
0
*
F F
t t t tP C d P C=∫ . Then the optimal allocation of expenditures between home and 
foreign goods is given by: 
(1 )
H
H t
t t
t
PC C
P
η
α
−
 
= −  
 
 
F
F t
t t
t
PC C
P
η
α
−
 
=  
 
  
where ( ) ( ) 1/(1 )1 1(1 ) H Ft t tP P P ηη ηα α −− − ≡ − +    is the Consumer Price Index (CPI) (see 
Mathematical Appendix B.1, p. 82). One can show that total expenditures on 
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consumption are given by: H H F Ft t t t t tP C P C PC+ = , which shows that tP  is indeed the CPI. 
The derivation is again done in Appendix B.1.   
The budget constraints subject to which the individual maximizes his/her utility are 
given by1:   
1 1 1
* *
, 1 10 0 0
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) *t t t t t t t t t t t tp z c z dz p z c z dz d Q D D W N T+ + + + Ε = + + ∫ ∫ ∫  
where tW  is the nominal wage, tT  denotes lump-sum transfers,  1tD +  is the nominal 
payoff in period 1t +  of the portfolio held at the end of period t  (it includes shares in 
firms). All these variables are expressed in units of domestic currency. 
, 1t tQ +  is a 
stochastic discount factor for one period ahead nominal payoffs. 1tD +  and , 1t tQ +  are 
explained in more detail later on. Assume, in addition, that the economic agents have 
access to a complete set of contingent claims, traded internationally, i.e. complete 
international asset markets with Arrow-Debreu securities. Note that here tT  denotes 
lump-sum transfers in nominal terms, not in real, as it is in Obstfeld and Rogoff’s model. 
There the equivalent is t tPT . This is a trivial fact and here it is kept in nominal terms for 
simplicity, as most variables in this model are nominal, while in the first model most 
were real.  
More importantly, observe that there is no money in the utility function as well as in 
the budget constraint. This is a cashless limit economy. Money is not introduced at all. 
One can think of money as a unit of account, but not as an asset. Monetary policy takes 
the form of interest rate rules. This noticeably differs from the Obstfeld and Rogoff’s 
model, where monetary policy was executed through changes in the money supply. These 
are, historically, the two main approaches used in conducting monetary policy. In recent 
years money growth targeting has almost entirely been abandoned in favor of interest rate 
rules. Growth of money supply targeting was extensively used in the 1970s and was 
widely credited for the1978-1981 disinflation period in the United States. However, after 
                                                 
1
 The budget constraint is given with an equal sign ( = ) instead of smaller or equal ( ≤ ), since, if the 
decision problem is solved with smaller or equal sign, from the first-order condition with respect to 
consumption comes that the Lagrangian multiplier must be greater than 0, as consumption cannot be 
negative (the problem is solved with a bit modified budget constraint, as seen shortly). This, together with 
the complementary slackness condition, assures that the budget constraint holds with equality sign. 
Therefore, for briefness and simplicity, one can skip all these steps and start directly with the problem as 
given above.    
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this period, money growth targets became long-run considerations for the Federal 
Reserve in the US and, currently, most central banks have adopted this approach (see 
Taylor (1999a), p. 335). This is not a coincidence. Several studies have shown that, if 
some conditions are met, which is usually the case for advanced economies, interest rate 
rules are superior to money growth rules (see Poole (1970), pp. 205-206 and Carlstrom 
and Fuerst (1995), p. 266). Superior has different meaning in two papers. In Poole 
(1970), equivalent monetary policies in the two approaches are compared by measuring 
the volatility of output (the lower the volatility is, the better). Equivalent monetary 
policies means that if the interest rate is set on some level (when using interest rate rules), 
there is a corresponding expected level of money growth, and if money growth is set on 
this level (when using money supply rules), the corresponding expected level of the 
interest rate is exactly the same as before. This means that if the model was deterministic 
the two policies would have been indistinguishable (see Poole (1970), pp. 203-204). 
Carlstrom and Fuerst use a fully specified model with utility maximizing agents and then 
compare different monetary approaches on utility basis. Nevertheless, when inflation is 
really high or negative, interest rate rules perform worse than money supply rules (see 
Taylor (1999b), p. 661). Then again, this was hardly the case in developed countries 
during the last decades and, as a consequence, it is normal to expect that central banks in 
these countries would prefer interest rate rules.  
Deciding to use interest rate rules is not equivalent to eliminating money altogether. 
To understand why it is possible not to introduce money at all, one must realize that when 
the money supply or the interest rate is the policy instrument the other one is endogenous 
to the model. If the central bank uses an interest rate rule, then it must vary the money 
supply in order to achieve its desired interest rate setting (see Taylor (1999b), p. 661). 
Similarly, a money growth rule has implications for the interest rate. In fact, in Obstfeld 
and Rogoff’s model it was shown that the short-run real interest rate is given by 
ˆ
ˆ (1 )
w
r Mβε β
 
= − + 
− 
 and the long-run by 1r ββ
−
= . The long-run (steady state) interest 
rate is determined only by the model’s parameters (the discount factor), since prices are 
flexible and money has no effect on it. The short-run real interest rate, however, is a 
(invertible) function of the money supply. Because the model is deterministic and there is 
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no uncertain financial intermediation, the two policy approaches are interchangeable. The 
central bank can easily transfer its money supply rules to real (or nominal, as one can 
show) interest rate rules. In reality, “a fixed money growth rule will generally imply a 
reaction of interest rates to the inflation rate and to real output similar in form though not 
necessary similar in size to interest rate policy rules” (see Taylor (1999b), p. 661). 
However, if the central bank follows an interest rate rule, it varies money supply in such a 
way that the interaction of money supply with money demand leads to the desired interest 
rate. What feeds back into the model is the interest rate and it is the interest rate that 
affects the model’s variables. If it is assumed that the central bank can in some way set 
the interest rate to the desired levels, it is not necessary to specify in exactly what way 
this happens. Changes in money growth do not feed back into the model and, hence, 
money growth need not be computed and could actually be ignored (see Taylor (1999b), 
p. 661).  
Another important difference between the two models is that Obstfeld and Rogoff’s 
model is, as mentioned above, a deterministic model, while Gali and Monacelli’s model 
is stochastic. In the former, agents have a perfect-foresight. They know exactly what their 
investment in assets will yield and what their output will be in the future (as well as all 
other values of variables). The central bank might surprise them with an unanticipated 
monetary shock, as it was modeled in part 2 of this paper, but immediately after the shock 
the agents know what the values of the variables will be in the future with certainty. 
There in no intrinsic uncertainty. Only on state of nature is possible. In the latter model, 
this is not the case. The agents can only expect what will happen in the future. As seen 
later on, in this model, the productivity of the workers follows a random process (AR(1)), 
and, as mentioned previously, there is a stochastic discount factor. What the future value 
of one of these variables will be depends on the state of nature, which follows some 
distribution. The agent has some rational expectations about what might be the value and 
he/she knows that the deviations from it depend on the states of nature. However, the 
expected value need not be realized, and once there is a specific realization of some of 
the random variables (or processes), the decision problem of the individual changes. 
He/she must condition his/her expectations on the fact that some state of nature has 
already occurred. The view of the world in Gali and Monacelli’s model is obviously more 
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realistic, but what really makes a difference is the fact that when there is uncertainty and 
individuals form expectations about the future, the model results will depend on the 
expectations for the future of the economic agents. Forward-looking relationships 
between variables can be formed, such as new Keynesian Phillips curve, where current 
inflation depends on expected future inflation. This is widely used connection, supported 
by some empirical literature (see Chadha et al. (1992), p. 326 and Stock and Watson 
(1999), p. 327). However, there are some studies reaching the conclusion that the 
forward-looking elements are not significant (see Fuhrer (1997), p. 349). 
 The first two terms of the left-hand side of the budget constraint denote total 
expenditures on consumption goods. Hence, using the revealed fact that total 
expenditures on consumption goods are given by t tPC , the budget constraint becomes: 
, 1 1t t t t t t t t t tPC Q D D W N T+ + + Ε = + +                                                                                 (25) 
For some of the following, Gali (2008) is used as a source. 
Notice that 1tD +  is the nominal payoff of a portfolio in period 1t + , not the price of a 
bond in period t . 
, 1 1t t t tQ D+ + Ε    is the price of this nominal  payoff in period t . Let there 
be H possible states of nature that could be realized in 1t +  (it is not really necessary to 
specify H , it could be infinity as well) conditional on the state of nature in period t . It 
was assumed that there is a complete asset market. There is an Arrow-Debreu security2 
for every state of nature. Then in order to obtain a certain payoff of  1tD +  in period 1t + , 
the agent must buy 1tD +  Arrow-Debreu securities for each possible state of nature. Let 
the price in period t  of an Arrow-Debreu security be 
, 1( )t tV h+ , where h  is the state of 
nature for which the security pays a unit of currency in period 1t + . Then the price of a 
portfolio in period t  risklessly yielding 1tD +  units of currency in period 1t +  is given by 
, 1 1
1
( )
H
t t t
h
V h D+ +
=
∑  or, equivalently, , 1 1
, 1
( )
( )
t t
t t
t t
V h
D
hξ
+
+
+
 
Ε   
 
, where 
, 1( )t t hξ +  is the probability that 
                                                 
2
 An Arrow-Debreu Security is an one-period security that yields one unit of currency in the period after the 
purchase of the security, if a specific state of nature occurs in this period, and nothing ,if any other state of 
nature occurs.  
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state of nature h  occurs conditional on the state on nature in period t . Hence, the one-
period stochastic discount factor 
, 1t tQ +  is defined as: , 1, 1
, 1
( )( ) ( )
t t
t t
t t
V hQ h
hξ
+
+
+
≡ .  
The domestic individual maximizes (24) subject to (25), which yields the two first-
order conditions (see Mathematical Appendix B.2, p. 84): 
t
t t
t
WC N
P
σ ϕ
=  
1
1, 1
1 1t tt
t tt t t
P C
P CQ
σ
β
−
+
++
  
 Ε = 
 Ε      
 
In order for these conditions to be indeed maximizing, it is assumed that the individuals 
are constrained by a no-Ponzi-scheme condition. 
Notice that , 1
, 1 , 1
1, 1
( ) ( )( )
H
t t
t t t t t t
ht t
V hQ V h
hξ
+
+ +
=+
 
 Ε = Ε =    
 
∑ , this means that this is the price in 
period t  of a portfolio consisting of one Arrow-Debreu security for each state of nature, 
i.e. a portfolio yielding riskless one unit of currency in period 1t + . Then the nominal 
riskless interest rate must be given by  
, 1 (1 ) 1t t t tQ i+ Ε + =  . Hence, 
, 1
11 t
t t t
i Q +
+ ≡
 Ε  
. 
This might look different from the setting in Obstfeld and Rogoff’s model, but the 
nominal interest rate is exactly equivalent. In the first model in this paper, the individual 
is buying a portfolio (of bonds) for a nominal price of t tPF  in period t , which yields 
1(1 )t t tP r F+ + in period 1t + . Therefore, the nominal interest rate is defined as 
1(1 ) (1 )t t t t t ti PF P r F++ = + , or as stated before 11 (1 )tt t
t
Pi r
P
++ = + . In the currently 
discussed model, the individual buys a nominal portfolio (of Arrow-Debreu securities) 
for 
, 1t t tQ + Ε    and gets 1 in the following period. Hence,  
, 1
11 t
t t t
i Q +
+ ≡
 Ε  
.  
Generally, the two asset markets, one with riskless bonds and one with a full set of 
Arrow-Debreu securities, are not equivalent. Assuming that there is a complete market 
for a full set of Arrow-Debreu securities is a stronger assumption than assuming there is a 
riskless bond. As discussed, one can always create a riskless bond out of Arrow-Debreu 
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securities by just buying securities for each state of nature. However, when there is an 
uncertainty, the Arrow-Debreu securities can provide insurance against unfavorable states 
of nature, which the riskless bond cannot. With Arrow-Debreu securities, the individual 
can not only smooth consumption intertemporally, but also across different states of 
nature. In Obstfeld and Rogoff’s model, however, the two assumptions are equivalent, 
since there is no uncertainty, i.e. there is only one state of nature. Arrow-Debreu 
securities are totally unrealistic, there are no such assets in the real world. On the 
contrast, one can think of some real world financial assets as riskless (if not perfectly 
riskless) bonds, such as US Treasuries or German Bonds. Both models assume perfect 
financial capital markets. This assumption does matter, even though there is no capital 
accumulation in these models. For a list of studies that show the major effects of asset 
markets imperfections on the current account, future output, etc. for models with capital 
accumulation see Antras and Caballero (2009), p. 704. Even when there is no investment 
in fixed capital, and only consumption, financial capital imperfections limit how much 
individuals can smooth consumption, thus possibly affecting the current account, 
consumption, output, etc. (see Obstfeld and Rogoff (1996), p. 359).   
Using 
, 1
11 t
t t t
i Q +
+ ≡
 Ε  
, one can rewrite the second first-order condition as: 
1
1
(1 ) 1t tt t
t t
P Ci
P C
σ
β
−
+
+
  
 + Ε = 
   
 
Then the two first-order condition can be log-linearized (in the case of the second, a log-
linear approximation), (see Mathematical Appendix B.3, p. 86): 
t
t t
t
WC N
P
σ ϕ
=                ⇒            t t t tc n w pσ ϕ+ = −                                                         (26) 
1
1
(1 ) 1t tt t
t t
P Ci
P C
σ
β
−
+
+
  
 + Ε = 
   
            ⇒      [ ] ( )1 11t t t t t tc c i pi ρσ+ += Ε − − Ε −               (27) 
where small case letters denote the natural logarithms of the respective variables, ti  is 
still the nominal interest rate (not the log), 1t t tp ppi −≡ −  is the CPI inflation, and 
lnρ β≡ − .  Note that ( )t tc c z≠  and ( )t tp p z≠ .          
 - 31 - 
Next, define the bilateral terms of trade between Home and country * as 
*
* t
t H
t
PS
P
=  , 
i.e. the price of country * goods in terms of domestic goods. Then the effective terms of 
trade are given by: ( ) 1/(1 )11 *
0
*
F
t
t tH
t
PS S d
P
γγ −− 
= =   
∫ , which can be approximated (up to first 
order) by log-linearizing around a perfect-foresight symmetric steady state. This 
symmetric state is derived later on, as, in order to solve for a symmetric steady state, the 
model should be fully specified (more relationships here, the firms’ side, and equilibrium 
conditions). It is a lot more convenient if the relationships are now log-linearized with a 
leap of faith, than postponing it after the symmetric steady state derivation. Furthermore, 
after discussing the Obstfeld and Rogoff’s model, it should be straightforward to see that 
there should be such a steady state. In fact, the symmetric steady state is basically 
equivalent. Again, all countries are assumed to be symmetric (for both firms and 
households), there are no foreign assets (before *0 0 0F F= = ), and no government 
spending, as here there is no government at all (before *0 0 0G G= = ). The last feature of 
the steady-state, perfect-foresight, is again shared by both models. In the first model, it is 
the general setting. In the currently discussed model, it is corresponding to assuming a 
fixed and known (and symmetric) technology of production for firms in all countries. 
Therefore, as in the first model, in the following, variables denoted with subscript 0 
concern this case. In this symmetric steady state the Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) 
holds, i.e. 0 0
H FP P= , and *00 0
0
1
F
H
PS S
P
= = =  for all [ ]* 0,1∈ . Then (see Mathematical 
Appendix B.4, p. 87):   
( ) 1/(1 )11 *
0
*
F
t
t tH
t
PS S d
P
γγ −− 
= =   
∫             ⇒         
1
*
0
*
F H
t t t ts p p s d= − = ∫     
The price index can be linearized around the steady state as well: 
( ) ( ) 1/(1 )1 1(1 ) H Ft t tP P P ηη ηα α −− − ≡ − +         ⇒          (1 ) H Ft t tp p pα α= − +  
where small case variables are the natural logarithms of the corresponding normal 
variables. ts  is called the log effective terms of trade. 
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Combining the two equations above gives:  
(1 ) ( )H H Ht t t t t tp p s p p sα α α= − + + = +   
Define domestic goods inflation as 1
H H H
t t tp ppi −= − . Given the above equation, the 
following must hold: Ht t tspi pi α= + ∆ . The difference between CPI inflation and domestic 
goods inflation is proportional to the percentage (remember that the variables are in 
logarithmic form) change in the terms of trade. The coefficient of proportionality is given 
by the coefficient of openness α . 
As in Obstfeld and Rogoff’s model, it is assumed that the law of one price holds: 
* * *
,*
( ) ( )t t tp z E p z=  for all [ ],* 0,1z ∈ , where *( )tp z is, as before, the price of country *’s 
good z is domestic currency, *tE  is the bilateral nominal exchange rate (the price of 
country *’s currency in terms of home currency), *
,*
( )tp z  is the price of county *’s good 
z in terms in country *’s currency (the producer’s currency). As previously, 
* * *
,*
( ) ( )t t tp z E p z=    ⇒    * * *,*t t tP E P= , 
where ( )( )1/(1 )1 1* *,* ,*0 ( )t tP p z dz µµ −−≡ ∫   (the result is obtained by just factoring out *tE ). 
Plugging this into the definition of FtP  and log-linearizating around the steady state gives 
(see Mathematical Appendix B.4, p. 87):  
( )1 1* *,*
0 0
* *
F w
t t t t tp e d p d e p= + = +∫ ∫  
where, lnF Ft tp P≡ ;    
* *lnt te E≡ ;    ( )1* *,* ,*0 ln ( )t tp p z dz≡ ∫ , which is the log domestic price 
index for country *;  
1
*
0
*t te e d≡ ∫ , which is the log nominal effective exchange rate;    
( )1 *,*
0
*
w
t tp p d≡ ∫  , which is the log world price index. For the world as a whole, there is no 
difference between CPI and domestic goods price level, nor for the corresponding 
inflation rates, because of Ht t tp p sα= +  (when aggregated among all countries, the terms 
of trade cancel out).   
Combining the above result with F Ht t ts p p= − , gives: 
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w H
t t t ts e p p= + −  
Let 
*
,** t t
t
t
E P
B
P
≡  be the bilateral real exchange rate with country *. Note that here the 
notation is a bit different than the one used for the Obstfeld and Rogoff’s model. Roughly 
said, variables with superscript * are concerning country * from the perspective of Home 
or are concerning some bilateral relationship between Home and *, while variables with 
second subscript * are concerning country * from country *’s perspective. The notation is 
used like this, since any possible approach could not be fully consistent with the one used 
in Obstfeld and Rogoff’s model and variables from Home’s perspective are used a lot 
more often and, hence, for convenience they are the one with a superscript. Therefore,
,*tP  
is the CPI index of country * in country *’s currency ( *
,*tP  is the price only for goods 
produced in country *, not the whole CPI). Let the log real effective exchange rate be 
given by: 
1
*
0
*t tb b d≡ ∫ , where, as usual, 
* *lnt tb B≡ . Then: 
 ( )1 1* * ,*0 0* *t t t t tb b d e p p d= = + −∫ ∫ , recall now that for the world as a whole, there is no 
difference between CPI and domestic goods price level, i.e. ( )1 ,*0 *wt tp p d= ∫ .  
w
t t t tb e p p= + −  , using the fact that 
w H
t t t ts e p p= + −  gives: 
H
t t t tb s p p= + −  , and using the approximation 
H
t t tp p sα= +  results in: 
(1 )t tb sα= − .    The log real effective exchange rate depends only on the log effective 
terms of trade and on the coefficient of openness.   
Since international integrated complete asset markets are assumed, it must be that the 
Arrow-Debreu securities have the same price everywhere. Then some foreign country 
faces the same first-order optimization condition as Home: 
, 1
,* , 1 1,*
,* ,* 1,* 1,*
1t t
t t t t
t t t t
V
C C
E P E P
σ σξ β+ − −+ +
+ +
= , the only difference is that the price of the Arrow-
Debreu security is defined in Home currency and, correspondingly, it pays one unit of 
Home currency in the following period. Thus, both must be converted in foreign 
currency. The dependence on states of nature is dropped here, since the equations must 
hold for any state of nature and it is irrelevant for which one the derivation is done. This 
 - 34 - 
expression can be rewritten as:   ,* 1,* ,*
, 1
1,* ,* 1,*
t t t
t t
t t t
P C EQ
P C E
σ
σ
β
−
+
+
−
+ +
= . Combining this, the condition 
for home and the definition of bilateral real exchange rate gives (see Mathematical 
Appendix B.5, p. 90): 
( )1/* *,*t t tC C B σϑ= , where *ϑ  is a constant depending on the initial conditions. Without 
loss of generality one can assume identical initial condition – no net foreign assets and 
identical ex-ante environment, i.e. the steady state conditions. Then * 1ϑ =  for all *.  
Furthermore, as shown later, in the steady state 
,*
w
t t tC C C= = . Taking the natural 
logarithm of both sides of ( )1/* *,*t t tC C B σϑ=  and the integrating over i  gives: 
1 1w w
t t t t tc c b c s
α
σ σ
−
= + = + , using (1 )t tb sα= −  (which is again an approximation), 
where ( )1 ,*0 *wt tc c d= ∫  is the log index of world consumption. 
Therefore, because of international integrated complete asset markets, home consumption 
can be fully described by world consumption, the terms of trade and the index of 
openness.  
 
3.2 Firms 
There is a unit interval of firms in Home, each producing a differentiated good with a 
linear technology given by the production function:  
( ) ( )t t ty z A N z= ,   where z  is the firm (which produces good z ), and lnt ta A≡  follows 
an AR(1) process 1t a t ta aρ ε−= + , where [ ] 0t tεΕ = .  Then the log real marginal costs are 
given by: 
H
t t t tmc w p aυ= − + − − ,  where ln(1 )υ τ≡ − − , τ  is an employment subsidy, which is not 
necessary for the purposes of this paper, but as in the case of Obstfeld and Rogoff’s 
model the analysis is kept authentic. To obtain the real marginal cost, just take the 
derivative with respect to ( )tN z of the total cost function, which is the labor divided by 
its productivity, times the real home wage, and times one minus the employment subsidy, 
and then take the natural logarithm. The production technology is, obviously, different 
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from the one in the first model, since here the producer can only expect, but not be 
certain, what he/she will be able to produce in future periods given some resources 
(labor), while in Obstfeld and Rogoff’s model the individual (who is also a producer) 
knows exactly how much output will come out of his/her future effort.  
Define ( ) /( 1)1 ( 1)/0 ( )t tY y z dz µ µµ µ −−≡ ∫ , an index of aggregate domestic output, which is 
analogous to the index of domestic consumption goods. Notice that 
1
0
( )t tN N z dz≡ ∫ , then 
the index of aggregate domestic output can be log-linearized around the steady state, 
giving (see Mathematical Appendix B.6, p. 91): t t ty a n= +  
In order to finish with the supply side specification, one must determine how prices 
are set. This model assumes Calvo pricing as initiated by Calvo (1983), which means that 
in each period a constant fraction of randomly selected firms from the unit interval of 
firms can set new prices. The remaining fraction must stick with their old prices. Let a 
fraction of 1 ϖ−  be able to set new prices, where [ ]0,1ϖ ∈ , correspondingly, a fraction 
of ϖ  must keep prices unchanged. The probability for each firm to be able to set a new 
price is unaffected by what happened in the past, i.e. it does not matter how long ago the 
firm was not able to re-optimize, the probability of being able to do so in the current 
period is still 1 ϖ− . In order to justify price stickiness, one can quote the same factors as 
in part 2 of this paper. However, one must again ask, if this is a proper way to model 
price behavior. It was shown that the way price dynamics are modeled in Obstfeld and 
Rogoff’s model is not consistent with the empirical evidence. Recall that in the first 
model all prices are fixed for one period and then all adjust. In terms of the setting here 
this means that ϖ  will not be a constant, but rather 1tϖ =  and  1 0tϖ + = . If the period is a 
year, the average period a price stays fixed is a year, which is roughly consistent with the 
data, even if the dynamics are not. What about the current model? There are many ways 
to check if it is consistent with price dynamics givenϖ  and the length of the period. If 
the period is a quarter one must look at what fraction of the prices change every quarter. 
As already stated, Blinder finds that 15% of prices change more frequently than quarterly 
(see Blinder (1991), p. 93). That is 1 0.15ϖ− =  and 0.85ϖ = . All the studies mentioned 
in part 2 find that the average period prices stay fixed is somewhat longer than one year. 
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What is the average period prices stay fixed in the Calvo model? Notice that in the first 
period 1 ϖ−  of the prices change, the length of their period being fixed is 1 period. In the 
second period 1 ϖ−  of the remaining fraction ϖ change, the duration of their period 
being fixed is 2 periods. By continuing, one can see that the average period a price stays 
fixed is given by ( )2 3(1 ) 1 2 3 4 ....ϖ ϖ ϖ ϖ− + + + , or 1
0
(1 ) k
k
kϖ ϖ
∞
−
=
− ∑ . To calculate this 
sum, just notice that 
0
1
1
k
k
ϖ
ϖ
∞
=
=
−
∑ , as 1ϖ < . Differentiate both sides with respect to ϖ : 
1
2
0
1
(1 )
k
k
kϖ
ϖ
∞
−
=
=
−
∑ . Therefore, the average time a price stays fixed in the Calvo model is 
given by 1
1 ϖ−
 periods. If the period is a quarter and 0.75ϖ = , prices remain fixed on 
average for a year. More serious econometric studies concerning the value of ϖ  exist. 
Gali and Gertler estimate the value of ϖ (there θ , which is usually used, but in this paper 
θ  was already used for something else) and obtain a value of 0.8 (see Gali and Gertler 
(1999), p. 210). Eichenbaum and Fisher perform an extensive analysis. In their main case 
scenario, they obtain values between 0.83 and 0.89, depending on the data (GDP deflator 
or price deflator for personal consumption expenditures)  and on the time period (first 
part and second of observations, and full sample) (see Eichenbaum and Fisher (2007), p. 
2040). Then they perform a series of robustness checks by varying the econometric 
model (estimating tens of models), and get a wider interval of values for ϖ , from 0.56 to 
0.89, with most values cluster around 0.75-0.86 (see Eichenbaum and Fisher (2007), pp. 
2044-2045). To conclude, the Calvo pricing might be artificial, meaning that there is no 
economic reason backing the assumption that firms price their products in this way, but it 
fits extremely well the data. One can see that almost all the studies approximately agree 
with each other for a quarterly Calvo pricing with [ ]0.75,0.85ϖ ∈ .          
Under Calvo pricing a firm will optimally set prices by a rule that can be the log-
linearized so that (see Mathematical Appendix B.7, p. 92): 
( )
0
(1 ) ( )kH nt t k
k
p mcϖβ ϖβ
∞
+
=
= + − ∑
⌣
ℏ , 
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where Htp
⌣
 is the log newly set domestic price, (1 )ln lnn n tt k t k
t
W
mc MC
A
τ
+ +
−
= =  the log 
nominal marginal cost, and ln
1
µ
µ
 
≡  
− 
ℏ .  
For future references, it is useful to derive one more equation from the optimal price 
setting. This is as well done in Mathematical Appendix B.7: 
( )1 ( )H Ht t t tmcpi β pi λ+= Ε + + ℏ                                                                                            (28)     
where (1 ) (1 )ϖλ ϖβ
ϖ
−
≡ −    (note that λ  is not a Lagrangian multiplier) 
 
3.3 Equilibrium 
In equilibrium supply and demand for Home goods must be equal. For a specific 
good z  this means: 
1
,*0
( ) ( ) ( ) *H Ht t ty z c z c z d= + ∫  , 
where the first term on the right-hand side gives the home consumption of home goods 
and the second term gives the consumption of home goods from all foreign countries. 
Using the demand functions and allocation relationships obtained before, one can rewrite 
this equation. Note that  ( )( ) Htt tH
t
p z
c z C
P
µ−
 
=  
 
 and (1 )
H
H t
t t
t
PC C
P
η
α
−
 
= −  
 
, combining 
these two gives: ( )( ) (1 )
H
t t
t tH
t t
p z P
c z C
P P
µ η
α
− −
   
= −    
   
. The easiest way to find the second 
term is to see what the demand of Home for a specific foreign good is, and then just 
rewrite it from the perspective of a foreign country, which is possible because of the 
assumption of symmetric preferences across countries. Notice that 
*
* *
*
( )( ) tt t
t
p z
c z C
P
µ−
 
=  
 
, 
*
* Ft
t tF
t
PC C
P
γ−
 
=  
 
 and 
F
F t
t t
t
PC C
P
η
α
−
 
=  
 
. Combining these gives: 
 
* *
*
*
( )( )
F
t t t
t tF
t t t
p z P P
c z C
P P P
µ γ η
α
− − −
     
=      
     
 . Rewriting this for foreign country leads to: 
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,*
,* ,**
,* ,*
( )( )
FH
tH t t
t tH F
t t t t
Pp z P
c z C
P E P P
γ ηµ − −−
    
=         
     
 
Then the equilibrium relation for good z  is given by: 
1
,*
,**0
,* ,*
( )( ) (1 ) *
FH H
tt t t
t t tH F
t t t t t
Pp z P Py z C C d
P P E P P
γ ηµ η
α α
− −
− −       
 = − +                    
∫   
In order to obtain the equilibrium aggregate domestic output, one must substitute the 
above equation into the definition of aggregate domestic output  
( ) /( 1)1 ( 1)/0 ( )t tY y z dz µ µµ µ −−= ∫ , which eventually leads to (see Mathematical Appendix B.8, 
p. 99): 
( ) ( )1 1/* *,*0(1 ) *
H
t
t t t t t
t
PY C S S B d
P
η
γ η η σ
α α
−
− −   
= − +     
∫  
After specifying the model in its entirety, it is now possible to derive the steady state 
around which some of the equations above are log-linearized. This is done in 
Mathematical Appendix B.9, p. 100.     
Now that the symmetric steady state is obtained, one can linearize without leaps of 
faith the equation giving the equilibrium in the domestic goods market. The result is (see 
Mathematical Appendix B.10, p. 104): 
1
t t t t t ty c s b c s
αω
αγ α η
σ σ
 
= + + − = + 
 
 
where ( 1)(1 )ω σγ ση α≡ + − − . 
For each country *, a similar condition hold, i.e. 
,* ,* ,*t t ty c s
αω
σ
= +  for each *. In order to 
obtain the world goods market clearing condition, one must aggregate over all the 
countries: 
1 1 1 1
,* ,* ,* ,*0 0 0 0
* * * *
w w
t t t t t ty y d c d s d c d c
αω
σ
≡ = + = ≡∫ ∫ ∫ ∫ . Note that here it is again 
used the fact that 
1
,*
0
* 0ts d =∫ .  Using this, and a previously obtained result, 
1w
t t tc c s
α
σ
−
= + , to plug into the linearized home goods clearing condition, gives: 
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1 1w w
t t t t t t t ty c s c s s y s
α
αω α αω
σ σ σ σ
−
= + = + + = +  
where 
1α
σ
σ
α αω
≡
− +
 
The results just obtained allow the linearized Euler equation (27) to be transformed in the 
following way (see Mathematical Appendix B.11, p. 105):  
[ ] ( )1 1 11 H wt t t t t t t ty y i y
α
pi ρ α
σ+ + +
   = Ε − − Ε − + ΘΕ ∆    
where ( 1) ( 1)(1 ) 1σγ ση α ωΘ = − + − − = −  
It is interesting to observe that the sensitivity of output to interest rate changes is 
influenced by the degree of openness, as 
1 1 ( 1) 1α
σ σ σ
σ
α αω α ω α
≡ = =
− + + − + Θ
. If 
0Θ > , an increase in openness raises the sensitivity, since ασ  gets smaller. In this case, 
if the interest rate is increased, there is an additional, to the direct negative effect on 
demand and output, negative effect of real appreciation (which makes consumers shift 
their demand towards foreign goods).  The effect’s magnitude is reduced by an increase 
in the CPI inflation relatively to domestic inflation (which makes consumer allocate more 
expenditures on home goods.), but not enough.    
Let the current account be defined as 
0
1 ( )tt t tH
t
P
ca Y C
Y P
= −  in terms of domestic 
output, as a fraction of the steady state output (similarly to the approach in Obstfeld and 
Rogoff’s model, where the current account was given by 
0
w
dF
C
). Ht t t tP Y PC=  implies 
balanced trade. Linearizing this expression is quite straightforward, additionally, recalling 
that Ht t tp p sα= + , then t t t tca y c sα= − − . Modifying the expression, using 
t t ty c s
αω
σ
= + , gives: 1t tca s
ω
α
σ
 
= − 
 
.  The current account depends only on the terms 
of trade and the parameters’ values. Notice that when 1ω
σ
= , which is possible, there is 
always balanced trade. This is quite strange, as then the current account is independent of 
the policy makers. There was no such situation in Obstfeld and Rogoff’s model, where 
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the current account is always affected by a change in policy. If it is predetermined that 
there is always a balanced trade, the model is seriously impaired. There will be no 
international net capital flows with resulting transfers, thus the possibility that a monetary 
shock has a longer affect (or in this model, stronger effect, as with Calvo pricing, some 
prices stay theoretically forever fixed) than for the period that prices are fixed has 
vanished. Furthermore, if this is the case, the model departs from reality in a noticeable 
way.   
The dynamics of domestic inflation are described by the previously derived equation 
(28): ( )1 ( )H Ht t t tmcpi β pi λ+= Ε + + ℏ , where (1 ) (1 )ϖλ ϖβϖ
−
≡ − . The real marginal cost is 
given by: Ht t t tmc w p aυ= − + − − , as previously shown. Add and subtract tp :  
( ) ( )Ht t t t t tmc w p p p aυ= − + − + − −   , remember that Ht t tp p sα= +  and equation (26)  
t t t tc n w pσ ϕ+ = − , which assures labor market clearing. 
t t t t tmc c n s aυ σ ϕ α= − + + + − , now use t t ty a n= +  and 
1w
t t tc c s
α
σ
−
= +  
1 (1 )wt t t t tmc c y s a
α
υ σ ϕ α σ ϕ
σ
− 
= − + + + + − + 
 
, world goods market clearing ensure 
that w wt tc y= . 
(1 )wt t t t tmc y y s aυ σ ϕ ϕ= − + + + − +  
The marginal cost increases with output and decreases with productivity. These two 
effects are obvious and equivalent to their counterparts in the closed economy setting. In 
open economy setting, however, the marginal cost also increases with world output and 
the terms of trade (when treated separately, as if they are not connected). Both variables 
influence positively the real wage through the wealth effect on labor supply resulting 
from their effect on domestic consumption.  
 Finally, use 1wt t ty y s
ασ
= +  to eliminate ts  from the equation: 
( ) ( ) (1 )wt t t tmc y y aα αυ σ σ ϕ σ ϕ= − + − + + − +                                                                (29) 
Here, one can see even better how the different variables affect the marginal cost. 
Domestic output affects the marginal cost through its impact on employment (captured by 
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ϕ ) and on terms of trade (captured by ασ ). World output, as discussed, affects marginal 
cost through its affect on consumption and, thus, on the real wage (captured byσ ) and, 
now, on the terms of trade, again captured by ασ . Recall that ασ  is a function of the 
coefficient of openness. It is not clear if world output raises the marginal cost or not when 
terms of trade are treated as endogenous, as it depends on the values of ασ  and σ . 
The output gap is defined as nt t tx y y≡ − , where 
n
ty is the log natural output, which 
means the output when prices are flexible. To obtain nty  use the obtained fact that under 
flexible prices tmc = −ℏ  and plug into (29), which gives (see Mathematical Appendix 
B.12, p. 106):  
n w
t t ty y aα= Ω + Ψ + Γ   
where  
α
υ
ϕ σ
−Ω ≡
+
ℏ
   ;    
1
α
ϕ
ϕ σ
+Γ ≡
+
    ;     α
α
σ
ϕ σ
ΘΨ ≡ −
+
 
Furthermore, combining equations (28) and (29) (it is derived in the same appendix 
B.12.) yields the so-called New Keynesian Phillips Curve (NKPC): 
( )1H Ht t t txαpi β pi κ+= Ε +                                                                                                      (30) 
where ( )α ακ λ ϕ σ≡ +  
The degree of openness affects the sensitivity of domestic inflation to the output gap 
again through ασ . The output gap affects the inflation rate by its impact on employment 
(captured by ϕ ) and on the terms of trade (captured by ασ ).  
Finally, modify [ ] ( )1 1 11 H wt t t t t t t ty y i y
α
pi ρ α
σ+ + +
   = Ε − − Ε − + ΘΕ ∆    to obtain a 
dynamic IS-type of relation in terms of the output gap. This is again done in appendix 
B.12.  
[ ] ( )1 11 H nt t t t t tx x i r
α
pi
σ+ +
 = Ε − − Ε −                                                                                (31) 
where ( ) 1(1 )n wa t t tr a yαρ σ ρ α + ≡ − Γ − + Θ + Ψ Ε ∆   is the natural real rate of interest.  
One can see that this is the natural rate of interest from the fact that if there is no output 
gap, i.e. 0tx =  for all t , output is always equal to its natural level, it must be that 
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( )1H nt t ti rpi +− Ε =  for all t  (note that according to the Fisher identity ( )1Ht t ti pi +− Ε  is the 
real interest rate).   
Equations (30) and (31) construct the non-policy block of this model. They involve 
two endogenous variables, the output gap- tx  and domestic inflation -
H
tpi , and one 
exogenous variable – the nominal interest rate ti . World output is also exogenous, but it 
is treated more as a parameter than as a variable from here on, since it cannot be affected 
by Home’s policies. In order to complete the model, it must be specified how the central 
bank determines the nominal interest rate. As already discussed, the market for money is 
ignored in this model, and it is assumed that the central bank can set any nominal interest 
rate it wants, without specifying exactly how it achieves that. Immediately, the question 
why does not the central bank choose a rule nti r=  arises. Surely, then  0
H
t tx pi= =  for 
all t  is an equilibrium. There are two problems with this rule, the first one concerns the 
real world, the second the particular model. First, the natural rate of interest is, in reality, 
something that is not usually observable, thus it is hard for a central bank to follow such a 
rule. The more serious problem is, however, that in this model, even if the central bank 
knows exactly what nr  is, this is not a rule that can be followed mechanically. This is the 
case, as 0Ht tx pi= =  is only one of the possible equilibria, and it is not unique. Multiple 
equilibria must be avoided, otherwise the model is nonsensical. In order to understand 
when there are multiple equilibria and when there is a unique equilibrium, let the central 
bank follow a Taylor rule, as proposed by Taylor (1993) (see Taylor (1993), p. 202).  
H
t t x t ti h h xpiρ pi δ= + + +   This is the most famous and used interest rate rule. The non-
negative parameters hpi  and xh  show how strongly the central bank reacts on, 
correspondingly, inflation and output gap. Let 1t t t
δ
δδ ρ δ ε−≡ + , [0,1)δρ ∈  ,be an AR(1) 
process, which represents an exogenous disturbance, i.e. the monetary shock. Then the 
whole model is described by the three equations (30), (31) and the Taylor rule:  
( )1H Ht t t txαpi β pi κ+= Ε +  
[ ] ( )1 11 H nt t t t t tx x i r
α
pi
σ+ +
 = Ε − − Ε −   
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H
t t x t ti h h xpiρ pi δ= + + +  
Using the Taylor rule to eliminate the interest rate from equation (31) transforms the 
system into: 
( )1H Ht t t txαpi β pi κ+= Ε +  
[ ] ( )1 11 H H nt t t t x t t t tx x h h x rpi
α
ρ pi δ pi
σ+ +
 = Ε − + + + − Ε −   
A system of two expectational difference equations. Expressing the system explicitly and 
stating it in matrix form gives (see Mathematical Appendix B.13, p. 107): 
( )
( )
1
1
( )t tt n tH H
t t t
xx
A b rα α ρ δpi pi
+
+
Ε  
= + − −    Ε   
 
where: 
1
( )x
h
A
h
α pi
α α
α α α α
σ β
σ κ κ β σ
− 
≡ Ξ  + + 
    ;   
1
bα α
ακ
 
≡ Ξ  
 
       ;     
1
xh h
α
α α piσ κ
Ξ ≡
+ +
 
Now, one can discuss the problem with multiple equilibria. The problem is that both tx  
and Htpi  are non-predetermined (jump) variables. Therefore, the solution is unique if and 
only if both eigenvalues of Aα  are in the unit circle (see Blanchard and Kahn (1980), p. 
1308). For exactly this problem, the necessary and sufficient condition for this to hold is 
given by: ( 1) (1 ) 0xh hα piκ β− + − >  (see Bullard and Mitra (2002), p. 1115). After 
establishing this fact, examining the proposed interest rate rule nti r=  shows that it is just 
a special case of the general formula of the Taylor rule. However, in this special case it 
holds that 0hpi =  and 0xh = , thus ( 1) (1 ) 0xh hα pi ακ β κ− + − = − < .   
In Obstfeld and Rogoff’s model a permanent money shock is modeled, that is here 
equivalent to a permanent increase of the interest rate. However, there is a key difference. 
In the first model in this paper, the central bank does not react on any developments in 
the economy. Its monetary policy is totally exogenous. Here, this would correspond to a 
policy with 0hpi =  and 0xh = , e.g. t si ρ δ= + , where sδ  is the increase, but, as it was 
just shown, such a policy cannot be used in Gali and Monacelli’s model. In the currently 
discussed model, an active central bank must be modeled, which responds to the 
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economy developments. If there is a shock through tδ , the interest rate does not change 
by tδ , but also accounts for the central bank’s endogenous response to changes in the 
output gap and the inflation rate. Qualitatively, there should generally not be a difference, 
but, quantitatively, the results could be quite different. One can again quote John Taylor, 
as earlier in this paper: In reality, “a fixed money growth rule will generally imply a 
reaction of interest rates to the inflation rate and to real output similar in form though not 
necessary similar in size to interest rate policy rules” (see Taylor (1999b), p. 661). One 
must keep this in mind when analyzing the results. 
In order to find how variables react to a monetary shock, it is useful to eliminate all 
other shocks, otherwise the effects of the different shocks would indistinguishably mix. 
Assume that the change in world output is zero. Furthermore, assume that monetary 
policy does not affect the natural level of output and this level stays the same (equivalent 
to assuming that the technology of production stays the same). This assumptions imply 
nr ρ= . This is, because 
 ( ) 1(1 )n wa t t tr a yαρ σ ρ α + ≡ − Γ − + Θ + Ψ Ε ∆  , as 1 0wty +∆ = , this turns to: 
(1 )n a tr aαρ σ ρ= − Γ − . It was assumed that 1 0nty +∆ = , but n wt t ty y aα= Ω + Ψ + Γ  and  
1 1 1
n w
t t ty y aα+ + += Ω + Ψ + Γ , combining these two gives 1 ( 1)nt a ty aρ+∆ = Γ − . Hence, it must 
be that nr ρ= . Note that the fact that ( 1) 0a taρΓ − =  implies that technology stays 
constant.  
The system of equations that must be solved for tx and 1
H
tpi +   is given by: 
( )1H Ht t t txαpi β pi κ+= Ε +  
( ) ( )1 11 H H nt t t t x t t t tx x h h x rpi
α
ρ pi δ pi
σ+ +
 = Ε − + + + − Ε −   
The solution is found again in appendix B.13. It takes the following form: 
( )1t tx Hδ δβρ δ= − −  
H
t tHα δpi κ δ= −  
where [ ]
1 0(1 ) (1 ) ( )x
H
h hδ δ α δ pi δ αβρ σ ρ ρ κ
≡ >
− − + + −
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A contractionary monetary shock ( 0tδε > ) affects both the output gap and the inflation 
rate negatively.  Notice that Hδ  is decreasing in both hpi  and xh , and hence the effect of 
the shock is decreasing in them. Therefore, if the central bank reacts strongly to both 
deviation of output and inflation, it would stabilize them a lot faster when there is 
monetary shock. There is no tradeoff between inflation stabilization and output 
stabilization when stabilizing a monetary shock. The optimal thing for a central bank that 
faces only such shocks is to have as strong a response as possible.   
It is now fairly easy to solve for all other variables in the model. The most important 
step is to realize that, since the natural level of output is unaffected by the monetary 
shock and stays constant, the response of output matches that of the output gap. 
Furthermore, the results below are responses to the monetary shock, the deviation caused 
by the shock from their value before that. Some variables may experience permanent 
changes, some might revert back to their original level. This is not equivalent to the “hat” 
notation used in part 2 of this paper, since the variables are still the logarithms. Note that 
a single one period shock is modeled, i.e. 0t
δε ≠  in period t  and 0t
δε =  in later periods. 
Therefore, since 1wt t ty y s
ασ
= + , the effect of the monetary shock on the terms of trade is  
given by ( )1t t ts x Hα α δ δσ σ βρ δ= = − − . Here are the effects on the following variables 
( )1 1 1t t tca s Hα δ δω ωα α σ βρ δσ σ
   
= − = − − −   
   
 
( )1Ht t t t ts H Hα δ α δ δpi pi α κ δ ασ βρ δ= + ∆ = − − − ∆  
( ) ( ) ( )1 1 1 1t t t t t tc y s H H Hδ δ α δ δ α δ δαω αω αωβρ δ σ βρ δ σ βρ δσ σ σ
 
= − = − − + − = − − − 
 
 
( )(1 ) (1 ) 1t t tb s Hα δ δα σ α βρ δ= − = − − −  
From w Ht t t ts e p p= + −    ⇒    ( )1Ht t t t te s H Hα δ δ α δpi σ βρ δ κ δ∆ = ∆ − = − − ∆ −  
( )( )1 1Ht t x t t x ti h h x h H h Hpi pi α δ δ δρ pi δ κ βρ δ= + + + = − − −  
( ) ( )( )1 11 1Ht t t t x t tr i h H h H Hpi α δ δ δ α δpi κ βρ δ κ δ+ += − Ε = − − − + =  
( )( ) ( )( )1 1 1 ( ) 1x t x th H h H H h H h Hpi α δ δ δ α δ δ pi δ α δ δ δκ βρ κ ρ δ ρ κ βρ δ= − − − + = − − − −  
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As seen from the equations above, an expansionary monetary shock ( 0tδε < ) 
increases consumption by less than output, because of a deterioration of the terms of 
trade. The intuition behind this is straightforward. Given an expansionary shock, ts  
becomes larger. ts  is the logarithm of 
F
t
t H
t
PS
P
= . That is, the relative price of foreign 
goods increases. This is the case, since an expansionary shock increases home output, 
while the outputs of foreign countries stay the same. Therefore, the relative price of home 
goods decreases with the effect depending on η , the elasticity of substitution between 
home and foreign goods. A lower relative price of home goods means that the real 
amount of goods home consumers can buy from the revenue of their exports falls. Hence, 
the consumption does not increase as much as output. Another important thing to note is 
that CPI inflation increases faster than home goods inflation, again because of 
deterioration of the terms of trade. The effects are, however, more easily seen when the 
model is simulated and plotted, as displayed in the next part of this paper.     
 
4. Assessment  
In this section, the two models’ results are compared, to each other and to the real 
world data. In order to perform the comparison quantitatively and not only qualitatively, 
the two models must be simulated. This also makes the qualitative analysis easier. Before 
simulated, the models must be calibrated. In obtaining the parameters’ values, various 
microeconomic studies are used and, generally, the main case scenario for the estimated 
value is chosen. Studies or cases in a study that give extreme values for a parameter are    
avoided. The parameters are assigned the following values taken from the quoted studies: 
3.846ε = , since from the money demand equations (12) and (13), one can calculate 
that: 
1 1(1 )(interest elasticity of money demand) (interest elasticity of money demand)iε = + ≈  
for small i (even if i  is 0.1 (10% interest, which is quite high), ε  becomes 4.23. The later 
obtained results are quite robust in terms of this parameter and, thus, this approximation 
is not of a great importance). Hafer and Hein estimate interest elasticities of money 
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demand for different periods in the US. Here, their estimation of 0.26 is used (see Hafer 
and Hein (1984), p. 251). This gives 3.846ε = . 
0.955β = , which is the annual discount factor. Coller and Williams find that 
individuals discount payoffs, which are one year in the future, by a rate between 4.08% 
and 5.13% (see Coller and Williams (1999), p. 117). Here, a 4.5% is chosen. Note that an 
annual discount factor of 0.955 means a quarterly discount factor of 0.989.  
1.88θ µ γ= = = , the elasticity of substitution between all goods in Obstfeld and 
Rogoff’s model,θ , is assumed to be equal to the elasticity of substitution between goods 
produced within a country, µ , and the elasticity of substitution between goods produced 
in different foreign countries, γ , in Gali and Monacelli’s model. This is the case, since 
the value for θ  is obtained from a study examining goods in general (all goods, foreign 
and home, making no difference between the two, as in Obstfeld and Rogoff’s model), 
and there is no logical reason why consumers should have different, from the general 
case, preferences when they consider goods from the same country or that they should 
favor some foreign country’s goods instead of the goods of some other foreign country. 
The value is taken from a paper that studies price elasticities of demand (recall that for 
these particular functions (CES functions of this type) the elasticity of substitution 
between goods is also the price elasticity of demand). A not-extreme value of 1.88 is 
chosen (see Tellis (1988), p. 334).    
0.81η = , consumers do, however, differentiate between foreign and home goods in 
the real world. There are many studies examining this phenomenon and they always find 
lower elasticity of substitution between home and foreign goods compared to the 
elasticity of substitution for all good. Here the value is taken from a study by Blonigen 
and Wilson (see Blonigen and Wilson (1999), p. 8).      
0.23n = , which is roughly the size of US GDP relatively to World GDP. The biggest 
economy in the world is chosen for the size of Home in Obstfeld and Rogoff’s model, 
since if the model is interpreted as “Foreign equals the rest of the world”, changes in 
policy of a small country have negligible effects on Foreign and much of the insights of 
the model are lost. Furthermore, the effects of Foreign policy on Home are unrealistically 
strong (mainly because there is no home bias in this model).   
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1.5hpi =  and 0.5xh = ,  the strength of the reaction of the central bank to inflation and 
output gap in Gali and Monacelli’s model is set the same as Taylor estimated it in his 
initial contribution (see Taylor (1993), p. 202).  
0.55α = , which is the coefficient of openness in Gali and Monacelli’s model. A 
value of 0.55 corresponds to a rather open economy.   
0.8ϖ = , which agrees with the already discussed studies concerning quarterly Calvo 
pricing. This particular value is found by Gali and Gertler (see Gali and Gertler (1999), p. 
210).  
0.933δρ = , which measures the persistency of a monetary shock. The parameter’s 
value is calculated by using the fact the half-life of a monetary shock is found to be 
around 10 quarters (see Christiano et al. (2005), p. 41). The effect of a monetary shock is 
precisely halved after 10 quarters if 0.933δρ = .    
The last two parameters that must be determined are the ones from the utility function 
in Gali and Monacelli’s model: 
1 1
0
0 1 1
t t t
t
C NU
σ ϕ
β
σ ϕ
− +∞
=
 
= Ε − 
− + 
∑ . It is assumed that 1ϕ = , a 
quadratic loss from labor effort, just as in Obstfeld and Rogoff’s model, and that 0.9σ = . 
For the latter parameter, a value different from 1 is chosen, since, although a value of one 
corresponds to the logarithmic case, similarly to Obstfeld and Rogoff’s model, it is a 
particularly special case, and there might be some insights that occur only for this 
situation. As the model is solved for the general case, it is practical not to restrict it only 
to the logarithmic one.   
One must stress that this is not a proper calibration, as the values are taken from 
across the literature. To be fully consistent one must investigate what the values of all the 
parameters for one single country are. For example, it could be quite possible that no 
country that is that open ( 0.55α = ), pursues such a monetary policy ( 1.5hpi =  and 
0.5xh = ), even though both phenomena are separately observed. This argument can be 
extended to many of the parameters’ values, even the ones that depend mostly on human 
nature. Unfortunately, an estimation of all these parameters for a single country at a 
single point of time (as parameters change over time) is out of the scope of this paper. 
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Therefore, with this disclaimer note, it is assumed that such countries, as the ones 
described by the parameters above, exist.  
Deviations of Output, Consumption, Exchange Rate and CPI
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Figure 2: Effects of a permanent one percent increase in home money supply on Output, 
Exchange rate, Consumption and Consumer Price Level. 
 
Figure 2 shows the effects of a one percent increase in home money supply in 
Obstfeld and Rogoff’s model. Figure 3 displays the simulation of a unit expansionary 
monetary shock ( 1 1δε = −  and 0tδε =  for 1t > ) in the setting of Gali and Monacelli’s 
model. Before comparing the models’ results, it must be again stated that oranges and 
apples are compared. In the first model, the central bank does not react to developments 
in the economy, while, in the second model, the central bank actively interacts with the 
economic environment. Therefore, the effects from the monetary shocks are not 
equivalent in magnitude. Only the relative size of two variables in one of the models can 
be compared with the relative size of two variables in the other model, e.g. consumption 
rises by some fraction of the increase in output in Obstfeld and Rogoff’s model and by 
some other fraction in Gali and Monacelli’s model. The sheer fact that output increases 
by 1.7% from the steady state in the first period after the shock in Obstfeld and Rogoff’s 
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model and by approximately 0.7% in Gali and Monacelli’s model does not yield further 
information concerning the comparison between the models.   
 
Figure 3: Effects of a unit expansionary monetary shock ( 1 1δε = − ) on Output, 
Exchange rate, Consumption and Consumer Price Inflation rate. 
 
Furthermore, Obstfeld and Rogoff’s model is simulated by setting one period equal to 
a year, otherwise (one period = one quarter), as already discussed, the price dynamics 
does not make sense. Moreover, the results would be quite strange, since the short term 
effects of the shock would disappear after only one quarter. Gali and Monacelli’s model 
is simulated on a quarterly basis, as typical for such models. 
The most notable difference is in terms of the models’ dynamics. As, in the first 
model, prices are fixed only for one period, the graph displays kinks and the economy 
converges from the short-run state to its long-run steady state for just one period. In the 
second model, the economy converges slowly to the long-run steady state. However, in 
both cases there are only two phases after the shock: the first phase, which displays the 
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increases after the shock and is equal to one period for both models, and a second phase 
of convergence to the long-run steady state. In Obstfeld and Rogoff’s model the second 
phase is again equal to one period, while in Gali and Monacelli’s model it is much longer. 
If the length of the convergence is put aside, the models exhibit strong resemblance. 
In both models, an expansionary monetary shock results in an increase in output and in a 
smaller increase in consumption. Both of which converge in the long-run to values close 
to zero. In Obstfeld and Rogoff’s model consumption stays permanently higher and 
output permanently lower, because of interest payments, as discussed before, but the 
effects are relatively small compare to the short-run fluctuations. In Gali and Monacelli’s 
model, consumption and output deviations from the steady state asymptotically converge 
to zero, however, that also means that they stay positive for any finite horizon, even if the 
values become negligibly small.  
Furthermore, in both models the price level rises permanently and the rise occurs in 
both phases. The graphs are here slightly confusing, as in figure two the consumer price 
level is shown, and in figure three the inflation rate. This is done, since the two models 
are structured in such a way that it is straightforward to solve for the displayed variables 
and the literature usually depicts them in this manner. It is clear from figure 2 that there is 
inflation in periods 1 and 2. After these two periods the price level reaches a value close 
to one, but remains below one, because of the permanent increase in consumption (recall 
the long-run money demand equations). After period 2, there is no inflation in Obstfeld 
and Rogoff’s model. In figure 3, inflation starts in period one and diminishes in future 
periods, asymptotically converging to zero. This is equivalent to the price level increasing 
in period one and then in increasing further at a diminishing rate to some value (which 
could be found if the model is solved for the price level). 
The only significant difference, besides the length of convergence, is in the effect of 
the policy shock on the nominal exchange rate. In Obstfeld and Rogoff’s model, the 
exchange rate jumps immediately to its long-run steady state value. In Gali and 
Monacelli’s model, this is not the case. The exchange rate either overshoots or 
undershoots its long-run steady state value. One can show that which of the two happens 
depends on the parameters’ values (see Gali (2008), ch. 7, p. 22). Then the exchange rate 
converges to its long-run steady state value. 
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How do these results compare to the real world? Obviously, Obstfeld and Rogoff’s 
model is not consistent with the dynamics of a real economy, but dynamics aside, do the 
real world economies exhibit the same patterns. Figure 4 and figure 5 show a vector 
autoregression (VAR) studies done respectively by Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans 
(see Christiano et al. (2005), pp. 6-7) and by Bouakez, Cardia and Ruge-Murcia (see 
Bouakez et al. (2005), p. 1083).  
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Figure 4: The effects of an expansionary monetary shock on output, 
consumption and inflation, estimated by a VAR (the line with plus signs). 
The shaded areas are the 95% confidence intervals. Periods are quarters. The 
effects are measured in percentages. Note: the line without plus signs is a 
simulation of a model, which is not important for this paper 
 
        
   
Figure 5: The effects of a one percent money supply shock on output, consumption 
and inflation, estimated by a VAR (the dashed line). Periods are quarters. The effects 
are measured in percentages. Note: the green continuous line is a simulation of a 
model, which is not important for this paper. 
 
The models’ results are roughly consistent with these studies when output and 
consumption are considered. Although, in both models the maximum deviation from the 
steady state occurs immediately after the shock, while the estimates show that the 
maximum is reached after a few quarters. In figure 4, output and consumption behave 
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exactly as predicted by the models, with output increasing more than consumption and 
then both converge to zero. Output slightly overshoots the zero and goes to negative, an 
effect precisely consistent with Obstfeld and Rogoff’s insights. The study displayed in 
figure 2 finds similar patterns in output and consumption, however, here consumption 
rises by more than output and then overshoots the zero and turns negative. Both effects 
are not predicted by the models. Inflation behaves quite strangely in both studies. At first, 
it is negative and then turns positive before starting to converge to zero. The negative turn 
in the beginning is not explain by the models in this paper. However, it must be noted 
that both studies are using US data. In the models described here, almost the entire (in 
Obstfeld and Rogoff’s model - the entire) positive deviation of inflation in the beginning 
is explained by exchange rate fluctuations. As the US is huge and quite close economy, 
these effects are smaller than for smaller and more open economies.      
One must also state that studies examining the effects of monetary policy do not 
always agree with each other. For example, in a famous paper, Bernanke and Mihov find 
persistency of output deviations after a monetary shock, which is not consistent with most 
of macroeconomic theory (including the two models discussed in this paper). Figure 6 
displays one of their results, if some other money aggregate is used, the results are similar 
(see Bernanke and Mihov (1998), p. 155).   
 
  Figure 6: Effect of a M2 increase on GDP, estimated by a bivariate VAR. Dashed 
lines denote the 95% confidence intervals.  
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When considering nominal exchange rates, the problem of estimating the response to 
a monetary shock is quite severe. This is the case, since nominal exchange rates are 
extremely volatile. They might change with full percentage points in a day, which is not 
the case for the other estimated aggregates. Furthermore, in general, exchange rates are 
not driven by fundamentals in the short-run. Even a rumor in the financial markets can 
dramatically change the exchange rate. Meese and Rogoff find that no estimating 
procedure performs better than a random walk (or in continuous setting – Brownian 
motion) when it comes to estimating nominal exchange rates (see Meese and Rogoff 
(1983), pp. 20-21). Nevertheless, there are studies that try to measure the effect of a 
monetary shock on the exchange rate. Figure 7 displays a study by Eichenbaum and 
Evans, note that here a contractionary shock is modeled (see Eichenbaum and Evans 
(1995), p. 995). Hence, in order to compare to the models in this paper, just multiply the 
results by -1, which is slightly sloppy but should be, in general, approximately true. 
 
          
Figure 7: Effects of a contractionary monetary shock on the bilateral nominal 
exchange rates between the USD and, respectively, the Yen, the DM, the Lira, the 
Franc and the Pound, as estimated by a VAR. The periods are months. Dashed lines 
denote the 95% confidence intervals. 
 
Eichenbaum and Evans look only on bilateral exchange rates. Figure 8 displays a 
study by Kim where the trade-weighted exchange rate is considered. This time the 
monetary shock is expansionary (see Kim (2003), p. 364). 
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A)  B)  
C)  
Figure 8: Effects of an expansionary monetary shock on the trade-weighted nominal 
exchange rate, as estimated by three different VARs (A, B, C). Dashed lines denote 
the 95% confidence intervals. 
 
The displayed results are slightly different from each other, but they all share some 
features. No study shows that exchange rates jump immediately to their new long-run 
values. On the contrary, there is strong evidence that this is not the case. Therefore, this 
insight from Obstfeld and Rogoff’s model is not consistent with the data. Furthermore, all 
studies show a peak of the deviation after some periods and then convergence to some 
lower value. That is consistent with the simulation of Gali and Monacelli’s model when 
the exchange rate overshoots, although there the peak occurs immediately after the shock.  
One last aspect to consider is the magnitude of the effect of the exchange rate on the 
inflation rate. In Obstfeld and Rogoff’s model, all of the inflation in the period directly 
after the shock is caused by the change in the interest rate. Afterwards, in the convergent 
phase, all of it is caused by the change in home prices.  In Gali and Monacelli’s model, it 
is harder to judge exactly what fraction of inflation is due to exchange rate fluctuations 
from the graph. However, a precise answer can be obtained as the model can be 
simulated also for home goods inflation. Nevertheless, you can see from the graph that 
the peak in the inflation rate is just after the shock, when only a small fraction of home 
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prices change, but the exchange rate is at its peak as well. Therefore, much of the 
inflation rate deviation is due to the change in the exchange rate. In Obstfeld and 
Rogoff’s model around 75% of inflation is caused by the change in the exchange rate. In 
Gali and Monacelli’s model the fraction is less, but still quite high. There is extensive 
literature on exchange rate pass-through effects in imported goods inflation and its effect 
on the inflation rate in general. Studies like Choudhri and Hakura (2006), Tulk (2004), 
etc. find significant pass-through effects, especially for smaller, more open, and less 
developed economies. However, these effects are a lot smaller than 75% even for the 
most open developing economies. Usually, there is significantly less than 100% pass-
through in imported goods prices (see Tulk (2004), p. 7) and, consequently, much less in 
consumer price inflation (see Choudhri and Hakura (2006), p. 628). The effect is so 
significant in Obstfeld and Rogoff’s model, because of the earlier discussed flaw of the 
model, which is that there is no home bias.  
To sum up, the models fit rather well to the real world data when output and 
consumption are considered, if the flawed dynamics of Obstfeld and Rogoff’s model is 
put aside. This is not the case when inflation is examined. Gali and Monacelli’s model 
roughly match the exchange rate data when the coefficients are such that the exchange 
rate overshoots its long-run value immediately after the shock. Obstfeld and Rogoff’s 
model fails to explain the dynamics of interest rate changes.  
 
4. Conclusion  
The two models discussed in this thesis represent two of the three prominent ways to 
model the effects of monetary policy in an open economy setting while combining 
rational expectations and intertemporal optimization with nominal rigidities and 
imperfect markets. Obstfeld and Rogoff’s initial contribution was followed by many two-
country models with one period in advance preset prices. Notably, by Corsetti and 
Pesenti (2001), where the flaw in Obstfeld and Rogoff’s model of no home bias is fixed, 
making the results more credible. However, models with one period in advance preset 
prices cannot describe the more complex dynamics of a real world economy. Models with 
Calvo pricing are better suited for this. Gali and Monacelli’s paper is one of the key 
contributions when a small open economy with Calvo pricing is analyzed. Another paper 
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by Clarida , Gali and Gertler (2001) introduces also cost-push shocks in this setting, 
which could also be done in the Gali and Monacelli’s model, a not extremely complicated 
extension. Kollmann (2002) analyzes even more general case with several sources of 
shocks.  
The problem with models like Gali and Monacelli’s is that not only the home 
economy has a zero measure, but all the economies in the world do so. This means that 
policies in a country do not affect any other countries. In many real world situations this 
is not really the case (e.g. policy in the US should have no effect on Canada). In this 
situation a two-country model can be used to examine the effects. However, if one wants 
to keep Calvo pricing in the model, models like Obstfeld and Rogoff’s cannot be used. 
Therefore, the third prominent way to model monetary policy in open economy setting is 
developed. Contributions, such as Clarida, Gali and Gertler (2002) and Benigno and 
Benigno (2006), combine a two-country model with Calvo pricing. This field in the 
literature is not analyzed in this paper, but it is equally important to the first two.   
The fact that these three braches of literature are already initiated does not mean that 
there is no scope for further research. As seen in this thesis, there are many things that 
could be improved in the existing models. Furthermore, new models can be developed by 
relaxing some of the strong assumptions in the existing models. For example, a model 
with capital market imperfections can lead to rather different results or a model with 
central banks with different strengths of commitment in different countries. Many of 
these ideas are already treated in the literature, but rarely in fully specified models with 
all the essential features discussed in this thesis.   
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Mathematical Appendix A 
A.1. CES Function 
Let an individual has fixed income equal to I  and let he/she gains utility from higher 
values of  
1 ( 1)/ /( 1)
0
[ ( ) ]C c z dzθ θ θ θ− −= ∫ , then the agent maximizes 
1 ( 1)/ /( 1)
0
[ ( ) ]C c z dzθ θ θ θ− −= ∫ , 
subject to 1
0
( ) ( )p z c z dz I=∫ , which is his/her budget constraint. Take the Lagrangian: 
1 1( 1)/ /( 1)
0 0
[ ( ) ] [ ( ) ( ) ]L c z dz p z c z dz Iθ θ θ θ λ− −= − −∫ ∫  
FOC: 
1 ( 1)/ 1/( 1) 1/
0
1[ ( ) ] ( ) ( ) 0( ) 1 i ii
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θ θ θ θθ θ λ
θ θ
− − −
∂ −
= − =
∂ − ∫
 
1 ( 1)/ 1/( 1) 1/
0
[ ( ) ] ( ) ( )i ic z dz c z p zθ θ θ θ λ− − − =∫ , taking this also for jz  and dividing gives: 
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Since elasticity of substitution is defined as 
ln[ ( ) / ( )]
ln[ ( ) / ( )]
j i
s
i j
d c z c z
d p z p z
Ε = , it is clear from the 
equation above that s θΕ = . 
 
A.2 Price index 
The price index is defined as the minimum expenditure for which a consumer can obtain 
1 unit of the consumption index, hence the problem is: 
1
0
min ( ) ( )p z c z dz∫    subject to 
1 ( 1)/ /( 1)
0
[ ( ) ] 1c z dzθ θ θ θ− − =∫  
the solution to this is quite similar to the derivation of the Elasticity of substitution. 
1 1 ( 1)/ /( 1)
0 0
( ) ( ) {[ ( ) ] 1}L p z c z dz c z dzθ θ θ θλ − −= − −∫ ∫  
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same for jz  and dividing gives: 
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the constraint 
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, multiply both sides by ( )jp z  and integrate: 
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1
0
( ) ( )p z c z dz∫ is the minimum expenditure to buy one unit, that is what was denoted by 
tP . Hence, 
1 1 1/(1 )
0
[ ( ) ]t iiP p z dz
θ θ− −
=
= ∫   
 
A.3. Demand function 
The beginning of this derivation is exactly the same as the one in A.1 and A.2. The 
individual has some fixed amount for expenditure on consumption I , and maximizes 
1 ( 1)/ /( 1)
0
[ ( ) ]C c z dzθ θ θ θ− −= ∫ , because higher values of tC  result in higher utility, given 
utility function (1). The problem is again: max 1 ( 1)/ /( 1)
0
[ ( ) ]C c z dzθ θ θ θ− −= ∫ , subject to 
1
0
( ) ( )p z c z dz I=∫ . From here we get:  
( )( ) ( ) ( )
i
i j
j
p z
c z c z
p z
θ
θ
−
−
= , plugging in this in the constraint as in A.2. gives: 
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c z
p z Pp z dz
θ θ θ
θ θ θ
− −
−
− −
=
∫
∫
, clearly t
t
I C
P
=  
( ) ( )
t
j t
j
P
c z C
p z
θ
θ
−
−
=  
( )( ) [ ]jj t
p z
c z C
P
θ−
=  gives the demand function for jz  
 
A.4. Price indexes’ connection: 
As *( ) ( )p z Ep z= , the price index for home can be rewritten as: 
1/(1 ) 1/(1 )1 11 1 * 1
0 0
( ) ( ) [ ( )]n
n
P p z dz p z dz Ep z dz
θ θ
θ θ θ
− −
− − −   
= = +
      ∫ ∫ ∫  
analogously for foreign: 
1/(1 )11/(1 )1 1
* * 1 * 1
0 0
( )( ) ( )n
n
p zP p z dz dz p z dz
E
θθθ
θ θ
−
−
−
− −
   
= = +        
∫ ∫ ∫  
Then:
1/(1 )1 1/(1 )1 1
* * 1 1 * 1
0 0
( ) ( ) ( ) [ ( )]n n
n n
p zEP E dz p z dz p z dz Ep z dz P
E
θθ θ
θ θ θ
−
−
−
− − −
    
= + = + =        
∫ ∫ ∫ ∫    
 
A.5. The individual’s decision problem: 
1
2
0
max log ( )
1 2
j
t j t
t t
t t
MC y j
P
εχ κβ
ε
−
∞
=
  
 + − 
−   
∑   
subject to: 1 1 1(1 ) ( ) ( )j j j j j jt t t t t t t t t t t t tPF M P r F M p j y j PC PT− − −+ = + + + − −  
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The individual decides how much to consume - jtC , how much money to hold -
j
tM , how 
much real bonds to hold - jtF , and how much to work - ( )ty j . World demand, both 
private and government, is taken as given.  
The budget constraint can be modified, since, as shown ( )( ) ( )w wtt t t
t
p jy j C G
P
θ−
 
= + 
 
: 
( ) ( ) ( )w wt t t t ty j p j P C Gθ θ= + , multiplying both sides by 1( )ty j θ −  gives: 
1 1( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )w wt t t t t t ty j y j p j y j P C Gθ θ θ θ− −= +  
( ) 1( ) ( ) ( ) ( )w wt t t t t ty j p j y j P C Gθ θ θ−= +  
( 1)/ 1/( ) ( ) ( ) ( )w wt t t t t ty j p j y j P C Gθ θ θ−= + , substituting this into the budget constraint: 
( 1)/ 1/
1 1 1(1 ) ( ) ( )j j j j w w j jt t t t t t t t t t t t t t tPF M P r F M P y j C G PC PTθ θ θ−− − −+ = + + + + − −  
Expressing explicitly for jtC : 
( 1)/ 1/
1 1 1(1 ) ( ) ( )j j j w w j j jt t t t t t t t t t t t t t tPC P r F M P y j C G PT PF Mθ θ θ−− − −= + + + + − − −  
( 1)/ 1/1
1 1(1 ) ( ) ( )
j j
j j w w j jt t
t t t t t t t t
t t
M MC r F y j C G T F
P P
θ θ θ−
−
− −
= + + + + − − −   
Plugging in this into the utility function in order to obtain an unconstraint maximization 
problem: 
1
( 1)/ 1/ 21
1 1
0
max log (1 ) ( ) ( ) ( )
1 2
j j j
t j w w j jt t t
t t t t t t t t
t t t t
M M M
r F y j C G T F y j
P P P
ε
θ θ θ χ κβ
ε
−
∞
−
−
− −
=
    
 + + + + − − − + −   
−     
∑
Then the three first order conditions (Euler equations) are: 
With respect to jtF : 
( 1)/ 1/1
1 1
1
( 1)/ 1/ 1
1 1 1 1 1
1 1
1( 1)
(1 ) ( ) ( )
1(1 ) 0
(1 ) ( ) ( )
t
j j
j w w j jt t
t t t t t t t
t t
t
t j j
j w w j jt t
t t t t t t t
t t
M M
r F y j C G T F
P P
r
M M
r F y j C G T F
P P
θ θ θ
θ θ θ
β
β
−
−
− −
+
− +
+ + + + +
+ +
− +
+ + + + − − −
+ + =
+ + + + − − −
 
1
1
1 1(1 )t tt j j
t t
r
C C
β β+
+
+ =  
1 (1 )j jt t tC r Cβ+ = +  
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With respect to jtM : 
( 1)/ 1/1
1 1
1 1 1 (1 )
1(1 ) ( ) ( )
j
t t t
j j
j w w j jt tt t t
t t t t t t t
t t
M
M MP P P
r F y j C G T F
P P
ε
θ θ θ
χβ β ε
ε
−
−
−
− −
 
−
+ − + 
−  + + + + − − −
1
( 1)/ 1/ 11
1 1 1 1 1
1 1
1 1 0
(1 ) ( ) ( )
t
j j
j w w j jt tt
t t t t t t t
t t
M MP
r F y j C G T F
P P
θ θ θ
β +
− ++
+ + + + +
+ +
+ =
+ + + + − − −
 
1
1 1 1 1 1 01
1
j
t
j j
tt t t t t
t
t
M
iP C P P CP
r
ε
χ β
−
+
 
− + + =  + 
+
, since 11 (1 )tt t
t
Pi r
P
++ = +  ⇒  1
1
1
t
t t
t
iP P
r
+
+
=
+
 
1
11 1
1
j
t t
j j
t t t t
M r
P C i C
ε
χ β
−
+
  +
= − 
+ 
, substituting 1 (1 )j jt t tC r Cβ+ = +  gives 
11 1
1 (1 )
j
t t
j j
t t t t t
M r
P C i r C
ε
χ β β
−
  +
= − 
+ + 
 
1 1(1 )
1
j
t
j
t t t
M
P C i
ε
χ
−
 
= − 
+ 
 
1
1
j
t t
j
t t t
M i
P C i
ε
χ
−
 
= 
+ 
    ⇒     
1j jt t
t
t t
M iC
P i
ε
χ  += 
 
 
1/
1j jt t
t
t t
M iC
P i
ε
χ +=  
 
 
With respect to ( )ty j : 
[( 1)/ ] 1 1/
( 1)/ 1/1
1 1
1 1( ) ( )
(1 ) ( ) ( )
t w w
t t t j j
j w w j jt t
t t t t t t t
t t
y j C G
M M
r F y j C G T F
P P
θ θ θ
θ θ θ
θ β
θ
− −
−
−
− −
−
+ −
+ + + + − − −
( ) 0t ty jβ κ− =  
1/ 1/1 1( ) ( ) ( ) 0w wt t t tj
t
y j C G y j
C
θ θθ κ
θ
−
−
+ − =  
1/ 1/1 1 1( ) ( ) ( )w wt t t tj
t
y j y j C G
C
θ θθ
κ θ
−
= +  
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( 1)/ 1/1 1( ) ( )w wt t tj
t
y j C G
C
θ θ θθ
θκ
+ −
= +   
The Transversality Conditions are given by: 
The Transversality Condition concerning the real bonds is: 
( 1)/ 1/1
1 1
1lim 0
(1 ) ( ) ( )
t j
tj jt j w w j jt t
t t t t t t t
t t
F
M M
r F y j C G T F
P P
θ θ θ
β
→∞
−
−
− −
−
=
+ + + + − − −
 
1lim 0t jtjt
t
F
C
β
→∞
= , however 2 21 1(1 ) (1 )j j jt t t t tC r C r Cβ β+ −= + = + , continuing this until 0t =  
gives: 0(1 )j t t jt tC r Cβ= + , then the Transversality Condition is: 
0
1lim 0(1 )
t j
tt t jt
t
F
r C
β β→∞ =+ , canceling out gives: 
1lim 0(1 )
j
ttt
t
F
r→∞
=
+
 
Transversality Condition for money holdings is given by: 
1lim 0
j
t t
jt
t t
M
C P
β
→∞
=    ⇒     lim 0(1 )
j j
T t t
T TT
t t
C M
r P
β β→∞ =+  
1lim 0(1 )
j
t
tt
t t
M
r P→∞
=
+
 
Combining these two gives the condition imposed onto the agents: 
1lim 0(1 )
j
j t
ttt
t t
MF
r P→∞
 
+ = 
+  
 
 
A.6. Modifying the budget constraint: 
Given that no Ponzi schemes can exist (insured by the Transversality Condition) the 
budget constraint in a steady state for home must hold in the following form:   
(1 ) ( )PF M P r F M p h y PC PT+ = + + + − − , expressing for C  gives 
( )p h yC rF T
P
= + − , however 1t tt t
t
M MG T
P
−
−
= + , hence in this case it is 
M MG T T
P
−
= + = , therefore T can be interchanged with G . 
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( )p h yC rF G
P
= + −  
Analogously for foreign: 
* *
* * *
*
( )p f yC rF G
P
= + − . World net foreign assets must be zero, as domestic nominal 
money supply must equal domestic nominal money demand, i.e. *(1 ) 0nF n F+ − = . Then 
*
1
nF F
n
= −
−
, plugging in this into the equation gives: 
* *
* *
*
( )
1
n p f yC r F G
n P
 
= − + − 
− 
  
 
A.7. Global goods market clearing condition: 
The budget constraint for a representative agent of home is given by: 
1 1 1(1 ) ( )t t t t t t t t t t t t tPF M P r F M p h y PC PT− − −+ = + + + − −  
for a representative agent of foreign: 
* * * * * * * * * * *
1 1 1(1 ) ( )t t t t t t t t t t t tP F M P r F M p f y P C P T− − −+ = + + + − − , divide both by the 
corresponding price indexes: 
1
1 1
( )(1 )t t t tt t t t t
t t t
M M p h yF r F C T
P P P
−
− −
+ = + + + − −  
* * * *
* * * *1
1 1* * *
( )(1 )t t t tt t t t t
t t t
M M p f yF r F C T
P P P
−
− −
+ = + + + − − , rearrange and use the fact that 
1 0t tt t
t
M MG T
P
−
−
= + =  and 
* *
* * 1
*
t t
t t
t
M MG T
P
−
−
= + : 
1 1
( )(1 ) t tt t t t t
t
p h yC r F F G
P− −
= + − + −  
* *
* * * *
1 1 *
( )(1 ) t tt t t t t
t
p f yC r F F G
P− −
= + − + − , take a population weighted average and add: 
Left-hand side: *(1 ) wt t tnC n C C+ − =  
Right-hand side: 
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[ ]
* *
* * *
1 1 1 1 *
( ) ( )(1 ) (1 ) (1 ) (1 ) (1 )t t t tt t t t t t t t
t t
p h y p f y
n r F F n r F F n n nG n G
P P− − − −
 + − + − + − + + − − − − 
Using the financial market clearing condition to cancel out the real bonds and the fact 
that *(1 )wt t tG nG n G= + − gives: 
* *
*
( ) ( )(1 )w wt t t tt t
t t
p h y p f yC n n G
P P
= + − −  
  
A.8. Closed Form Solution: 
As *0 0 0F F= =  and 
*
0 0 0G G= =  
0 0 0 0
0 0 0
0 0
( ) ( )p h y p h yC rF G
P P
= + − =   and  
* * * *
* *0 0 0 0
0 0 0* *
0 0
( ) ( )
1
p f y p f ynC r F G
n P P
 
= − + − = 
− 
 
Furthermore, 
*
0 0
*
0 0
( ) ( ) 1p h p f
P P
= = , as the wealth of the countries is the same ( *0 0 0F F= = ). 
(Formally, that is: 0 0 1/(1 )11 * 10
0
( ) ( )
( ) [ ( )]n
n
p h p h
P p h dh Ep f df
θ
θ θ
−
− −
=
 +
  ∫ ∫
. Since 0 ( )p h and 
*
0 ( )p f  are the same for all h  and f respectively, this can be rewritten as: 
0 0
1/(1 )1 * 1
0 0 0
( ) ( )
( ) (1 )[ ( )]
p h p h
P np h n Ep f θθ θ −− −
=
 + − 
. In this symmetric equilibrium with equal 
country wealth, any two goods produced anywhere in the world have the same price 
when measured in the same currency, that is *0 0( ) ( )p h Ep f= .  Then 0 0
0 0
( ) ( ) 1( )
p h p h
P p h
= =  
One must again stress that this is not the case when wealth is not the same in both 
countries, since, as seen later on, terms of trade vary with wealth, because individuals 
change their consumption-leisure decision with wealth.)  
Then 0 0C y=  and 
* *
0 0C y= . However, as the individuals in this case in the two countries 
face identical optimization, it must be that *0 0y y=  and, thus, 
*
0 0C C= . From 
*
0 0C C=  it 
follows that *0 0 0
WC C C= = . Then the condition for the output is: 
( 1)/ 1/ 1/
0 0 0 0
0 0
1 1 1 1( ) ( )w wy C G y
C y
θ θ θ θθ θ
θκ θκ
+ − −
= + =  
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( 1)/
0
(1 )/
0
1y
y
θ θ
θ θ
θ
θκ
+
−
−
=    ⇒    ( 1 1 )/0
1y θ θ θ θ
θκ
+ − + −
=  
1/2
0
1y θ
θκ
− 
=  
 
 
The equation that determines real money holdings is: 
1/
1j jt t
t
t t
M iC
P i
ε
χ +=  
 
, where 11 (1 )tt t
t
Pi r
P
++ = + , as at the steady state 1t tP P+ = , it follows 
ti r= . The real interest rate is given by 
1
r
β
β
−
= , then  
1 11
1 1 1
1 1 1
t
t
i r
i r
β
β β
β β β
β β
−
+
+ +
= = = =
− −
−
. Hence, 
1/ 1/
1/0
0 0
0
1 ( )
1
M y y
P
ε ε
εχ β
β χ
−
   −
= =   
−   
. The derivation is analogous for 
*
0
*
0
M
P
 and, since 
*
0 0y y= , 
*
0 0
*
0 0
M M
P P
= . 
 
A.9. Log-linearization of the model: 
Purchasing power parity: 
*P EP=  , take natural logarithm of both sides 
*ln( ) ln( )P EP=   ⇒    *ln( ) ln lnP E P= + , totally differentiate (one must take into 
account that the initial value is at the steady state denoted by 0 subscripts): 
*
*
0 0 0
dP dE dP
P E P
= +     ⇒     *ˆ ˆ ˆP E P= +      ⇒   *ˆ ˆ ˆE P P= −  
Price Indexes: 
As all producers are symmetric
1/(1 )11 * 1
0
( ) [ ( )]n
n
P p z dz Ep z dz
θ
θ θ
−
− − 
= +
  ∫ ∫ is equivalent to: 
{ }1/(1 )11 *( ) (1 ) ( )t t t tP np h n E p f θθθ −−−  = + −   , take natural logarithm of both sides 
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{ }11 *1ln ln ( ) (1 ) ( )1t t t tP np h n E p f θθθ −−  = + −  − , totally differentiate: 
* 1
0 0 0
1 11 * 1 *
0 0 0 0 0 0 0
(1 ) ( ) (1 )(1 ) ( )1 1( )
1 1( ) (1 ) ( ) ( ) (1 ) ( )t t
np h n p f EdP dp h dE
P np h n E p f np h n E p f
θ θ θ
θ θθ θ
θ θ
θ θ
− − −
− −
− −
− − −
= + +
− −   + − + −   
* 1
*0 0
11 *
0 0 0
(1 )(1 ) ( )1 ( )
1 ( ) (1 ) ( ) t
n p f E dp f
np h n E p f
θ θ
θθ
θ
θ
− −
−
−
− −
+
−  + −  
, as  *0 0 0( ) ( )p h E p f=  (this is true, since in 
this steady state the two countries have the same wealth, hence 
*
0 0
*
0 0
( ) ( ) 1p h p f
P P
= = , and as  
*P EP= , it must be that *0 0 0( ) ( )p h E p f=  also.) the equation becomes: 
[ ] [ ]
* 1
0 0 0
1 11 1
0 0 0 0
( ) (1 ) ( )
ˆ ( )
( ) (1 ) ( ) ( ) (1 ) ( )t t t
np h n p f EP dp h dE
np h n p h np h n p h
θ θ θ
θ θθ θ
− − −
− −
− −
−
= + +
+ − + −
 
[ ]
* 1
*0 0
11
0 0
(1 ) ( ) ( )
( ) (1 ) ( ) t
n p f E dp f
np h n p h
θ θ
θθ
− −
−
−
−
+
+ −
 
* 1 * 1
*0 0 0 0 0
01 1 1
0 0 0
( ) (1 ) ( ) (1 ) ( )
ˆ ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )t t t
np h n p f E n p f EP dp h dE dp f
p h p h p h
θ θ θ θ θ
θ θ θ
− − − − −
− − −
− −
= + +  
( ) ( )
* 1 * 1
*0 0 0 0
1 1
* *
0 0 0 0 0
( ) ( ) ( )
ˆ (1 ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )
t
t t t
dp h p f E p f EP n n dE dp f
p h E p f E p f
θ θ θ θ
θ θ
− − − −
− −
 
 = + − +
 
 
 
*
ˆ ˆ
ˆ ˆ( ) (1 )( ( ))t t t tP np h n E p f= + − +   
Completely analogical is the derivation of the Price index for foreign: 
* *
ˆ ˆ
ˆ ˆ( ( ) ) (1 ) ( )t t t tP n p h E n p f= − + −   
 Global goods market equilibrium: 
* *
*
( ) ( )(1 )w wt t t tt t
t t
p h y p f yC n n G
P P
= + − −  
The left-hand side is given by:  *(1 )wt t tC nC n C= + − , take natural logarithm of both sides 
( )*ln ln (1 )wt t tC nC n C= + − , totally differentiate: 
*
* *
0 0 0 0 0
1
(1 ) (1 )
w
t
t tw
dC n ndC dC
C nC n C nC n C
−
= +
+ − + −
 , one must recall that *0 0 0
WC C C= =  
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*
*
0 0 0
(1 )
w
t t t
w
dC dC dC
n n
C C C
= + −     ⇒     *ˆ ˆ ˆ(1 )wt t tC nC n C= + −  
The right-hand side: 
* *
*
( ) ( )(1 )w wt t t tt t
t t
p h y p f yC n n G
P P
= + − − , take natural logarithm of both sides 
* *
*
( ) ( )ln ln (1 )w wt t t tt t
t t
p h y p f yC n n G
P P
 
= + − − 
 
, totally differentiate: 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
0
* * *0
* *
0 0 0 0
0*
0 0
( )
ˆ
... ( ) ... ... ... ( ) ... ...( ) ( )(1 )
w w
t t t t t t t t
w
p h
n
PC dy dp h dP dy dp f dP dG
p h y p f y
n n G
P P
= + + + + + +
+ − −
where ( )... is the first partial derivative with respect to the variable of the following 
differential (it is explicitly solved only for ty , the other cases are as straightforward). 
Here, it is important to remember that * *0 0 0 0 0
WC C y y C= = = = and  
*
0 0
*
0 0
( ) ( ) 1p h p f
P P
= = . 
Then the above equation can be simplified to: 
* * *
* * *
0 0 0 0 0 0 0
( ) ( )
ˆ (1 ) (1 ) (1 )( ) ( )
w
w t t t t t t t
t w
dy dp h dP dy dp f dP dGC n n n n n n
y p h P y p f P C= + − + − + − − − −  
* * *
0
ˆ ˆ ˆ
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ( ( ) ) (1 )( ( ) )
w
w t
t t t t t t t w
dGC n y p h P n y p f P
C
= + − + − + − −  
Demand faced by producers: 
( )( ) ( )w wtt t t
t
p zy z C G
P
θ−
 
= + 
 
, take into account that all producers are symmetric and take 
natural logarithm of both sides: 
( )ln ln ln( )w wtt t t
t
p h
y C G
P
θ  = − + + 
 
,  
( )ln ln ln ( ) ln( )w wt t t t ty P p h C Gθ= − + + , totally differentiating gives: 
( )
0
ˆˆ
ˆ ˆ ( )
w
w t
t t t t w
dGy P p h C
C
θ= − + +  
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Analogously for foreign: ( )* * *
0
ˆˆ
ˆ ˆ ( )
w
w t
t t t t w
dGy P p f C
C
θ= − + +   
First order conditions determining output: 
( 1)/ 1/1 1 ( )w wt t t
t
y C G
C
θ θ θθ
θκ
+ −
= + , take natural logarithm of both sides 
1 1 1 1ln ln ln ln( )w wt t t
t
y C G
C
θ θ
θ θκ θ
+ −
= + + + , multiply both sides by θ  and totally 
differentiate:  
0
ˆ ˆ
ˆ( 1)
w
w t
t t t w
dGy C C
C
θ θ+ = − + +  
Same for foreign: * *
0
ˆ ˆ
ˆ( 1)
w
w t
t t t w
dGy C C
C
θ θ+ = − + +  
Modified budget constraints: 
( )p h yC rF G
P
= + − , take natural logarithm of both sides: 
( )ln ln p h yC rF G
P
 
= + − 
 
, totally differentiate: 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
0 0
0 0
0
ˆ
... ( ) ... ... ...( )
rdFC dp h dy dP dGp h y
rF G
P
= + + − −
+ −
, one must here again 
recall the fact that: * *0 0 0 0 0
WC C y y C= = = = ;  
*
0 0
*
0 0
( ) ( ) 1p h p f
P P
= =  and *0 0 0F F= =  
0 0
ˆ ˆ
ˆ ˆ( )
w w
dF dGC r p h y P
C C
= + + − −  
For foreign, repeating the same procedure leads from 
* *
* *
*
( )
1
n p f yC r F G
n P
 
= − + − 
− 
 
to 
*
* * * *
0 0
ˆ ˆ
ˆ ˆ( )
1 w w
n dF dGC r p f y P
n C C
 
= − + + − − 
− 
 
Consumption Euler equations: 
1 (1 )t t tC r Cβ+ = + , take natural logarithm of both sides and totally differentiate: 
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1
0
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ
ˆ(1 )11 1
t t
t t t t t t t
dr drC C C dr C r C
r
β ββ
β
+ = + = + = + = − +
−+ +
  (note that 1r ββ
−
=  or 
1
r
ββ −= ) 
Same for foreign: 1ˆ ˆˆ(1 )t t tC r Cβ+ = − +  
Money demand equations: 
1/
1t t
t
t t
M iC
P i
ε
χ +=  
 
    ⇒      
1/
1 1t t
t t
M C
P i
ε
χ
  
= +   
  
 recall that 1
1
1
t
t t
t
iP P
r
+
+
=
+
, from where 
one can express 1 1(1 ) (1 )1t t t t t
t t
r P r P Pi
P P
+ ++ + −
= − = .  Then: 
1/ 1/
1
1 1
(1 )1(1 ) (1 )
t t t t
t t
t t t t t t t
M P r PC C
P r P P r P P
ε ε
χ χ +
+ +
      +
= + =         + − + −      
, take natural logarithm of 
both sides: 
1
1
(1 )1ln ln ln ln (1 )
t t t
t
t t t t
M r PC
P r P P
χ
ε
+
+
  +
= + +   + −  
  
( ) ( )( )1 11ln ln ln ln (1 ) ln (1 )t t t t t t t
t
M C r P r P P
P
χ
ε + +
= + + + − + −  
( )( )1 11ln ln ln ln(1 ) ln ln (1 )t t t t t t t
t
M C r P r P P
P
χ
ε + +
= + + + + − + − , totally differentiate: 
0 0
1 1
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
11 1 1 1
ˆˆ ˆ ˆ
1 (1 ) (1 ) (1 )t t t t t t t t
P rM P C dr P dr dP dP
r r P P r P P r P Pε ε + +
 +
− = + + − − + 
+ + − + − + − 
 
0
1
0 0 0 0
11 1 1 1 1 1 1
ˆˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ1
1t t t t t t
rM P C dr P P
r r r rε ε ε ε+
   +
− = + − + − +   
+   
 
0 0
1
0 0 0 0
11 1 1 1 1 1
ˆˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ
(1 )t t t t t t
r rM P C dr P P
r r r rε ε ε ε+
 
− −
− = + − + 
+ 
, recall that 0
1
r
β
β
−
= , hence: 
0
1 1
1 1r
β
β β
β
= =
−
−
. Then: 
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( )1
0 0
1 1 1 1
ˆˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ
(1 ) 1t t t t t tM P C dr P Pr r
β
ε ε ε β +
 
− = − − − 
+ − 
 
2 2 2 2
0 0 2 2 2
1 1 1 (1 ) (1 ) (1 ) 1 2(1 ) 1r r β β β β β β β β β β ββ β β β β β
 − − − − − + − − + − +
+ = + = + = = 
 
 
0 0 2
1(1 )r r ββ
−
+ = . Substitute in the equation: 
( )2 11 1 1ˆˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ1 1t t t t t tM P C dr P Pβ βε ε β ε β + − = − − − − −  , recall that 0
1
1 r
β
β =− : 
1
ˆ ˆ1
ˆˆ ˆ
ˆ
1
t t
t t t t
P PM P C rβ
ε ε β
+
 
−
− = − + 
− 
 
Analogically for foreign: 
* *
* * * 1
ˆ ˆ1
ˆˆ ˆ
ˆ
1
t t
t t t t
P PM P C rβ
ε ε β
+
 
−
− = − + 
− 
 
 
A.10. Solving the linearized model: 
First solve for the difference between home and foreign variables. Subtracting (5) from 
(4) gives:  
( ) ( )* * *
0 0
ˆ ˆˆ ˆ
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ( ) ( )
w w
w w
w w
dG dGy y P p h C P p f C
C C
θ θ− = − + + − − − −  
( )* * *ˆ ˆˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ( ) ( )y y P p h P p fθ− = − − + , recall that *ˆ ˆ ˆE P P= −  
( )* *ˆˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ( ) ( )y y E p h p fθ− = − +  
Then subtracting (7) from (6): 
* *
0 0
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ
ˆ ˆ( 1)( )
w w
w w
w w
dG dGy y C C C C
C C
θ θ θ+ − = − + + + − −  
* *ˆ ˆ
ˆ ˆ( 1)( )y y C Cθ θ θ+ − = − +  
( )* *ˆ ˆˆ ˆ 1y y C Cθθ− = − −+  
Subtracting (9) from (8) 
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*
* * * *
0 0 0 0
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ( ) ( )
1w w w w
dF dG n dF dGC C r p h y P r p f y P
C C n C C
 
− = + + − − + − − + + 
− 
 
*
* * * *
0 0 0
1ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ( ( ) ( ))
1 w w w
dF dG dGC C r y y P P p f p h
n C C C
 
− = − + + − − − + − 
− 
, note that  
( )* * *ˆ ˆˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ( ) ( )y y P p h P p fθ− = − − + , hence: 
* * *
*
0 0 0
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ1 ( )ˆ ˆ
1 w w w
dF dG dG y y y yC C r
n C C C
θ
θ θ
− − 
− = − + + − 
− 
 
 
*
* *
0 0 0
1 1ˆ ˆ
ˆ ˆ( )
1 w w w
dF dG dGC C r y y
n C C C
θ
θ
− 
− = − + + − 
− 
, note that ( )* *ˆ ˆˆ ˆ 1y y C Cθθ− = − −+  
( )** *
0 0 0
1 1ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ
1 1w w w
dF dG dGC C r C C
n C C C
θ θ
θ θ
− 
− = − + − − 
− + 
 
( ) **
0 0 0
1 1ˆ ˆ1
1 1 w w w
dF dG dGC C r
n C C C
θ
θ
−   
+ − = − +   + −   
 
( ) **
0 0 0
2 1ˆ ˆ
1 1 w w w
dF dG dGC C r
n C C C
θ
θ
 
− = − + + − 
 
*
*
0 0 0
1 1 1 1ˆ ˆ
2 1 2 2w w w
rdF dG dGC C
n C C C
θ θ θ
θ θ θ
+ + +      
− = − +      
−      
 
Now multiply equation (6) by n  and equation (7) by 1 n− , then add up: 
0
ˆ ˆ
ˆ( 1)
w
w
w
dG
n y n C C
C
θ θ + = − + + 
 
 
* *
0
ˆ ˆ
ˆ(1 )( 1) (1 )
w
w
w
dG
n y n C C
C
θ θ − + = − − + + 
 
 
( )* *
0
ˆ ˆ ˆ
ˆ ˆ( 1) (1 ) ( (1 ) )
w
w
w
dG
ny n y nC n C C
C
θ θ+ + − = − + − + +  
Do the same procedure with equations: 
( )
0
ˆˆ
ˆ ˆ ( )
w
w
w
dGy P p h C
C
θ= − + + and ( )* * *
0
ˆˆ
ˆ ˆ ( )
w
w
w
dGy P p f C
C
θ= − + + : 
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( ) ( )* * *
0
ˆˆ ˆ
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ(1 ) ( ) (1 ) ( )
w
w
w
dG
ny n y n P p h n P p f C
C
θ θ+ − = − + − − + + , recall that  
*
ˆ ˆ
ˆ ˆ( ) (1 )( ( ))t t t tP np h n E p f= + − +  and * *ˆ ˆˆ ˆ( ( ) ) (1 ) ( )t t t tP n p h E n p f= − + −  
( ) ( )* * *
0
ˆ
ˆ ˆˆ ˆ
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ(1 ) ( 1) ( ) (1 )( ( )) (1 ) ( ( ) ) ( ) ( )
w
w
t t t t t t w
dG
ny n y n n p h n E p f n n p h E n p f C
C
θ  + − = − + − + + − − + − + +
 
After canceling out: 
*
0
ˆ
ˆ ˆ(1 )
w
w
w
dG
ny n y C
C
+ − = +  
combining with the result obtain just before this one, 
0
ˆ
ˆ( 1) (1 )
w
w w
w
dGy C
C
θ θ+ = − +  and   
0
ˆ
ˆ
w
w w
w
dGy C
C
= + , where *ˆ ˆ ˆ(1 )wy ny n y= + −  gives :  
0 0
ˆ ˆ( 1) (1 )
w w
w w
w w
dG dGC C
C C
θ θ + + = − + 
 
  ⇒      
0
ˆ2
w
w
w
dGC
C
θ θ= −  
0
1ˆ
2
w
w
w
dGC
C
= −  
The same for ˆ wy  gives : 
0
1
ˆ
2
w
w
w
dGy
C
=  
Noticed that *(1 ) wnX n X X+ − = , where X is equal to ˆC  or ˆy , can be rewritten in two 
ways: *(1 )( )wX X n X X= + − −  or * *( )wX X n X X= − − . Then: 
*
0 0 0 0
1 1 1 1 1
ˆ (1 )
2 2 1 2 2
w
w w w w
dG rdF dG dGC n
C n C C C
θ θ θ
θ θ θ
 + + +      
= − + − − +       
−       
, since  
*(1 )wdG ndG n dG= + −  this could be simplified to: 
*
0 0 0
1 (1 )( 1) (1 )( 1) 1ˆ
2 2 2 2 2w w w
rdF n n dG n n dGC
C C C
θ θ θ
θ θ θ
+ − + − + −     
= − + + −     
     
 
*
0 0 0
1 1 1ˆ
2 2 2w w w
rdF n dG n dGC
C C C
θ θ
θ θ θ
+ + − −     
= − +     
     
 
For foreign: 
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*
*
0 0 0 0
1 1 1 1 1
ˆ
2 2 1 2 2
w
w w w w
dG rdF dG dGC n
C n C C C
θ θ θ
θ θ θ
 + + +      
= − − − +       
−       
 
*
*
0 0 0
1 ( 1) ( 1) 1ˆ
1 2 2 2 2 2w w w
n rdF n n dG n n dGC
n C C C
θ θ θ
θ θ θ
+ + + −      
= − + − − +      
−      
 
*
*
0 0 0
1ˆ
1 2 2 2w w w
n rdF n dG n dGC
n C C C
θ θ
θ θ θ
+ +      
= − + −      
−      
 
To obtain the solution for output, use equations (6) and (7) for a steady state. 
Equation (6) 
0
ˆ ˆ
ˆ( 1)
w
w
w
dGy C C
C
θ θ+ = − + +  , can be rewritten by using 
0
1ˆ
2
w
w
w
dGC
C
= −  as: 
0 0
1 1
ˆ
ˆ
1 1 2
ww
t
w w
dGdGy C
C C
θ
θ θ
 
= − − − 
+ +  
 
0
1ˆ
ˆ
1 2(1 )
w
w
dGy C
C
θ
θ θ
 
= − +  + + 
 
The same procedure from equation (7): * *
0
ˆ
ˆ( 1)
w
w
w
dGy C G
C
θ θ+ = − + + gives: 
* *
0
1ˆ
ˆ
1 2(1 )
w
w
dGy C
C
θ
θ θ
 
= − +  + + 
 
The solution for terms of trade can be obtained by recalling that: 
( )* *ˆˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ( ) ( )y y E p h p fθ− = − +  and ( )* *ˆ ˆˆ ˆ 1y y C Cθθ− = − −+ . The equations can be 
transformed to: ( ) ( )* * *1 1 ˆ ˆˆˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ( ) ( ) 1p h p f E y y C Cθ θ− − = − − = −+  
 
A.11. Linearizing the current account: 
1 1 1
( )t t
t t t t t t
t
p h yF F r F C G
P− − −
− = + − −  , recall that *0 0 0F F= = and that 1tF −  denote the 
stock of bond held by a home resident at the beginning of period t. Since the system is 
log-linearized around the zero steady state, the change from this state is examined. 
Hence, 1tF −  denote the bonds held in the baseline steady state, i.e. 1 0 0tF F− = = . 
Then the equation is: 
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( )t t
t t t
t
p h yF C G
P
= − − , rearrange and take the natural logarithm of both sides:  
( )( )ln lnt t t t t
t
p h y F C G
P
= + + , totally differentiating gives: 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
( )
( )
t t t t t tdp h dy dP dF dC dG
p h y P F C G F C G F C G
+ − = + +
+ + + + + +
, since *0 0 0G G= =   and 
* *
0 0 0 0 0
WC C y y C= = = = : 
0 0 0
( )
ˆˆ
ˆ
t t t
t t tw w
dp h dF dGy P C
y C C
+ − = + + , however here the short run is considered, then 
ˆ ˆ(1 )P n E= −  and ( ) 0dp h = : 
0 0
ˆ ˆ
ˆ (1 )t
w w
dF dGy C n E
C C
= − − − − , notice that the assets at the end of period t are the steady 
state levels, since the economy has returned to the steady state after one period:  
0 0
ˆ ˆ
ˆ (1 )
w w
dF dGy C n E
C C
= − − − −  
Equivalently for foreign, remember that *(1 ) 0nF n F+ − = : 
* *
* *
0 0 0
ˆ ˆ
ˆ
1w w w
dF dG n dFy C nE
C C n C
 
= − + − = − 
− 
 
 
A.12. Solving the short-run linearized model: 
First solve for the difference between home and foreign variables. Subtracting (19) from 
(18) gives: 
* * *ˆ ˆ
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ
ˆ ˆ(1 ) (1 )C C r C r C C Cβ β− = − + − − − = −  
Subtracting (21) from (20) gives: 
* *
* * *
ˆˆ
ˆˆ1 1
ˆ ˆˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ
ˆ ˆ
1 1
P PP PM P M P C r C rβ β
ε ε β ε ε β
  
−−
  − − + = − + − + +
   
− −   
 
( ) ( )* * * *1 ˆ ˆˆ ˆˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ(1 ) (1 )M M n E nE C C P P P Pβε ε β− − − − = − − − − +− , recall the purchasing 
parity equation *ˆ ˆ ˆE P P= − , which holds always: 
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( ) ( ) ( )* *1 ˆˆ ˆˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ(1 )M M E C C E Eβε ε β− − = − − −−  
Consider the same equation one period later, when all variables are the steady state 
variables, alternatively the equation can be derived after observing that in the long-run 
1
ˆˆ ˆ
t t tP M Cε
= −  and * * *1 ˆˆ ˆt t tP M Cε
= −  must hold: 
( ) ( )* *1 ˆ ˆˆ ˆ ˆE M M C Cε= − − −  
Substituting this into the equation for the difference in money holdings: 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )* * * *1 1 ˆ ˆˆ ˆˆ ˆˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ(1 )M M E C C M M C C Eβε ε β ε − − = − − − − − − −   , note that 
( ) ( )* *ˆ ˆˆ ˆM M M M− = −  as the monetary shock is permanent, and that it was shown that 
( ) ( )* *ˆ ˆˆ ˆC C C C− = − , then: 
( ) ( )* *1 ˆ ˆˆ ˆ ˆ1 1 1(1 ) (1 ) (1 )E C C M Mβ β βε β ε β ε ε β     − + = + − − + −     − − −       
( ) ( )* *1 ˆ ˆˆ ˆ ˆE M M C C
ε
= − − −  
Subtracting (23) from (22) gives: 
* *
0 0
ˆ ˆˆ ˆ
ˆ ˆ(1 )
1w w
dF n dF y C n E y C nE
C n C
 
+ = − − − − + − 
− 
 
( ) ( )* *
0
1
ˆ ˆ ˆ
ˆ ˆ
1 w
dF y y C C E
n C
 
= − − − − 
− 
 
( ) ( )* *
0
ˆ ˆ ˆ
ˆ ˆ(1 )
w
dF
n y y C C E
C
 = − − − − −
 
 
Then subtract (17) from (16): 
*
ˆ ˆˆ ˆ
ˆ ˆ (1 ) w wy y n E nE C Cθ θ− = − + + −  
*
ˆ
ˆ ˆy y Eθ− = , plugging in this into the above equation for the current account: 
( )*
0
ˆ ˆˆ(1 ) ( 1)
w
dF
n E C C
C
θ = − − − −
 
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Now consider the solution for long-run steady state difference between consumptions, 
which was obtained in appendix A.10, shortly before the two separate equations for home 
and foreign consumption were obtained, (alternatively just subtract the two solutions): 
*
*
0 0 0
1 1 1 1ˆ ˆ
2 1 2 2w w w
rdF dG dGC C
n C C C
θ θ θ
θ θ θ
+ + +      
− = − +      
−      
 eliminate the fiscal policy and 
express for the current account: 
( ) ( )
0
2 ˆ ˆ1( 1)w
dF
n C C
C r
θ
θ
 
= − − + 
, unite the two equations for the current account: 
( ) ( ) ( )* 2 ˆ ˆˆ ˆˆ(1 ) ( 1) 1( 1)n E C C n C Cr θθ θ  − − − − = − −   +   
( )*2 ( 1) ˆ ˆˆ( 1) ( 1)rE C Crθ θθ θ + +− = − +   
( )*22 ( 1) ˆ ˆˆ ( 1)rE C Crθ θθ + += − −   
Combining this result with ( ) ( )* *1 ˆ ˆˆ ˆ ˆE M M C C
ε
= − − −  gives: 
( )*22 ( 1)ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ( 1)rE M M Erθ θ εθ + +  = − −   −   
[ ] [ ] ( )*2 22 ( 1) 2 ( 1)ˆ ˆ ˆ1( 1) ( 1)r rE M Mr rε θ θ ε θ θθ θ   + + + ++ = −   − −     
[ ]
[ ] ( )*2
2 ( 1)
ˆ ˆ ˆ
2 ( 1) ( 1)
r
E M M
r r
ε θ θ
ε θ θ θ
 + +
= −  + + + − 
 
Then plugging in this into ( ) ( )* *ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆC C M M Eε  − = − −  : 
( ) ( ) [ ][ ] ( )* * *2
2 ( 1)
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ
2 ( 1) ( 1)
r
C C M M M M
r r
ε θ θ
ε
ε θ θ θ
  + +
− = − − −   + + + −   
 
( ) [ ] [ ][ ] ( )
2
* *
2
2 ( 1) ( 1) 2 ( 1)
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ
2 ( 1) ( 1)
r r r
C C M M
r r
ε θ θ θ ε θ θ
ε
ε θ θ θ
 + + + − − + +
− = −  + + + − 
 
( ) [ ] ( )
2
* *
2
( 1)
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ
2 ( 1) ( 1)
rC C M M
r r
ε θ
ε θ θ θ
 
−
− = −  + + + − 
 
 - 79 - 
 
To solve for the current account, use ( ) ( )
0
2 ˆ ˆ1( 1)w
dF
n C C
C r
θ
θ
 
= − − + 
, and substitute the 
difference in consumption with the result obtained above: 
( ) [ ] ( )
2
*
2
0
2 ( 1)
ˆ ˆ1( 1) 2 ( 1) ( 1)w
dF r
n M M
C r r r
θ ε θ
θ ε θ θ θ
   −
= − −    + + + + −   
 
( )
[ ] ( )*20
2 1 ( 1)
ˆ ˆ
2 ( 1) ( 1)w
ndF M M
C r r
θ ε θ
ε θ θ θ
 
− −
= −  + + + − 
 
After obtaining the current account, all the long-term variables can be easily found:  
Consumption: 
*
0 0 0
1 1 1ˆ
2 2 2w w w
rdF n dG n dGC
C C C
θ θ
θ θ θ
+ + − −     
= − +     
     
    ⇒       
0
( 1)ˆ
2 w
r dFC
C
θ
θ
+ 
=  
 
 
( )
[ ] ( )*2
2 1 ( 1)( 1)ˆ
ˆ ˆ
2 2 ( 1) ( 1)
nrC M M
r r
θ ε θθ
θ ε θ θ θ
 
− −+ 
= −   + + + −  
 
( )
[ ] ( )
2
*
2
1 ( 1)
ˆ
ˆ ˆ
2 ( 1) ( 1)
r n
C M M
r r
ε θ
ε θ θ θ
 
− −
= −  + + + − 
 
For foreign: [ ] ( )
2
* *
2
( 1)ˆ
ˆ ˆ
2 ( 1) ( 1)
nrC M M
r r
ε θ
ε θ θ θ
 
−
= − −  + + + − 
 
Output: 
0
1ˆ
ˆ
1 2(1 )
w
w
dGy C
C
θ
θ θ
 
= − +  + + 
    ⇒   ˆˆ
1
y Cθ
θ
= −
+
 
( )
[ ] ( )*2
1 ( 1)
ˆ ˆˆ
2 ( 1) ( 1)
r n
y M M
r r
θ ε θ
ε θ θ θ
 
− −
= − −  + + + − 
 
For foreign: [ ] ( )* *2( 1) ˆ ˆˆ 2 ( 1) ( 1)nry M Mr rθ ε θε θ θ θ
 
−
= −  + + + − 
 
Terms of trade: 
( )* *1 ˆ ˆˆˆ ˆ( ) ( ) 1p h p f E C Cθ− − = −+  
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[ ] ( )* *2( 1)ˆ ˆ ˆˆ ˆ( ) ( ) 2 ( 1) ( 1)rp h p f E M Mr rε θε θ θ θ
 
−
− − = −  + + + − 
 
To obtain the short-run variables, however, one must first solve for world aggregates: 
Multiply the home Euler equation (18) by n  and the foreign Euler equation (19) by 
(1 )n− and add them up: 
* *ˆ ˆ
ˆ ˆ
ˆ ˆ(1 ) (1 ) (1 )(1 ) (1 )nC n C n r nC n r n Cβ β+ − = − + + − − + −  
ˆ
ˆ
ˆ(1 )w wC r Cβ= − +  
Recall that 
0
1ˆ
2
w
w
w
dGC
C
= − . Thus, here ˆ 0wC = . Then: 
ˆ
ˆ(1 )wC rβ= − −  
Now, multiply the home money demand equation (20) by n  and the foreign money 
demand equation (21) by (1 )n− and add them up: 
( ) ( ) * ** * * ˆˆ ˆˆ1 1ˆ ˆˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ(1 ) (1 )1 1P PP Pn M P n M P n C r n C rβ βε ε β ε ε β
     
−−
     − + − − = − + + − − +
   
− −        
Equations (14) and (15) give, respectively, ˆ ˆ(1 )P n E= −  and *ˆ ˆP nE= − , and let 
*
ˆ ˆ ˆ(1 )wM nM n M= + − : 
( )* *1 ˆ ˆˆˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆˆ(1 ) (1 ) (1 ) (1 )(1 )w wM n n E n n E C r nP nP n P n Pβ βε ε ε β− − + − = − − − + − − −−  
( )*1 ˆ ˆˆˆ ˆ (1 )(1 )w wM C r nP n Pβ βε ε ε β= − − + −−  
Remember that 1 ˆˆ ˆP M C
ε
= −  and * * *1 ˆˆ ˆP M C
ε
= − : 
1 1 ˆ
ˆˆ ˆ
ˆ (1 )
w w w wM C r M Cβ β
ε ε ε β ε
 
= − − − 
−  
, but ˆ 0wC = : 
1
ˆˆ ˆ
ˆ (1 )
w w wM C r Mβ β
ε ε ε β= − − −  
Combining this with ˆ ˆ(1 )wC rβ= − −   gives: 
1
ˆ ˆ
ˆ ˆ(1 ) (1 )
w wM r r Mβ ββ
ε ε ε β= − − − − −  
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ˆ
ˆ ˆ
(1 )
w w rM Mβ
ε β ε+ = −−  
ˆ
ˆ (1 )
w
r Mβε β
 
= − + 
− 
 
Alternatively combining the same equations gives: 
ˆ1
ˆˆ ˆ
(1 ) (1 )
w
w w wCM C Mβ β
ε ε β ε β= + −− −  
(1 ) (1 )
ˆˆ
(1 ) (1 )
w wM Cε β β β β
ε β ε β
− + − +
=
− −
 
( ) ˆˆ(1 ) w wM Cε β β− + =  
Furthermore, equation (3), global goods market equilibrium always holds: 
 
* * *
0
ˆ ˆ ˆ
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ( ( ) ) (1 )( ( ) )
w
w
w
dGC n y p h P n y p f P
C
= + − + − + − − and here it simplifies to: 
*
ˆ
ˆ ˆ ˆ(1 )w wC ny n y y= + − =  
Lastly, the model can now be solved for short-run variables: 
Noticed again that *(1 ) wnX n X X+ − = , where X is equal to ˆC  or ˆty , can be rewritten in 
two ways: *(1 )( )wX X n X X= + − −  or * *( )wX X n X X= − − . Then: 
*
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ(1 )( )wy y n y y= + − − , as * ˆˆ ˆy y Eθ− =  
( ) ˆ ˆˆ (1 ) (1 )wy M n Eε β β θ= − + + − , recall that  
[ ]
[ ] ( )*2
2 ( 1)
ˆ ˆ ˆ
2 ( 1) ( 1)
r
E M M
r r
ε θ θ
ε θ θ θ
 + +
= −  + + + − 
 
( ) [ ][ ] 2
2 ( 1)
ˆ
ˆ (1 ) (1 )
2 ( 1) ( 1)
r
y n n M
r r
ε θ θ
ε β β θ
ε θ θ θ
  + +
= − + + − +   + + + −   
 
( ) [ ][ ]
*
2
2 ( 1)
ˆ(1 ) (1 ) (1 )
2 ( 1) ( 1)
r
n n M
r r
ε θ θ
ε β β θ
ε θ θ θ
  + +
+ − − + − −   + + + −   
 
For foreign: ( ) [ ][ ]
*
2
2 ( 1)
ˆ
ˆ (1 )
2 ( 1) ( 1)
r
y n n M
r r
ε θ θ
ε β β θ
ε θ θ θ
  + +
= − + − +   + + + −   
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( ) [ ][ ]
*
2
2 ( 1)
ˆ(1 ) (1 )
2 ( 1) ( 1)
r
n n M
r r
ε θ θ
ε β β θ
ε θ θ θ
  + +
+ − − + +   + + + −   
 
For consumption: 
*
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ(1 )( )wC C n C C= + − −  
( ) *ˆ ˆ ˆˆ(1 ) (1 )( )wC M n C Cε β β= − + + − − , as  
( ) [ ] ( )
2
* *
2
( 1)
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ
2 ( 1) ( 1)
rC C M M
r r
ε θ
ε θ θ θ
 
−
− = −  + + + − 
 it follows that: 
( ) [ ] ( )
2
*
2
( 1)
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ(1 ) (1 )
2 ( 1) ( 1)
w rC M n M M
r r
ε θ
ε β β
ε θ θ θ
 
−
= − + + − −  + + + − 
 
For foreign: ( ) [ ] ( )
2
* *
2
( 1)
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ(1 )
2 ( 1) ( 1)
w rC M n M M
r r
ε θ
ε β β
ε θ θ θ
 
−
= − + − −  + + + − 
 
Special case 1ε = : 
Then ( )2 ( 1) ( 1)( 1) 2 ( 1)r r rθ θ θ θ θ θ+ + + − + = + +  
*2 ( 1) 2 ( 1)
ˆ ˆ
ˆ (1 ) (1 ) 1
2 ( 1) 2 ( 1)
r ry n n M n M
r r
θ θ θ θ
θ θ
      + + + +
= + − + − −      + + + +      
 
( ) *2 ( 1) (1 ) 2 ( 1) 2 ( 1) 2 ( 1)
ˆ ˆ
ˆ (1 )
2 ( 1) 2 ( 1)
n n r n r r ry M n M
r r
θ θ θ θ θ θ
θ θ
 + + + − + +  + + − − +
= + −  
+ + + +   
 
( ) *2 (1 ) ( 1) 2(1 )(1 )
ˆ ˆ
ˆ
2 ( 1) 2 ( 1)
n n r ny M M
r r
θ θ θ
θ θ
+ − + +
− −
= +
+ + + +
 
 
Mathematical Appendix B 
B.1. Optimal allocation between home and foreign goods: 
Note first that: 
Plugging in ( )( ) Htt tH
t
p z
c z C
P
µ−
 
=  
 
  into total expenditure for home goods 
1
0
( ) ( )t tp z c z dz∫  
gives:  
( )
( )
( )
1
1 1 1
0 0
( ) 1( ) ( )
H
tH H H H Ht
t t t t t t tH H H
t t t
Pp zp z C dz C p z dz C C P
P P P
µµ
µ
µ µ
−
−
−
− −
 
= = = 
 
∫ ∫ , since 
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( )1/(1 )1 10 ( )Ht tP p z dz µµ −−≡ ∫  
Analogously:  
1
* * * *
0
( ) ( )t t t tp z c z dz P C=∫  
1
* *
0
( ) * F Ft t t tP C z d P C=∫  
Let the individual has fixed income equal to I  and let him/her gain utility from higher 
values of ( ) ( ) /( 1)( 1)/ ( 1)/1/ 1/(1 ) H Ft t tC C C η ηη η η ηη ηα α −− − ≡ − +   , then the agent 
maximizes ( ) ( ) /( 1)( 1)/ ( 1)/1/ 1/(1 ) H Ft t tC C C η ηη η η ηη ηα α −− − ≡ − +   , subject to his/her budget 
constraint H H F Ft t t tP C P C I+ =  . Take the Lagrangian: 
( ) ( ) ( )/( 1)( 1)/ ( 1)/1/ 1/(1 ) H F H H F Ft t t t t tL C C P C P C Iη ηη η η ηη ηα α λ−− − = − + − + −    
The first order conditions are: 
( ) ( ) ( )1/( 1)( 1)/ ( 1)/ 1/1/ 1/ 1/1(1 ) (1 ) 01 H F H Ht t t tHt
L C C C P
C
ηη η η η ηη η ηη ηα α α λ
η η
−
− − −∂ − 
= − + − − =  ∂ −
 
( ) ( ) ( )1/( 1)( 1)/ ( 1)/ 1/1/ 1/ 1/1(1 ) 01 H F F Ft t t tFt
L C C C P
C
ηη η η η ηη η ηη ηα α α λ
η η
−
− − −∂ − 
= − + − =  ∂ −
 
Rearrange and divide the two FOCs: 
1/1/1 H Ht t
F F
t t
C P
C P
ηη
α
α
−
 
− 
=  
   
 , take both sides to the power η  
1 11H Ht t
F F
t t
C P
C P
η
α
α
−
−
   
− 
=    
    
     ⇒       
1 HH Ft
t tF
t
PC C
P
η
α
α
−
 
−
=  
 
 
Plug in this into the budget constraint gives: 
1 HH F F Ft
t t t tF
t
PP C P C I
P
η
α
α
−
 
−
+ = 
 
, divide both sides by tP , and use the definition of tP . 
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
1
1/(1 )1 1
1
(1 )
H F F F F
t t t t t
H F t
t t
P P C P C I
PP P
η η
ηη η
α
α
α α
−
−
− −
−
+
=
 
− +  
, multiply both sides by ( )FtP ηα − : 
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( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
1 1
1/(1 )1 1
(1 )
(1 )
H F
t t F F
t t t
H F
t t
P P
C P C
P P
η η
η
ηη η
α α
α
α α
− −
−
−
− −
− +
=
 
− +  
, canceling out gives: 
( ) ( ) ( )/(1 )1 1(1 ) H F F Ft t t t tP P C P Cη ηη η ηα α α− −− − − − + =   . 
Note that ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )/(1 ) 1/(1 )1 1 1 1(1 ) (1 )H F H Ft t t tP P P P
ηη η ηη η η η
α α α α
−
− − −
− − − −    
− + = − +        
 
( ) ( )F Ft t t tP C P Cηη α −− =  
F
F t
t t
t
PC C
P
η
α
−
 
=  
 
 
By plugging in into the budget constraint not for HtC  but for 
F
tC , the analogous result for 
home goods consumption is obtained: 
(1 )
H
H t
t t
t
PC C
P
η
α
−
 
= −  
 
 
To show that H H F Ft t t t t tP C P C PC+ = , just plug in the results for HtC  and FtC  just obtained 
in the left-hand side: 
(1 )
H F
H H F F H Ft t
t t t t t t t t
t t
P PP C P C P C P C
P P
η η
α α
− −
   
+ = − +   
   
 
( ) ( )1 1 11 1(1 )H H F F H Ft t t t t t t t t t t
t t
P C P C P P C P C PC
P P
η η η
η ηα α
− −
−
− −
 + = − + = =  
  
 
B.2. The agent’s decision problem: 
1 1
0
0
max
1 1
t t t
t
C NU
σ ϕ
β
σ ϕ
− +∞
=
 
= Ε − 
− + 
∑  
subject to 
, 1 1t t t t t t t t t tPC Q D D W N T+ + + Ε = + +   
The individual decides how much to consume - tC , how much to work - tN , and what 
payoff 1tD + , he/she wants to sent aside for the following period. 
Expressing explicitly for tC the budget constraint gives: 
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, 1 1t t t t t t t t
t
t
D W N T Q D
C
P
+ + + + − Ε  
= , plug this into the utility function: 
1
, 1 1
1
0
0 1 1
t t t t t t t t
tt t
t
D W N T Q D
P NU
σ
ϕ
β
σ ϕ
−
+ +
+∞
=
   + + − Ε    
   
= Ε − 
− + 
 
  
∑  and maximize the unconstraint 
problem: 
FOCs: 
0t tt t t
t t
WU C N
N P
σ ϕβ β−∂ = − =
∂
                 ⇒                tt t
t
WC N
P
σ ϕ
=  
1
, 1 1
1 1
1 1( ) ( ) 0( )
t t
t t t t
t t t
U C Q h C h
D P P h
σ σβ β− + −+ +
+ +
∂
= − + =
∂
 , where 1, 2...h H=  
Note that the second first-order condition must hold for all possible states of nature (the 
notation here is a bit sloppy.). And that 1( )tP h+  and 1( )tC h+ are conditional on the state of 
nature. Written differently, using , 1
, 1
, 1
( )
( )
t t
t t
t t
V hQ
hξ
+
+
+
= , this is: 
, 1
, 1 1
1
( ) 1( ) ( ) ( )
t t
t t t t
t t
V h
C h C h
P P h
σ σξ β+ − −+ +
+
=   The left-hand side gives the utility loss from 
purchasing the Arrow-Debreu security due to forgone consumption in period t  and the 
right-hand side gives the expected utility gain from additional consumption due to the 
revenue from the security in period 1t + .  
Rearranging the second first-order condition gives: 
1
, 1
1
( )( ) ( )
t t
t t
t t
P C hQ h
P h C
σ
σ
β
−
+
+
−
+
= ,   take conditional expectations on both sides: 
1
, 1
1
t t
t t t t
t t
P CQ
P C
σ
β
−
+
+
+
  
  Ε = Ε   
   
 
1
1, 1
1 1t tt
t tt t t
P C
P CQ
σ
β
−
+
++
  
 Ε = 
 Ε      
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B.3. Log-linearizing (approximating) the FOCs: 
t
t t
t
WC N
P
σ ϕ
= , take natural logarithm of both sides: 
( )ln ln tt t
t
WC N
P
σ ϕ
=      ⇒       ln ln ln lnt t t tC N W Pσ ϕ+ = −  
t t t tc n w pσ ϕ+ = −  
1
1
(1 ) 1t tt t
t t
P Ci
P C
σ
β
−
+
+
  
 + Ε = 
   
 
Notice that for small ti , (1 )ti+  can be approximated by t
i
e . Formally, the first-order 
Taylor approximation of  tie  around zero is given by 0 0 ( 0) 1ti t te e e i i≈ + − = + , but one 
can best see this from the graph: 
 
For [ ]0.2,0.2ti ∈ − there is hardly a difference, and such high interest rates 0.2, i.e. 20%, 
(especially riskless) are not common. Then: 
1 1
1 1
(1 ) tit t t tt t t
t t t t
P C P Ci e
P C P C
σ σ
β β
− −
+ +
+ +
      
   + Ε ≈ Ε   
         
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1
1
1ti t tt
t t
P C
e
P C
σ
β
−
+
+
  
 Ε = 
   
, take natural logarithm of both sides and interchange 
expectations and logarithms: 
[ ] [ ]1 1ln ln ln ln ln 0t t t t t t ti P P C Cβ σ σ+ ++ + − Ε − Ε + =  
[ ] [ ]1 1 lnt t t t t t tc c p p iσ σ β+ += Ε + Ε − − −  
[ ] ( )1 11t t t t t tc c i pi ρσ+ += Ε − − Ε −   , where lnρ β≡ −  
 
B.4. Some other Log-linearizations: 
Before log-linearizing, note that, as shown in the previous appendix for the interest rate, 
1Xe X≈ + , when X  is small ( X can here stand for any variable). Therefore, after taking 
natural logarithms of both sides: ln(1 )X X≈ + . Then the sequence following of 
equalities and approximated equalities holds:  
ˆ ln 1 ln ln lnt t t tt t
dX X X X X XX X X
X X X X
− − 
= ≈ ≈ + = = − 
 
  
where ˆ tX  is, as defined before, percentage change from some steady state X . In this 
model, it is worked with the logarithms of the variables, not with the percentage changes, 
as in Obstfeld and Rogoff’s model. Therefore, when tdX
X
 is reached, it would be 
interchanged with ln lntX X− , not with ˆ tX .   
 
Terms of trade: 
( ) 1/(1 )11 *
0
*
F
t
t tH
t
PS S d
P
γγ −− 
= =   
∫  
the first equality can be linearized by only taking logarithms of both sides: 
ln ln
F
t
t H
t
PS
P
=     ⇒     F Ht t ts p p= −  
take natural logarithms of both sides for the second equality as well: 
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( ) 1/(1 )11 *
0
ln ln *t tS S d
γγ −− 
=   
∫  
( )11 *
0
1ln ln *
1t t
S S d
γ
γ
− 
=  
−  
∫ , now totally differentiate: 
( )
( )
*1
0 *
11
*0 0
00
(1 )1
*
1
*
t
t
SdS dS d
S S d
γ
γ
γ
γ
−
−
 
− 
=  
−  
 
∫
∫
.    It might, at first, seem strange that the total 
differentiation leads to expression like this one, but this is exactly the continuous time 
counterpart of the operation that was made many times in this paper in discrete time. The 
differentiation on the right-hand side is done with respect to *tS  for all *. If instead the 
integral in the problem there would have been a sum, then the expression would have 
looked like: *1 *2
*1 *2
0 0
....t t
t tt t
F FdS dS
S S
= =
   ∂ ∂
+ +      ∂ ∂   
 , a sum over all the differentials for the 
different *. In continuous time this summation is done by integrating, as there is a unit 
interval of differentials. Hence, the expression:  
( )
( )
*1
0 *
11
*0
00
(1 )
*
*
t
S
dS d
S d
γ
γ
γ −
−
 
− 
 
 
 
∫
∫
, is nothing but the sum over all the different differentials. 
Now, note that *0 0 1S S= = . Then: 
1
*
0
0
*t t
dS dS d
S
= ∫  
1
*
0 00
ln ln (ln ln ) *t tS S S S d− = −∫  
1
*
0
*t ts s d= ∫  
 
Consumer Price Index: 
( ) ( ) 1/(1 )1 1(1 ) H Ft t tP P P ηη ηα α −− − ≡ − +    
( ) ( )1 11ln ln (1 )1 H Ft t tP P P
η η
α α
η
− − 
= − +  
−
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( )
( ) ( )
( )
( ) ( )
0 0
1 1 1 1
0 0 0 0 0
(1 )
(1 ) (1 )
H F
H Ft
t tH F H F
P PdP dP dP
P P P P P
η η
η η η η
α α
α α α α
− −
− − − −
−
= +
− + − +
,  
note that 0 0 0
H FP P P= =  
( )
( )
( )
( )
0 0
0 0 00 0
(1 )
H F
t t t
P PdP dP dP
P P PP P
η η
η ηα α
− −
− −
= − +  
0 0 0ln ln (1 )(ln ln ) (ln ln )H Ft t tP P P P P Pα α− = − − + −  
ln (1 ) ln H Ft t tP P Pα α= − +  
(1 ) H Ft t tp p pα α= − +  
 
Price index for foreign goods: 
( )( )1/(1 )1 1*0 *Ft tP P d γγ −−= ∫ , plugging in * * *,*t t tP E P=  gives: 
( )( )1/(1 )1 1* *,*0 *Ft t tP E P d γγ −−= ∫ , plugging in ( )( )1/(1 )1 1* *,* ,*0 ( )t tP p z dz µµ −−≡ ∫  gives: 
( )( ) 1/(1 )11/(1 )1 1 1* *,*0 0 ( ) *Ft t tP E p z dz d
γγµµ
−
−
−
−
  
=   
   
∫ ∫ ,take the natural logarithm of both sides: 
( )( ) 11/(1 )1 1 1* *,*0 01ln ln ( ) *1Ft t tP E p z dz d
γµµ
γ
−
−
−
  
=   
−    
∫ ∫ , totally differentiate: 
( )( ) ( )
( )( )
(1 )/(1 )1 1
* * *
1 0,* 00
11/(1 )1 1 10 0 * *
0 0,*0 0
( )
*
( ) *
F t
t
F
p z dz E dEdP d
P
E p z dz d
γ µµ γ
γµµ
− −
− −
−
−
−
= +
  
  
   
∫
∫
∫ ∫
 
( ) ( )( ) ( )( ) ( )( )
( )( )
1/(1 ) /(1 )1 1 11 1 1
* * * * *
0 0,* 0,* 0,* ,*1 0 0 0
11/(1 )1 1 10 * *
0 0,*0 0
1( ) ( ) (1 ) ( ) ( )
1
*
( ) *
tE p z dz p z dz p z dp z dz
d
E p z dz d
γµ µ µγ µ µ µ
γµµ
µ
µ
−
− −
− − − −
−
−
−
   
−    − +
  
  
   
∫ ∫ ∫
∫
∫ ∫
Note that in the case for *
,*
( )tp z  the summation as explain before is done twice, over z  
and over *: 
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As in the steady state all the countries are the same, it holds that *0 1E = , and further more 
*
0,*( )p z  is the same for all [ ],* 0,1z ∈  (meaning it can be factor out the integrals). Then: 
 
( )
( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( )
1
* * * *1
* *1 1 0,* 0,* 0,* ,*00,*
1 1
* *
0 0 00,* 0,*
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )
* *
( ) ( )
F ttt
F
p z p z p z dp z dzp z dEdP d d
P p z p z
γ µ µγ
γ γ
− −
−
− −
 
  
= +
∫
∫ ∫  
( ) *1 1 1 ,** *0
0 0,*0 0
( )
* *( )
F
tt
tF
dp zdP dE d dz d
P p z
  
= +    
   
∫ ∫ ∫ , remember 
*
0 1E = , hence 
*
*
*
0
t
t
dEdE
E
=  
( ) ( )1 1 1* * * *0 0 ,* 0,*0
0 0
ln ln ln ln * ln ( ) ln ( ) *F Ft t tP P E E d p z p z dz d − = − + −  ∫ ∫ ∫  
( ) ( )1 1 1* * * *0 ,* 0 0,*0
0 0
ln ln ln * ln ( ) * lnF Ft t tP P E d p z dz d E P − = + −  ∫ ∫ ∫ ,   since 
*
0 1E =  and 
( )( )1/(1 )1 1* * *0,* 0,* 0,*0 ( ) ( )P p z dz p zµµ −−= =∫ . Furthermore, * * *,*t t tP E P=  always, and since all the 
*
0P  are the same ( )( )1/(1 )1 1* *0 0 00 *FP P d Pγγ −−= =∫ . Then: 
( ) ( )1 1 1* *,*0
0 0
ln * ln ( ) *Ft t tp E d p z dz d = +   ∫ ∫ ∫ , where ln
F F
t tp P≡  
( )1 1* *,*
0 0
* *
F
t t tp e d p d= +∫ ∫ , where 
* *lnt te E≡   and  ( )1* *,* ,*0 ln ( )t tp p z dz≡ ∫  
F w
t t tp e p= + , where 
1
*
0
*t te e d≡ ∫  and  ( )
1
*
,*
0
*
w
t tp p d≡ ∫  
 
B.5. International asset markets integration: 
,* 1,* ,*
, 1
1,* ,* 1,*
t t t
t t
t t t
P C EQ
P C E
σ
σ
β
−
+
+
−
+ +
=  is the optimality condition for the foreign country. 
1
, 1
1
t t
t t
t t
P CQ
P C
σ
σ
β
−
+
+
−
+
=  is the optimality condition for Home. 
,* 1,* ,*1
1 1,* ,* 1,*
t t tt t
t t t t t
P C EP C
P C P C E
σσ
σ σ
β β
−
−
++
− −
+ + +
= , the bilateral real exchange rate is defined as 
*
,** t t
t
t
E P
B
P
≡ : 
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*
1,*1
*
,* 1
tt t
t t t
CC B
C C B
σσ
σ σ
−
−
++
− −
+
=          ⇒         
( )
( )
1/
*
,*
1/
*
1 1,* 1
ttt
t t t
BCC
C C B
σ
σ
+ + +
=  
( ) ( )
1/
*
1 1,* 11/
*
,*
t
t t t
t t
CC C B
C B
σ
σ+ + +
=                
Shift the equation one period in the past. 
( ) ( )
1/
*1
,*1/
*
1,* 1
t
t t t
t t
CC C B
C B
σ
σ
−
− −
=                  
Combining the two results gives: 
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
1/
*1
,*1/
*
1/1,* 1 *
1 1,* 11/
*
,*
t
t t
t t
t t t
t t
C C B
C B
C C B
C B
σ
σ
σ
σ
−
− −
+ + +=  
( ) ( )
1/
*1
1 1,* 11/
*
1,* 1
t
t t t
t t
CC C B
C B
σ
σ
−
+ + +
− −
= , compare to ( ) ( )
1/
*
1 1,* 11/
*
,*
t
t t t
t t
CC C B
C B
σ
σ+ + +
=  
One can go on with the shifting until the initial states are reached.  
( ) ( )
1/
*0
,*1/
*
0,* 0
t t t
CC C B
C B
σ
σ
= . Note that here the variables with the subscript 0 hold for any 
initial conditions, not only for the steady state. However, without loss of generality one 
can assume identical initial condition – no net foreign assets and identical ex-ante 
environment, i.e. the steady state conditions. Let : ( )
* 0
1/
*
0,* 0
C
C B
σ
ϑ = . Hence *ϑ  is a 
constant depending on the initial conditions and: 
( )1/* *,*t t tC C B σϑ=  
With identical initial condition it must be that 0 0,*C C=  and 
*
0 1B = , then 
* 1ϑ =  (as in the 
steady state).  
 
B.6. Log-linearizing the index of aggregate domestic output: 
( ) /( 1)1 ( 1)/0 ( )t tY y z dz µ µµ µ −−≡ ∫ , take natural logarithm of both sides: 
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1 ( 1)/
0
ln ln ( )
1t t
Y y z dzµ µµ
µ
−
=
−
∫ , totally differentiate: 
1 1/
0
1 ( 1)/
0 0 00
( ) ( )
( )
t tdY y z dy z dz
Y y z dz
µ
µ µ
−
−
= ∫
∫
 
1/ 10 0
( 1)/ 0
0
( ) ( )( )t t
Y y zdY dy z dz
y z
µ
µ µ
−
−
= ∫  
( )10 00ln ln ln ( ) ln ( )t tY Y y z y z dz− = −∫  
1
0
ln ( )t ty y z dz= ∫ , use the fact that ( ) ( )t t ty z A N z=  
1
0
ln ( )t t ty A N z dz= ∫  
1
0
ln ( )t t ty a N z dz= + ∫ , now log-linearize 
1
0
( )t tN N z dz= ∫  around the steady state: 
1
0
ln ln ( )t tN N z dz= ∫ , totally differentiate: 
1
1
0 0 00
( )
( )
t tdN dN z dz
N N z dz
= ∫
∫
, since 0 ( )N z  is the same for all z producers in the symmetric 
equilibrium: 
1
0 00
( )
( )
t tdN dN z dz
N N z
= ∫         ⇒      ( )
1
0 0
0
ln ln ln ( ) ln ( )t tN N N z N z dz− = −∫  
( )
1
0
ln ( )t tn N z dz= ∫ , plugging in this into 
1
0
ln ( )t t ty a N z dz= + ∫  gives: 
t t ty a n= +  
 
B.7. Optimal Pricing: 
Let ( )HtP z
⌣
 be the new price set by the firm, producer of z , which is adjusting its price in 
period t  . Note that ( ) ( )H Ht k tp z p z+ = ⌣  with probability kϖ  for 0,1, 2....k = . As all firms 
that are able to re-optimize in period t  will set the same price, the indexes z  are dropped.  
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Then the firm sets its price in period t  in such a way that the current value of future 
profits is maximized, conditional on this price being still effective, subject to supply 
equals demand. That is:  
( ),
0
max k H nt t t k t k t t k
k
Q Y P MCϖ
∞
+ + +
=
 Ε − ∑
⌣
 
subject to    ( )1 ,*0 *H H Htt k t k t kH
t k
PY C C d
P
µ−
+ + +
+
 
= + 
 
∫
⌣
. Note that the demand function previously 
derived was demand for home goods from Home. The term 
1
,*0
*
H
Ht
t kH
t k
P C d
P
µ−
+
+
 
 
 
∫
⌣
 captures 
the demand for home goods from foreign countries.  
(1 )n t
t k
t
WMC
A
τ
+
−
≡  is the nominal marginal cost.  
Plugging in the budget constraint into the objective function gives: 
( )( )1, ,*0
0
max *
H
k H H H nt
t t t k t k t k t t kH
k t k
PQ C C d P MC
P
µ
ϖ
−
∞
+ + + +
= +
  
 Ε + − 
   
∑ ∫
⌣
⌣
 
( ) ( ) ( )( )1 1, ,*0
0
1
max *k H H H H nt t t k t k t k t t t kH
k t k
Q C C d P P MC
P
µ
µ µ
ϖ
−
∞
− −
+ + + +
= +
  
 Ε + − 
   
∑ ∫
⌣ ⌣
 
Then the FOC is: 
( ) ( ) ( )1 1, ,*0
0
1
* (1 ) 0k H H H H nt t t k t k t k t t t kH
k t k
Q C C d P P MC
P
µ
µ µ
ϖ µ µ
−
∞
− − −
+ + + +
= +
      Ε + − + =          
∑ ∫
⌣ ⌣
  
( ) ( )1 1, ,*0
0
* (1 ) 0
H
k H H H nt
t t t k t k t k t t kH
k t k
PQ C C d P MC
P
µ
ϖ µ µ
−
∞
−
+ + + +
= +
      Ε + − + =          
∑ ∫
⌣
⌣
, multiply 
both sides by HtP−
⌣
: 
( )1, ,*0
0
* ( 1) 0
H
k H H H nt
t t t k t k t k t t kH
k t k
PQ C C d P MC
P
µ
ϖ µ µ
−
∞
+ + + +
= +
      Ε + − − =    
     
∑ ∫
⌣
⌣
, now divide 
both sides by 1µ − : 
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( )1, ,*0
0
* 0
1
H
k H H H nt
t t t k t k t k t t kH
k t k
PQ C C d P MC
P
µ µϖ
µ
−
∞
+ + + +
= +
      
 Ε + − =    
−       
∑ ∫
⌣
⌣
, plug in back t kY +  
from the budget constraint: 
,
0
0
1
k H n
t t t k t k t t k
k
Q Y P MCµϖ
µ
∞
+ + +
=
  
 Ε − =   
−  
∑
⌣
 
Recall that 1
, 1
1
t t
t t
t t
P CQ
P C
σ
σ
β
−
+
+
−
+
= . One can shift this expression by k periods to obtain: 
,
k t t k
t t k
t k t
P CQ
P C
σ
σ
β
−
+
+
−
+
= . Plug this into the budget constraint: 
0
0
1
k k H nt t k
t t k t t k
k t k t
P C Y P MC
P C
σ
σ
µ
ϖ β
µ
−∞
+
+ +
−
= +
  Ε − =  
−  
∑
⌣
, multiply both sides by t
t
C
P
σ−
 
( ) ( ) 1
0
0
1
k H n
t t k t k t k t t k
k
P C Y P MCσ µϖβ
µ
∞
−
−
+ + + +
=
  Ε − =  
−  
∑
⌣
 
Or alternatively one can write this equation as:  
( ) 1 1,
0 1
0
1
H H
k Ht t
t t k t k t t k t kH
k t k t
P PC Y MC
P P
σ µϖβ
µ
∞
−
−
+ + − + +
= + −
   Ε − Π =  
−   
∑
⌣
  
where 1,
1
H
H t k
t t k H
t
P
P
+
− +
−
Π ≡  and 
n
t k
t k H
t k
MCMC
P
+
+
+
≡  , rearrange:   
( ) ( )1 1 1,
0 01
0
1
H H H
k k Ht t t
t t k t k t t k t k t t k t kH
k kt k t t k
P P PC Y C Y MC
P P P
σ σ µϖβ ϖβ
µ
∞ ∞
− −
− −
+ + + + − + +
= =+ − +
   
Ε − Ε Π =   
−   
∑ ∑
⌣
, 
rearrange again and take the natural logarithm of both sides: 
( ) ( ) 1 1,
0 0
ln ln
1
H H
k k Ht t
t t k t k t t k t k t t k t k
k kt k t k
P PC Y C Y MC
P P
σ σ µϖβ ϖβ
µ
∞ ∞
− −
−
+ + + + − + +
= =+ +
   
Ε = Ε Π   
−   
∑ ∑
⌣
 
Now this expression can be linearized around a zero inflation steady state. Note that in 
zero inflation steady state: 1, 1
H
t t k− +Π = ,  
1
1
H
t
H
t
P
P
−
=
⌣
,   t k tMC MC MC+ = = ,  t k tY Y Y+ = = , 
t k tC C C+ = = . It is as in the subscript 0 steady state, but with additional assumption that 
there are no changes in prices. 
Linearizing around the steady state 
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( ) ( ) 1 1,
0 0
ln ln
1
H H
k k Ht t
t t k t k t t k t k t t k t k
k kt k t k
P PC Y C Y MC
P P
σ σ µϖβ ϖβ
µ
∞ ∞
− −
−
+ + + + − + +
= =+ +
   
Ε = Ε Π   
−   
∑ ∑
⌣
 is an 
extremely long and tedious process. In this appendix, the total differentiation is done with 
respect to only two variables, but they represent the main cases and all the others are 
equivalent to them.  
The easiest case is with respect to variables that do not depend on k , such as HtP
⌣
 and 
1
H
tP− . If the total differentiation is done with respect to 
H
tP
⌣
, it yields: 
( )
( )
0 0 0
0 0
0
00 0
0 0 0
0 0 0
1
ln ln
k
H
k H H Ht
t tHH H
k
H
k
C Y
P dPdP P P
PP PC Y
P P
σ
σ
ϖβ
ϖβ
∞
−
=
∞
−
=
  
Ε   
  
= = −
  
Ε  
   
∑
∑
⌣
⌣ ⌣ ⌣
⌣⌣  
With respect to 1
H
tP−  it will yield  1 0ln ln
H H
tP P− − , the two second terms will cancel out. 
The second case is for variables that depend on k , such as t kMC + , 1,
H
t t k− +Π , t kY + , t kC +   
and the prices. If the total differentiation is done with respect to t kMC + , it yields: 
( )
( )
0
0 0 0,0
0
0 0
0 0 0,0 0
0 0
1
1
H
k H
t
t t kH
kk H
t
k
PC Y
P
dMC
PC Y MC
P
σ
σ
µϖβ
µ
µϖβ
µ
−
∞
+
∞
=
−
=
 
Ε Π 
− Ε
 
Ε Π 
− 
∑
∑
, the sum can be explained similarly 
to the explanation of why there is an integral in appendix B.4. Note that most of the 
variables cancel out, leaving: 
( )
( )
( ) ( )11 00
0 0
0
1
1
kk
t t kt k
t
kk k
k
dMC MCdMC MC ϖβϖβ
ϖβ
ϖβ
−
−∞ ∞
++
∞
= =
=
Ε
Ε = =
−
∑ ∑
∑
 
( ) ( )0
0
(1 ) ln lnk t t k
k
MC MCϖβ ϖβ
∞
+
=
= − Ε −∑ . 
Same is done with respect to 1,
H
t t k− +Π  and the prices. One can see that the terms obtained 
for t kY +  and t kC +  cancel out.  
The end result of this procedure is: 
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( ) ( ) ( ) ( )1 0
0 0
(1 )k kH H Ht t t t k t t k
k k
p p mc mcϖβ pi ϖβ ϖβ
∞ ∞
− + +
= =
= + Ε + − Ε −∑ ∑
⌣
  
This could be written in a more compact way. Just subtract the expectation in period t  for 
the new price in period 1t +  times ϖβ , i.e.: 
Subtract 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )1 1 1 1 1 0
0 0
(1 )k kH H Ht t t t t k t t k
k k
p p mc mcϖβ ϖβ ϖβ ϖβ pi ϖβ ϖβ ϖβ
∞ ∞
+ + + + + + +
= =
Ε = + Ε + − Ε −∑ ∑
⌣
 
from: 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )1 0
0 0
(1 )k kH H Ht t t t k t t k
k k
p p mc mcϖβ pi ϖβ ϖβ
∞ ∞
− + +
= =
= + Ε + − Ε −∑ ∑
⌣
. Then: 
( ) ( )1 1 0(1 )( )H H H H Ht t t t t t t tp p p p mc mcϖβ ϖβ pi ϖβ+ −− Ε = − + Ε + − −⌣ ⌣  
( )1 1 0(1 )( )H H H H Ht t t t t t tp p p p mc mcϖβ ϖβ pi ϖβ− +− = Ε − + + − −⌣ ⌣  
( )1 1 0(1 )( )H H H H Ht t t t t t tp p p p mc mcϖβ pi ϖβ− +− = Ε − + + − −⌣ ⌣  
To proceed further, note that under the zero inflation steady state, as the firms never re-
optimize (change prices), hence for how long prices remain fixed is irrelevant, the firm 
optimizes in every period (actually, all periods are the same) the problem (notice that in 
order for them not to re-optimize, they must not have an incentive to change prices, hence 
the solution must be identical to the one under flexible prices – that is also the reason 
why the indexes t  are kept, since it is the general case when prices are flexible):  
( )max ( )H nt t tY p z MC−  
subject to ( )1 ,*0( ) *H H Htt t tH
t
p zY C C d
P
µ−
 
= + 
 
∫  
here the good index z is briefly introduced again, because there might be confusion 
otherwise. Once firms optimize, they will all set the same price, and basically 
( )H Ht tp z P=  will hold. However, firms do not know that and they think they do not have 
an effect on the overall price index, hence they maximize as HtP  is given.  
Plugging the budget constraint into the objective function gives: 
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( )( )1 ,*0( )max * ( )H H H H nt t t t tH
t
p z C C d p z MC
P
µ−
 
+ − 
 
∫  
FOC: 
( ) ( ) ( )( )1 1,*01 * (1 ) ( ) ( ) 0H H H H nt t t t tH
t
C C d p z p z MC
P
µ
µ µµ µ
−
− − − 
+ − + = 
 
∫ , multiplying by 
 
( )
( )1 ,*0
( )
1
*
H
t
H H
t tH
t
p z
C C d
P
µ
µ−
−
 
+ 
 
∫
 both sides gives: 
( ) 1( 1) ( )H nt tp z MCµ µ −− −  
1
1
( ) 1
n
t
tH
t
MC MC
p z
µ µ
µ µ
−
 −
= = =  
− 
, again note that all producers would set the same price, 
hence one can use ( )Htp z as deflator. Take natural logarithms of both sides: 
ln
1
n H
t t tmc p mc
µ
µ
 
− = = − = − 
− 
ℏ   , which is the value of log real marginal cost under 
the zero inflation steady state, i.e. 0mc . Note that because under this steady state the 
stickiness of the prices is irrelevant, this is actually the log real marginal cost that would 
be obtained under flexible prices.   
Plugging the last result into: ( )1 1 0(1 )( )H H H H Ht t t t t t tp p p p mc mcϖβ pi ϖβ− +− = Ε − + + − −⌣ ⌣  
gives:  ( )1 1 (1 )( )H H H H H n Ht t t t t t t tp p p p mc pϖβ pi ϖβ− +− = Ε − + + − − +⌣ ⌣ ℏ  
( )1 1 1 (1 ) (1 )( )H H H H H H H nt t t t t t t t tp p p p p p p mcϖβ ϖβ ϖβ ϖβ− + −= − + Ε + − − − + − +⌣ ⌣ ℏ  
( )1 (1 )( )H H nt t t tp p mcϖβ ϖβ+= Ε + − +⌣ ⌣ ℏ , shift the same with one period in the future: 
( )1 1 2 1(1 )( )H H nt t t tp p mcϖβ ϖβ+ + + += Ε + − +⌣ ⌣ ℏ , plug into the first one. 
( )( )2 1(1 )( ) (1 )( )H H n nt t t t t tp p mc mcϖβ ϖβ ϖβ ϖβ+ += Ε Ε + − + + − +⌣ ⌣ ℏ ℏ  
( ) ( )2 2 1(1 ) (1 )( ) (1 )H H n nt t t t tp p mc mcϖβ ϖβ ϖβ ϖβ ϖβ ϖβ+ += Ε + − + + − + −⌣ ⌣ ℏ ℏ   
If one continues with the same procedure, the end result looks like: 
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( ) ( )
0 0
(1 ) (1 )( )k kH nt t k
k k
p mcϖβ ϖβ ϖβ ϖβ
∞ ∞
+
= =
= − + −∑ ∑
⌣
ℏ  
( )
0
1 (1 ) (1 ) ( )
1
kH n
t t k
k
p mcϖβ ϖβ ϖβ
ϖβ
∞
+
=
= − + −
−
∑
⌣
ℏ  
( )
0
(1 ) ( )kH nt t k
k
p mcϖβ ϖβ
∞
+
=
= + − ∑
⌣
ℏ , which is the equation in the text. 
For further uses it is convenient to derive one more equation  
Notice that the price index for home goods can be defined as: 
( ) ( ) 1/(1 )111 (1 )H H Ht t tP P P µµµϖ ϖ −−−− ≡ + −  
⌣
, which is quite straightforward to interpret as 
(1 )ϖ−  of firms adopt new prices and the remaining keep their old prices. 
Log-linearizing this around the zero inflation steady state: 
( ) ( )1111ln ln (1 )1H H Ht t tP P P
µµ
ϖ ϖ
µ
−−
−
 
= + −
  
−
⌣
, totally differentiate: 
( )
( ) ( )
( )
( ) ( )
00
11 11 1
0 0 0 0 0
(1 )
(1 ) (1 )
HHH
H Ht
t tH H H H H
PPdP dP dP
P P P P P
µµ
µ µµ µϖ ϖ
ϖ ϖ ϖ ϖ
−
−
−
− −− −
= + −
+ − + −
⌣
⌣
⌣ ⌣  
1
0 0 0
(1 )
H H H
t t t
H H H
dP dP dP
P P P
ϖ ϖ−= + −
⌣
⌣ , since in the steady state 0 0 1
H H H H
t tP P P P−= = =
⌣
 
0 1 0 0ln ln ln ln (1 ) ln (1 ) lnH H H H H Ht t tP P P P P Pϖ ϖ ϖ ϖ−− = − + − − −
⌣ ⌣
 
( )1 11 (1 )H H H Ht t t tp p p pϖ ϖ− −− = − + − ⌣  
1(1 )( )H H Ht t tp ppi ϖ −= − −⌣  
1 (1 )
H
H H t
t tp p
pi
ϖ−
− =
−
⌣
, plug this into the preciously derived equation: 
( )1 1 (1 )( )H H H H Ht t t t t t tp p p p mcϖβ pi ϖβ− +− = Ε − + + − +⌣ ⌣ ℏ  
1 (1 )( )(1 ) (1 )
H H
Ht t
t t tmc
pi pi
pi ϖβ ϖβ
ϖ ϖ
+ 
− = Ε + − + 
− − 
ℏ  
( )1(1 ) (1 ) (1 )( )(1 )H Ht t t tmc
ϖ ϖβ ϖ
pi pi ϖβ
ϖ ϖ ϖ+
− −
= Ε + − +
−
ℏ  
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( )1 ( )H Ht t t tmcpi β pi λ+= Ε + + ℏ , where (1 ) (1 )ϖλ ϖβϖ
−
≡ −  (not a Lagrangian multiplier) 
 
B.8. Aggregating the equilibrium condition: 
 Plugging 
1
,*
,**0
,* ,*
( )( ) (1 ) *
FH H
tt t t
t t tH F
t t t t t
Pp z P Py z C C d
P P E P P
γ ηµ η
α α
− −
− −       
 = − +                    
∫  into  
( ) /( 1)1 ( 1)/0 ( )t tY y z dz µ µµ µ −−= ∫  leads to: 
/( 1)( 1)/
1 1
,*
,**0 0
,* ,*
( ) (1 ) *
FH H
tt t t
t t tH F
t t t t t
Pp z P PY C C d dz
P P E P P
µ µµ µγ ηµ η
α α
−
−
− −
− −
             = − +                           
∫ ∫  
( )
/( 1)( 1)/ 1
1 1 1
,*
,**0 0
,* ,*
1(1 ) * ( )
FH H
tt t
t t t tF H
t t t t t
PP PY C C d p z dz
P E P P P
µ µµ µγ ηη µ
µ
α α
−
−
− −
− −
−
           = − +                         
∫ ∫
Recall that ( )1/(1 )1 10 ( )Ht tP p z dz µµ −−≡ ∫  
( )1 ,* ,**0
,* ,*
1(1 ) *
FH H
t Ht t
t t t tF H
t t t t t
PP PY C C d P
P E P P P
γ ηη µ
µ
α α
− −
− −
−
          = − +                     
∫  
1
,*
,**0
,* ,*
(1 ) *
FH H
tt t
t t tF
t t t t
PP PY C C d
P E P P
γ ηη
α α
− −
−
    
= − +         
     
∫  
*
1
,* ,*
,*0
,*
(1 ) *
FH H
t t tt t
t t tH F
t t t t
E P PP PY C C d
P P P P
ηγη η
α α
−       
 = − +                   
∫  
* *
1
,* ,*
,*0
(1 ) *
FH
t t t tt
t t tH
t t t
E P E PPY C C d
P P P
γ η ηη
α α
−
−      
 = − +                
∫  
Recall that 
*
,** t t
t
t
E P
B
P
≡  and 
*
* t
t H
t
PS
P
= . Furthermore, 
F
t
t H
t
PS
P
= , which looked from the 
perspective of a foreign country * becomes ,*
,* *
,*
F
t
t
t
P
S
P
= . Now notice that 
*
,**
,* *
,*
F
t t
t t H
t t
P PS S
P P
=  
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and 
* *
,* ,*
*
,*
F F
t t t t
H H
t t t
E P P P
P P P
= , since 
*
*
*
,*
t
t
t
PE
P
= . Therefore, 
*
,**
,*
F
t t
t t H
t
E P
S S
P
= , and the equilibrium 
relation becomes: 
( ) ( )1 * *,* ,*0(1 ) *
H
t
t t t t t t
t
PY C S S B C d
P
η
γ η η
α α
−
−   
= − +     
∫  
It was previously shown in this paper that ( )1/* *,*t t tC C B σϑ= , where *ϑ  is a constant 
determined by the initial condition. Furthermore, without loss of generality one can 
assume identical initial condition and then * 1ϑ = . The aggregate output equilibrium 
condition is given by: 
( ) ( )1 1/* *,*0(1 ) *
H
t
t t t t t
t
PY C S S B d
P
η
γ η η σ
α α
−
− −   
= − +     
∫  
 
B.9. The steady state: 
Let all countries be symmetric. Furthermore, assume a constant productivity level equal 
to A.  
Global goods equilibrium in the steady state is:  
( ) ( )1 1/* *00 0 0,* 0 00
0
(1 ) *
HPY C S S B d
P
η
γ η η σ
α α
−
− −   
= − +     
∫  
Since all countries are symmetric, it must be that all *0S  and 
*
0B  are the same. In fact, 
notice that the effective terms of trade are given by ( ) 1/(1 )11 *
0
*
F
t
t tH
t
PS S d
P
γγ −− 
= =   
∫ , but 
since *0S  are all the same, it follows that 
*
0 0S S= , and from their definitions
*
* t
t H
t
PS
P
≡  and 
F
t
t H
t
PS
P
≡ , it must hold that *0 0
FP P=  at the steady state.  
The price index is given by ( ) ( ) 1/(1 )1 1(1 ) H Ft t tP P P ηη ηα α −− − ≡ − +   , or alternatively: 
1/(1 )1
(1 )
F
t t
H H
t t
P P
P P
ηη
α α
−
−  
 = − +  
   
, this holds always, including at the steady state. Then  
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( ) 1/(1 )10 0
0
(1 )H
P S
P
ηη
α α
−
− = − +
 
. 
Let *0 0B B=  as it is the same for all *. Notice that  
* *
0 0,* 0 0,* 0
0
0 0 0
F FE P E P PB
P P P
= = = , as from 
* * *
,*t t tP E P=    ⇒    
*
,*
F F
t t tP E P= . 
( )
0
0 0 0
0 1/(1 )100
0
0
(1 )
F
F H
H
P
P P SB PP S
P
ηη
α α
−
−
= = =
 
− +
 
, a function of 0S . 
From the integration of the financial markets the relationship ( )1/*,*t t tC C B σ=  (again 
identical initial conditions are assumed). In the steady state that is ( )1/*0 0,* 0C C B σ= . 
Integrating over all * gives: 
( ) ( )1 1/ 1/0 0,* 0 0 00 wC C B B Cσ σ= =∫  
And lastly, remember that when the terms of trade are aggregated over the whole world, 
they cancel out. Then the equation  
( ) ( )1 1/* *00 0 0,* 0 00
0
(1 ) *
HPY C S S B d
P
η
γ η η σ
α α
−
− −   
= − +     
∫  can be rewritten as: 
( )
( )
( ) ( )
1/
/(1 ) 1/1 0
0 0 0 0 01/(1 )1
0
(1 ) (1 )
(1 )
wSY S C S B
S
σ
η η γ η η ση
ηη
α α α α
α α
−
− −
−
−
−
 
    = − + − +        − +
  
( ) ( ) ( )
( )
1/
( 1/ )/(1 )1 1/ 0
0 0 0 0 01/(1 )1
0
(1 ) (1 )
(1 )
wSY S S S C
S
η σ
η σ η γ ηη σ
ηη
α α α α
α α
−
− −
−
−
−
−
  
   = − + − +       − +
   
( ) ( ) ( )( 1/ )/(1 )1/ 10 0 0 0 0(1 ) (1 ) wY S S S Cη σ η γσ ηα α α α− −−  = − − + +     
World goods market clearing condition implies 0 0
w wC Y= , then: 
( ) ( ) ( )( 1/ )/(1 )1/ 10 0 0 0 0(1 ) (1 ) wY S S S Yη σ η γσ ηα α α α− −−  = − − + +     
The other equilibrium condition is obtained from the labor market clearing.  
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0
0 0
0
WC N
P
σ ϕ
= , substituting from the production function gives: 
 
0 0
0
0
Y WC
A P
ϕ
σ  
= 
 
 
Recall that real marginal cost was defined as 00
0
(1 )
H
WMC
A P
τ−
=  and moreover that it was 
calculated in appendix B.7. that 0
1MC µ
µ
−
= . Then 0 0
1
(1 )
HW A Pµ
µ τ
−
=
−
. Hence: 
0 0
0
0
1
(1 )
HY PC A
A P
ϕ
σ µ
τ µ
− 
= 
− 
. Use the facts obtained for 0C  and 0
0
HP
P
: 
( )
( )
0
0 0 1/(1 )1
0
1 1
(1 ) (1 )
w YB Y A
A S
ϕ
σ
ηη
µ
τ µ α α
−
−
− 
= 
−   
− +
 
 
( )
( )
( )
0 0
01/(1 ) 1/(1 )1 1
0 0
1 1
(1 )(1 ) (1 )
wS YY A
AS S
ϕ
σ
η ηη η
µ
τ µα α α α
− −
− −
− 
= 
−    
− + − +
   
 
( ) 00 0 1(1 )w
YS Y A
A
ϕ
σ µ
τ µ
− 
= 
− 
 
( ) ( )
1
0
0 0
1
(1 ) w
Y A
S Y
ϕ ϕ
σ
µ
τ µ
+ −
=
−
 
( )
1/
(1 )/
0
0 0
1
(1 ) w
Y A
S Y
ϕ
ϕ ϕ
σ
µ
τ µ
+
 
− 
=
 
− 
 
There is a system of two equations in two variables 0Y  and 0S , conditional on A  and 0
wY    
( ) ( ) ( )( 1/ )/(1 )1/ 10 0 0 0 0(1 ) (1 ) wY S S S Yη σ η γσ ηα α α α− −−  = − − + +     
( )
1/
(1 )/
0
0 0
1
(1 ) w
Y A
S Y
ϕ
ϕ ϕ
σ
µ
τ µ
+
 
− 
=
 
− 
 
Notice that the first function is strictly increasing in 0S , while the second is strictly 
decreasing ( 1µ > ), both are always in the positive numbers. Therefore, these two curves 
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meet only once, and there is a unique solution. If it is obtained, the problem is solved in 
its entirety.  
Make guess of  
1/( )
(1 )/( )
0 0
1
(1 )
wY Y A
ϕ σ
ϕ ϕ σ µ
τ µ
+
+ +  −
= =  
− 
 and  0 1S =  
From the first equation, one can see that 0 1S =  satisfies the condition: 
( ) ( ) ( )( 1/ )/(1 )1/ 10 0 0(1 ) 1 (1 ) 1 1 w wY Y Y
η σ ησ η γ
α α α α
− −
−  = − − + + =   
 
Check if the values satisfy the second condition: 
1/
1/( )
(1 )/( ) (1 )/
1
(1 )/( )
0
1 1
(1 )
1(1 ) (1 )
A A
S A
ϕ
ϕ σ
ϕ ϕ σ ϕ ϕ
σ
ϕ σϕ ϕ σ
µ µ
τ µ
µ
τ µ
τ µ
+
+ + +
+
+ +
 
 
 
  − −
=   
−      −  
−   
−   
  
 
[ ] ( )
[ ]1/( ) 1 /( )
1/(1 )/ ( )(1 )/( ) (1 )/
0
1 1
(1 ) (1 )A A A S
ϕ σ σ ϕ σ ϕ
ϕσ ϕ ϕ σ ϕϕ ϕ σ ϕ ϕ µ µ
τ µ τ µ
− + − +
−+ ++ + − +    − −
=    
− −   
 
The powers of the left-hand side are:  
2 21 1 (1 ) 0( ) ( )
ϕ ϕ σ ϕ ϕ ϕ ϕ ϕ σ σϕ σ σϕ
ϕ σ ϕ ϕ σ ϕ ϕ σ ϕ
+ + + + − − − − + +
− + = =
+ + +
 
The powers of the right-hand side (excluding the one of the 0S ): 
1
1 1 1 1 0
σ ϕ
ϕ σ ϕ σ
ϕ σ ϕ ϕ σ ϕ ϕ σ ϕ σ
−
− − −+ +
+ = + = + =
+ + + +
 
Then: ( ) 1/01 S ϕ−=     ⇒     0 1S =  
Therefore, this is the unique solution of the system. 
If 0 1S = , it follows that 
*
0 1S =  for all *.  ( )
0
0 1/(1 )1
0
1
(1 )
SB
S
ηη
α α
−
−
= =
 
− +
 
 Therefore, it 
must be also that *0 1E = . Furthermore,  ( )1/0 0 0 0w wC B C Cσ= = .   
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B.10. Log-linearizing equilibrium relation in home goods market: 
( ) ( )1 1/* *,*0(1 ) *
H
t
t t t t t
t
PY C S S B d
P
η
γ η η σ
α α
−
− −   
= − +     
∫  
Again use the fact that: ( )
1/(1 )1
1/(1 )1(1 ) (1 )
F
t t
tH H
t t
P P S
P P
ηη
ηη
α α α α
−
−
−
−
     = − + = − +      
 
( ) ( ) ( )/(1 ) 1 1/1 * *,*0(1 ) (1 ) *t t t t t tY S C S S B d
η η γ η η ση
α α α α
−
− −
−   = − + − +
    ∫   
( ) ( ) ( )1 1/1 * *,*0ln ln (1 ) ln ln (1 ) *1t t t t t tY S C S S B d
γ η η σηη
α α α α
η
− −
−   = − + + + − +
    
−
∫  
Totally differentiate: 
( )
( )
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( )
1/ 1
* *1
0 0 0,* ,*0
1 1 1/
* *
0 0 00 0,* 0 00
( )
*
(1 ) (1 ) *
tt t
t
B S S dSSdY dCdS d
Y CS S S B d
η σ γ η γ ηη
η γ η η σ
γ η αηα
α α α α
− −
− −
−
− − −
−
= + + +
− +
− +
∫
∫
 
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( )
1 1/ 1
* * *1/ 1
* * *1 1 0 0,*0 0 0,*
1 11/ 1/
* * * *
0 00,* 0 0 0,* 0 00 0
1( )( )
* *
(1 ) * (1 ) *
t tt
B S S dBB S S dS
d d
S S B d S S B d
η σ γ η γ ηη σ γ η γ η
γ η η σ γ η η σ
α ηα γ η σ
α α α α
− − − − −
− − −
−
− − − −
−
−
+ +
− + − +
∫ ∫
∫ ∫
1 1 1
* *
0 0 ,*
0 0 0
1ln ln ( ) * ( ) * ( ) *t t t t t ty Y dS c C dS d dS d dB dαη α γ η α γ η α η σ− = + − + − + − + −∫ ∫ ∫  
1 1 1
* *
,*
0 0 0
1( ) * ( ) * ( ) *t t t t t ty c s s d s d b dαη α γ η α γ η α η σ= + + − + − + −∫ ∫ ∫ . Note that 
1
,*
0
* 0ts d =∫ , 
since when terms of trade are aggregated on a world basis, they cancel out (if they are not 
in logarithmic form they cancel out to 1, but here 
,*ts  are logarithms, hence it is zero.) 
1( ) ( )t t t t ty c s s bαη α γ η α η σ= + + − + −  
1( )t t t ty c s bαγ α η σ= + + − .  Recall that (1 )t tb sα= − : 
1( )(1 )t t t ty c s sαγ α η ασ= + + − −  
( )( 1)(1 )t t t t ty c s c sα αωσγ ση ασ σ= + + − − = +  
where ( 1)(1 )ω σγ ση α≡ + − −  
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B.11. Modifying the Euler equation: 
The linearized Euler equation (27) is given by: 
[ ] ( )1 11t t t t t tc c i pi ρσ+ += Ε − − Ε −    
Expressing tc  and 1tc +  from t t ty c s
αω
σ
= +  and 1 1 1t t ty c s
αω
σ+ + +
= + , and plugging into 
the Euler equation gives: 
( )1 1 11t t t t t t t ty s y s iαω αω pi ρσ σ σ+ + +
 
− = Ε − − − Ε −    
 
[ ] ( ) [ ]1 1 11t t t t t t t ty y i sαωpi ρσ σ+ + += Ε − − Ε − − Ε ∆    
Recall that Ht t tspi pi α= + ∆  
[ ] [ ] ( ) [ ]1 1 1 11 Ht t t t t t t t t ty y s i sα αωpi ρσ σ σ+ + + + = Ε + Ε ∆ − − Ε − − Ε ∆   
[ ] ( ) [ ]1 1 11 ( 1)Ht t t t t t t ty y i sα ωpi ρσ σ+ + +
− = Ε − − Ε − − Ε ∆   
Combining 1wt t ty y s
ασ
= +  and 1 1 1
1w
t t ty y s
ασ
+ + += +  yields ( )1 1 1wt t t ts y y yα ασ σ+ + +∆ = − − ∆  
[ ] ( ) ( )1 1 1 11 ( 1)H wt t t t t t t t t ty y i y y yα αα ωpi ρ σ σσ σ+ + + +
−   = Ε − − Ε − − Ε − − ∆    
[ ] [ ] ( )1 1 1 1( 1) ( 1) ( 1)1 H wt t t t t t t t t t ty y y y i yα α αα ω σ α ω σ α ω σpi ρσ σ σ σ+ + + +
− − −
   − = Ε − Ε − − Ε − + Ε ∆  
[ ] ( )1 1 1( 1) ( 1) ( 1)1 H wt t t t t t t ty y i yα α ασ α ω σ σ α ω σ α ω σpi ρσ σ σ σ+ + +
− − − − −
   = Ε − − Ε − + Ε ∆  
 
[ ] ( )1 1 1( 1)1( 1) ( 1)H wt t t t t t t ty y i yαα α
α ω σ
pi ρ
σ α ω σ σ α ω σ+ + +
−
   = Ε − − Ε − + Ε ∆  
− − − −
 
Note that: 
( 1)( 1)
1 1 1α α
σα ω σ σα σαω σαω σα σ
σ α ω σ σ σ
α αω α αω α αω
− − + − +
− − = − = = =
− + − + − +
 
( 1) ( 1) ( 1) ( 1) ( 1)( 1) ( 1)
1 1
α α α α
α α
α ω σ α ω σ α ω σ α ω σ
α ω
σ σ σα σαω σαω σασ α ω σ σσ α ω
α αω α αω
− − − −
= = = = −
− + − +
− −
− −
− + − +
Then: 
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[ ] ( )1 1 11 ( 1)H wt t t t t t t ty y i y
α
pi ρ α ω
σ+ + +
   = Ε − − Ε − + − Ε ∆    
[ ] ( )1 1 11 H wt t t t t t t ty y i y
α
pi ρ α
σ+ + +
   = Ε − − Ε − + ΘΕ ∆    
where ( 1) ( 1)(1 ) 1σγ ση α ωΘ = − + − − = −  
 
B.12. Formulating the model in terms of the output gap: 
The natural output level can be determined from: 
( ) ( ) (1 )w nt t ty y aα αυ σ σ ϕ σ ϕ− = − + − + + − +ℏ  
( ) ( ) (1 )n wt t ty y aα αϕ σ υ σ σ ϕ− + = − + − − +ℏ  
1n w
t t ty y aα
α α α
σ συ ϕ
ϕ σ ϕ σ ϕ σ
−− +
= + +
+ + +
ℏ
 
Let 
α
υ
ϕ σ
−Ω ≡
+
ℏ
 ;    
1
α
ϕ
ϕ σ
+Γ ≡
+
   ;   α
α
σ
ϕ σ
ΘΨ ≡ −
+
.  Then: 
n w
t t ty y aα= Ω + Ψ + Γ  
Notice that: ( )1
1 1 1α α
ω σσ ασ αωσ
σ σ σ α α σ
α αω α αω α αω
−
−
− = − = = − = − Θ
− + − + − +
 
Furthermore, equation (29) is: ( ) ( ) (1 )wt t t tmc y y aα αυ σ σ ϕ σ ϕ= − + − + + − +  and, 
correspondingly, ( ) ( ) (1 )w nt t ty y aα αυ σ σ ϕ σ ϕ− = − + − + + − +ℏ  when prices are flexible. 
Combining these two results with the identity ( )t tmc mc+ = − −ℏ ℏ  yields: 
( ) ( ) (1 ) ( ) ( ) (1 )w w nt t t t t t tmc y y a y y aα α α αυ σ σ ϕ σ ϕ υ σ σ ϕ σ ϕ+ = − + − + + − + + − − − + + +ℏ
( )t tmc xαϕ σ+ = +ℏ  
Plug this into equation (28), ( )1 ( )H Ht t t tmcpi β pi λ+= Ε + + ℏ : 
( )1 ( )H Ht t t txαpi β pi λ ϕ σ+= Ε + +   
( )1H Ht t t txαpi β pi κ+= Ε + ,    where ( )α ακ λ ϕ σ≡ +  
To derive the IS-type relation in terms of the output gap start from 
[ ] ( )1 1 11 H wt t t t t t t ty y i y
α
pi ρ α
σ+ + +
   = Ε − − Ε − + ΘΕ ∆    
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( )1 1 1 11n n H wt t t t t t t t t tx y x y i y
α
pi ρ α
σ+ + + +
    + = Ε + − − Ε − + ΘΕ ∆     , as 
n
t t ty x y= +  
Recall that n wt t ty y aα= Ω + Ψ + Γ . Then 
[ ]1 1 1 1 1n w wt t t t t t t t ty y a y aα α+ + + + +     Ε = Ε Ω + Ψ + Γ = Ω + ΨΕ + Ε Γ       
Since 1t a t ta aρ ε−= +  with [ ] 0t tεΕ = , it must be that: 
1 1
n w
t t t t a ty y aα ρ+ +   Ε = Ω + ΨΕ + Γ     
Using these facts the equation can be modified to: 
[ ] ( )1 1 1 11w w H wt t t t t t t a t t t t t tx x y a y a i y
α
α α ρ pi ρ α
σ+ + + +
    = Ε − Ω − Ψ − Γ + Ω + ΨΕ + Γ − − Ε − + ΘΕ ∆    
[ ] ( ) ( )1 1 11(1 ) H wt t t a t t t t t tx x a i y
α
ρ pi ρ α
σ+ + +
   = Ε − Γ − − − Ε − + Θ + Ψ Ε ∆    
[ ] ( ) ( )1 1 11 (1 )H wt t t t t t a t t tx x i a yα α
α
pi ρ σ ρ ασ
σ+ + +
  = Ε − − Ε − + Γ − − Θ + Ψ Ε ∆    
[ ] ( )1 11 H nt t t t t tx x i r
α
pi
σ+ +
 = Ε − − Ε −   
where ( ) 1(1 )n wa t t tr a yαρ σ ρ α + ≡ − Γ − + Θ + Ψ Ε ∆   
 
B.13. Solving the model: 
The model is given by: 
( )1H Ht t t txαpi β pi κ+= Ε +  
( ) ( )1 11 H nt t t t t tx x i r
α
pi
σ+ +
 = Ε − − Ε −   
1
H
t t x t ti h h xpiρ pi δ+= + + +  
Use the last equation to eliminate the interest rate: 
( ) ( )1 11 H H nt t t t x t t t tx x h h x rpi
α
ρ pi δ pi
σ+ +
 = Ε − + + + − Ε −   
( ) ( )1 111 H H nx t t t t t t th x x h rpi
α α
ρ pi δ pi
σ σ+ +
 
 + = Ε − + + − Ε −   
 
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( ) ( )1 11 H H nt t t t t t t
x x
x x h r
h h
α
pi
α α
σ ρ pi δ pi
σ σ+ +
 = Ε − + + − Ε − + +
 
Plug this into the Phillips curve: 
( ) ( ) ( )1 1 11H H H H nt t t t t t t t t
x x
x h r
h h
α
α pi
α α
σ
pi β pi κ ρ pi δ pi
σ σ+ + +
 
 = Ε + Ε − + + − Ε −  + + 
 
( ) ( ) ( )1 11 H H nt t t t t t
x x x x
h
x r
h h h h
α pi α α α α
α α α α
κ κ κ σ κ
pi β pi ρ δ
σ σ σ σ+ +
   
+ = + Ε + Ε − + −   
+ + + +   
 
( ) ( ) ( )1 1( )H H nxt t t t t t
x x x
h
x r
h h h h h h
α α α α α
α α pi α α pi α α pi
β σ κ κ σ κ
pi pi ρ δ
σ κ σ κ σ κ+ +
+ +
= Ε + Ε − + −
+ + + + + +
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )1 1( )H H nt x t t t t th x rα α α α α αpi β σ κ pi κ σ κ ρ δ+ + = Ξ + + Ε + Ε − + −   
where 1
xh h
α
α α piσ κ
Ξ ≡
+ +
.  
 
Now plug this into the IS relation: 
( )1t t t
x
x x
h
α
α
σ
σ +
= Ε −
+
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )1 1 11 ( ) H n H nx t t t t t t t t
x
h h x r r
h pi α α α α α αα
ρ β σ κ pi κ σ κ ρ δ δ pi
σ + + +
  
− + Ξ + + Ε + Ε − + − + − Ε −  +
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )1 1( ) 1 1x H nt t t t t t
x x x x
h hh h
x x r
h h h h
pi α α αα pi α α α pi α α
α α α α
β σ κσ κ σ κ
pi ρ δ
σ σ σ σ+ +
Ξ + + − Ξ Ξ −
= − Ε − Ε + + − 
+ + + + 
 
Notice that: 
1
1
x
x x
x x x
h h
h h h h h
h h h
pi α α
pi α α α α pi α α pi
α
α α α
κ σ
κ σ κ σ κ
σ σ σ
+
− −
Ξ − + + + +
= = = −Ξ
+ + +
  Hence:  
(1 )
x
h
h
pi α α α
α α
α
κ σ
σ
σ
− Ξ
= Ξ
+
 
Furthermore: 
( )( ) 1 1x x
x x
h h h h h h
h h
pi α α α pi α α pi α pi α α
α α
β σ κ βσ β κ
σ σ
Ξ + + − Ξ + Ξ + Ξ −
= =
+ +
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( 1)x
x
h h h h
h
pi α α pi α
α α pi
α
βσ β β
σ
Ξ + Ξ
− Ξ = Ξ −
+
.  Then: 
( ) ( ) ( )1 1(1 ) H nt t t t t tx x h rα α piσ β pi ρ δ+ + = Ξ Ε + − Ε − + −   
Putting this into matrix form: 
( )
( )
1
1
( )t tt n tH H
t t t
xx
A b rα α ρ δpi pi
+
+
Ε  
= + − −    Ε   
 
where 
1
( )x
h
A
h
α pi
α α
α α α α
σ β
σ κ κ β σ
− 
≡ Ξ  + + 
    
1
bα α
ακ
 
≡ Ξ  
 
      
 
Solving the system of equations: 
Guess a solution of a form t x tx G δδ=  and Ht tGpiδpi δ=  
Plug this into the system, and note that nr ρ= , 
( ) ( ) ( )1 1Ht t t t t t tG G G Gδpiδ piδ δ piδ piδ δpi δ ρ δ ε ρ δ+ +Ε = Ε = + Ε =  and hence ( )1t t x tx G δ δρ δ+Ε = : 
The system: 
( )1H Ht t t txαpi β pi κ+= Ε +  
( ) ( )1 11 H H nt t t t x t t t tx x h h x rpi
α
ρ pi δ pi
σ+ +
 = Ε − + + + − Ε −   
becomes: 
t t x tG G Gpiδ piδ δ α δδ β ρ δ κ δ= +  
[ ]1x t x t t x x t t tG G h G h G Gδ δ δ pi piδ δ piδ δ
α
δ ρ δ δ δ δ ρ δ
σ
= − + + −  
Cancel the tδ  and rearrange the first equation: 
( )1 xG Gδ piδ α δβρ κ− =     ⇒    1xG Gδδ piδ
α
βρ
κ
−
=   Plug this into the second: 
1 1 11 1xG G h G h G Gδ δ δpiδ piδ δ pi piδ piδ piδ δ
α α α α
βρ βρ βρρ ρ
κ κ σ κ
 
− − −
= − + + − 
 
 
1 1 11 1 1
x
h h Gδ δ pi δδ δ piδ
α α α α α α α
βρ βρ βρρ ρ
σ κ κ σ σ κ σ
 
− − −
= − − − + 
 
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(1 )( 1) (1 )1 xh h Gα δ δ pi α δ δ α piδ
α
σ βρ ρ κ βρ ρ κ
κ
− − − − − +
=  
[ ](1 ) ( 1) ( )xG h h
α
piδ
δ α δ pi δ α
κ
βρ σ ρ ρ κ= − − − − −  
[ ](1 ) (1 ) ( )xG h h
α
piδ
δ α δ pi δ α
κ
βρ σ ρ ρ κ
−
=
− − + + −
 
G Hpiδ α δκ= − , where  [ ]
1
(1 ) (1 ) ( )x
H
h hδ δ α δ pi δ αβρ σ ρ ρ κ
≡
− − + + −
 
Then: ( )1 1 ( ) 1xG G H Hδ δδ piδ α δ δ δ
α α
βρ βρ
κ βρ
κ κ
− −
= = − = − −  
The solutions are given by: 
( )1t tx Hδ δβρ δ= − −  
H
t tHα δpi κ δ= −  
 Note that [ ]
1 0(1 ) (1 ) ( )x
H
h hδ δ α δ pi δ αβρ σ ρ ρ κ
≡ >
− − + + −
. If ( ) 0hpi δ αρ κ− >  then it 
obviously holds. More interestingly, if ( ) 0hpi δ αρ κ− < , one can open the brackets on the 
left side and take out the term (1 ) xhδβρ− , which is obviously positive. Note that 
(1 ) (1 )x xh hδβρ β− > −  and, furthermore, the inequality that ensures unique solutions is 
( 1) (1 ) 0xh hα piκ β− + − > . Notice that if ( )hpi δ αρ κ− is negative, then ( 1)hα piκ −  is even 
“more” negative, but the inequality still holds. Hence, (1 ) ( ) 0xh hδ pi δ αβρ ρ κ− + − >  and 
therefore 0Hδ >  . 
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Abstracts in English and German: 
 
This thesis aims at reviewing and comparing in a systematic manner some of the most 
prominent New-Keynesian models concerning an open economy: Obstfeld and Rogoff 
(1995) and Gali and Monacelli (2005). It examines the settings of the models, the 
concluding findings, and how differences in the settings have affected these findings. The 
paper investigates the applicability of the different models to diverse economic situations. 
 
In dieser Masterarbeit werden zwei von den zentralsten und bekanntesten Ansätze aus der 
Klasse der New-Keynesian Modelle für offene Volkswirtschaften  hergeleitet und 
vorgestellt: Obstfeld und Rogoff (1995) und Gali und Monacelli (2005). Es werden 
insbesondere die Unterschiede beider Modelle einander gegenüber gestellt und welche 
Unterschiede sich hinsichtlich ihrer Schlussfolgerungen daraus ergeben. Zuletzt wird die 
Anwendbarkeit beider Modelle auf diverse ökonomische Szenarien evaluiert. 
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